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Preface 
Historians usually date the existence of the Christian Kingdom of 
Hungary from the coronation of Stephen I a millennium ago. Because it 
is not certain whether this event took place in the year 1000 or 1001 
(some medieval chronicles give Christmas of 1000 as the date, while 
others refer to January of 1001) we feel that we have the perfect excuse 
to celebrate this anniversary in both 2000 and 2001. 
Our commemorative activities in 2000 consisted of two feats. 
One was the publication of another special volume of our journal (vol. 
XXVII ) . It had the title Thousand Years of Hungarian Thought and 
offered translations into English of the writings of two dozen of Hun-
gary's prominent statesmen and thinkers, starting with King Stephen I and 
ending with several prominent twentieth-century figures. The other event 
that we had undertaken was the organization of a conference: "Hungary 
Through the Centuries: A Millennial Retrospection." The meeting was 
held on September 22-23 at the University of Toronto, on the campus of 
St. Michael's College. Several dozen scholars were in attendance as paper-
givers and session chairmen. The former came from Hungary, Canada, the 
United States and elsewhere, while the latter Were mainly from among the 
faculty and administration of the host university. The papers presented at 
the conference dealt with the evolution of Hungary from the late tenth 
century to the present. The conference was a part of the commemorative 
celebrations, organized by the Hungarian community of Toronto, of the 
1000 years of Hungarian statehood. 
In the year 2001 we continue our celebration of the millennium of 
the birth of the Hungarian state. We do this by publishing a selection of 
papers from this conference. Our original plan had been the publication of 
the conference's unabridged proceedings; however, pressures of time, limi-
tations on our resources, and the unavailability of some of the manu-
scripts, prompted us to abandon our initial intentions in favour of publish-
ing a selection of papers, all dealing with or touching on the theme of the 
survival of the Hungarian state, and even the Hungarian nation, through 
the second millennium of historical times. It is our hope that more of the 
papers given at the conference, including those not yet submitted and 
those on which rewriting and translation work has not been completed, 
can be published by us in our journal in the not too distant future. 
In the commemora t ive activities of the Hungarian Studies Review 
throughout 2000 and 2001 there had been a sometimes calculated and 
sometimes improvised division of labour between the journal's editors. 
The year 2000 volume was the result of many years of work by George 
Bisztray and his students in the University of Toronto's Hungarian studies 
program, while Nandor Dreisziger's input was confined largely to the 
preparation of a camera-ready copy. In making the 2000 gathering a 
reality, most of the myriad tasks of conference organizing and local 
arrangements were the lot of the Toronto-based member of the team, 
while the task of writing an introduction and a postscript, and the editing 
(sometimes the re-translating) of the manuscripts fell on the shoulders of 
the historian member of the team. 
A great many other people and several institutions also contrib-
uted to the success of our commemorative ventures. The conference in 
Toronto had several sponsors and official supporters: the Ministry of 
External Affairs of Hungary, the National Canadian Conference Commit-
tee and the Canadian-Hungarian Heritage Association; and, at the Univer-
sity of Toronto, the Connaught Committee of the Faculty of Arts and 
Science, the School of Graduate Studies, the Department of History, the 
Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, the Centre for Russian 
and East European Studies, and the European Studies Program. Dr. 
Sandor Szakaly, of the Institute of Military History in Budapest at the 
time, acted as one of the academic advisers and counselled on the selec-
tion of participants from Hungary, while Mrs. Eva Tomory of Toronto's 
Hungarian Studies Program, helped with local arrangements. Still others, 
too numerous to mention, offered encouragement, gave their time and 
energies to the organizing of the larger community celebrations in Toron-
to, or assisted with the many mundane tasks of making a gathering of 
scholars successful. 
George Bisztray 
Nandor Dreisziger 
Thousand Years of Hungarian Survival: 
An Introduction 
N. F. Dreisziger 
The perpetual struggle for room and food. 
Thomas Robert Malthus (1766-1834) 
If the history of mankind is an unending quest by nations for territory 
and sustenance then it is inevitable that in this contest there would be 
winners and losers.1 Anyone who looks at an atlas of the world produced 
generations ago will find countries that cannot be located on today's 
maps. A map of Central Europe, for example, printed in the early nine-
teenth century, is hardly recognizable to a person today who is not 
familiar with the region's history. The changes do not suggest that the 
political entities that exist on the old map and cannot be found on the 
new one have all disappeared. Some of them united with other states and 
assumed new names. Nevertheless it is a fact of human evolution that 
some countries disappear from the map through the course of history 
while others continue to exist in one form or another. 
While states appear on and disappear from political atlases, the 
same is not quite true of nations — those agglomerations of human 
beings which social scientists often talk about but rarely define in a 
satisfactory manner. In this connection Anthony D. Smith's description of 
an ethnic community, "...a named human group claiming a homeland and 
sharing myths of common ancestry, historical memories and a distinct 
culture,"2 might as well be the departure point for a definition of the term 
"nation," to which one should add one more criterion, the possession of 
national consciousness, something which may or may not characterize an 
ethnic community, especially if we talk of such a collection of individuals 
in bygone times. Whatever definition we apply to nations, we have to add 
that they tend to be more persevering than states, simply because the 
latter can be abolished through acts of international or even domestic 
politics, while nations tend to persist even if they are deprived of a 
homeland and are denied, de jure if not de facto, of existence as separate, 
readily identifiable political entities. 
If the birth and survival of states is not a simple process, the 
emergence and death of nations is an infinitely more complex one. 
Similarly intricate is the question of why some ethnic groups manage to 
become state-founding peoples — or, at least, are recognized as such by 
the international community of their times — while others fail to do so. 
Furthermore, and this is of immediate concern to us in this collection of 
studies, there is the query why some nations persevere through the ages 
while others fail and disappear from the stage of historical evolution. 
Even the very process of the disappearance of nations is a com-
plex, multi-faceted and multi-phased development. It may begin with the 
forfeiture of political independence and continue with the loss of some or 
all of the usual trappings of nationhood: language, traditions and a 
collective consciousness. Complicating all this is the fact that the evolu-
tion of nations in not a linear process; rather, for most of them historical 
development seems to resemble not the simple path of rise and decline 
but more of a roller-coaster ride in which times of greatness are repeat-
edly followed by political chaos, societal disintegration, foreign conquest 
or some other great calamity. 
Examples for the rise and near demise of nations abound. There 
are many to be found in Europe alone. In the British Isles we have the 
Welsh, the Irish and the Scots — all of whom have lost, at one time or 
another since the Middle Ages, their status as separate political entities, 
and even to a large extent their language. In the nineteenth century and 
early throughout the twentieth, they seemed headed for extinction as 
nations and yet, over the past several decades, they have started on the 
path of national re-generation and even the rejuvenation of their distinct 
languages. From the rise of an independent republic in southern Ireland 
to the "devolution" processes affecting Scotland and Wales we have seen 
the re-birth of nations that had been deemed by some as nearly extinct 
only a few generations ago. 
In East Central and Eastern Europe the Polish and Ukrainian 
nations come to mind when we think of these rise-and-decline and rise-
again processes. The former had emerged as a Christian state simulta-
neously with Hungary around 1000 a. d. and continued to exist as an 
influential player on the international stage until the eighteenth century. 
At the end of the seventeenth, for example, the Polish King with his army 
played a significant role in the saving of Vienna from becoming the 
victim of the last great Ottoman incursion into Central Europe. In less 
than hundred years, however, Poland declined and became the object of 
the expansionist ambitions of its ever more powerful neighbours: Prussia, 
Russia and the Habsburg Empire. By the end of the eighteenth century 
the Polish state was no more and the Polish people became ruled by 
foreign powers. It was only the collapse of the Hohenzollern, Habsburg 
and Romanov empires under the strain of the First World War that 
allowed Poland to be reborn as an independent state.3 
The history of the Ukrainian state goes back even further. Kievan 
Rus had emerged in the second half of the ninth century and continued to 
flourish until the Mongol onslaught in the twelfth. Mongol rule in this 
region eventually transpired into the hegemony of the Crimean Tatars 
who in time came under the control of the Ottoman Turks. The setbacks 
suffered by the Ottoman Empire at the end of the seventeenth century 
brought trouble for the Tatars. Under these circumstances there was a 
resurgence of Ukrainian power under their leaders, the most noted of 
them having been hetman Ivan Mazeppa. Unfortunately for the cause of 
Ukrainian nationhood, this renaissance was temporary and Ukraine fell 
victim to the hegemonic ambitions of its increasingly powerful northern 
neighbour: Russia of the Romanovs.4 An independent Ukraine almost re-
emerged with the collapse of the old empires in Central and Eastern 
Europe after the First World War, but its aspirations in this direction were 
thwarted by the rise of Bolshevik power in Russia. Ukrainian indepen-
dence had to wait for the collapse of the Soviet Empire in the 1990s. In 
our days Ukrainians are engaged in the building of their nation state for 
the third, some would say the fourth, time. 
Unlike the Polish and Ukrainian states, Hungary did not disappear 
completely from the map of Europe for a significant period of time. Even 
during the darkest days of Ottoman occupation of much of the Carpathian 
Basin there existed a so-called Royal Hungary beyond the reach of the 
Turks and it enjoyed a varying degree of autonomy within the Habsburg 
realm. Furthermore, the Transylvania of the times, which was nominally 
under Ottoman tutelage, was a Hungarian state that enjoyed a high degree 
of self-rule, sometimes even in external affairs. Furthermore, after the 
Turks were driven from East Central Europe and the whole of Hungary 
came under Habsburg rule, the kingdom did retain some autonomy 
despite periodic efforts by the court at Vienna at centralization and 
absolutist rule. Though both the Ottoman and Habsburg occupations had 
the potential of threatening the survival of the Hungarian nation, a 
multitude of historical circumstances helped to counteract or short-cut 
these dangers. 
While the persistence of a nation in the heart of East Central 
Europe for more than thousand years may be deemed a miracle, the fact 
that the Hungarians did establish a state there is even more of a marvel of 
historical development. As Dr. Laszlo Veszpremy points out in his essay 
in this volume, no ethnic group or nation had managed to build and 
sustain for more than a brief period a state in the Carpathian Basin before 
one was established by the Magyars. Two empires, the Roman and the 
Frankish, did establish control over the basin's Western regions, but for 
both of them these lands performed mainly or exclusively the function of 
military frontier. Between the time of Roman and Frankish rule, this part 
of Europe was ruled by the Turkic-speaking Huns, then by the Germanic-
speaking Gepids, then from the 560s to about 670 by the Avars (who, like 
the Huns, spoke an Altaic language), and then by what some historians 
call the Late Avars.5 From their Carpathian bases, at times all of these 
peoples held sway over lands beyond this part of Europe. Nevertheless, 
the dominion of these nomadic empires beyond the Carpathian mountain 
ranges, and even inside them, proved ephemeral. The same was true of 
Frankish control over the Basin's Western approaches which lasted from 
the time of Charlemagne (ruled 771-814) to the time of the disintegration 
of his empire under his successors. 
Medieval Hungary 
When the Hungarians under their ruler Arpad arrived in the Carpathian 
Basin at the end of the 9th century, they found large areas of the land — 
marshlands, primeval forests, desiccated areas of the eastern Hungarian 
Plain and other inhospitable places — unsettled or sparsely populated. 
Elsewhere they found the ruins of cities and fortifications left by the 
Romans, and to a lesser extent, by subsequent occupants of the realm. In 
terms of the populations they encountered, generalizations are more 
difficult to make, but there can be little doubt that Arpad's people found 
the demographic remnants of the previous nomadic ethnic groups, mixed 
with the ancestors of the peoples we know today as West- and South-
Slavs. These Slavic inhabitants may have had economic and even political 
ties to nascent state formations whose traditional lands and capital cities 
were situated outside of the Carpathian Basin, in Moravia or Slavonia.6 
The Hungarian occupation of the Carpathian Basin, unlike the 
previous occupations, did not prove ephemeral. Under Arpad's succes-
sors, the Hungarians established a Christian kingdom which in time 
became one of Europe's nation states — exactly when it became such, 
could be the subject of an unending debate by historians. Notwithstanding 
long periods of foreign occupation, the state established by Arpad's 
descendants continues to exist to our day, a millennium later. A number 
of complex factors, both internal and external, have contributed to the 
emergence and early survival of this political entity. Many of these are 
discussed in or are alluded to in the first two studies in this collection of 
papers, in the essays of Dr. Laszlo Veszpremy and Professor Zoltan Kosz-
tolnyik. 
There can be little doubt that of primary importance in the inter-
national context of the age of Hungary's state formation was the politico-
religious climate of the times. This was a time of keen competition bet-
ween Byzantine and Latin Christianity for influence in the region which 
today we know as East Central Europe. More important than this was the 
fact that in the very period of the Hungary's conversion to Christianity, 
the latter of these realms was on an offensive, though not so much in the 
literal but in the figurative sense of that term. It is not only the actions of 
the Magyar leaders of Prince Geza and King Stephen that help to account 
for the founding of a Christian kingdom in Hungary, but those of the 
Holy Roman Emperors Otto III and Henry II, as well as those of Otto's 
tutor and confidant, the brilliant Gerbert of Aurillac, later Pope Sylvester 
II.7 
Hungary's conversion to Latin Christianity cannot be explained 
exclusively or even largely by the nature of the international political (one 
might say religious — in those times the two overlapped) situation of the 
times. A fortuitous circumstance of Hungarian evolution was the fact that 
in this critical period, coinciding with the reigns of Otto III and Henry II 
and their efforts to expand the influence of Latin Christianity, relative 
stability existed in Hungary under the rule of Prince Geza and his son 
Stephen I.8 Stable rule for over two generations allowed Hungary's great 
transformation to take root and went a long way to assure the future of 
the Christian kingdom that had came into existence during this time. The 
success of this enterprise was not only the result of the absence of major 
civil strife or international conflict. Many of Geza's and Stephen's policies 
greatly contributed to this process.9 As Dr. Veszpremy points out in his 
study, Hungary's two state-founders sought accommodation with the 
country's neighbours. Furthermore, while they used a firm hand against 
those elements of Hungarian society that opposed the realm's transforma-
tion, they sought peaceful coexistence with, and even the cooperation of, 
the non-Magyars among their subjects, both of those living inside and 
those settled on the periphery of the Carpathian Basin.10 
If we ask people who have only a superficial knowledge of 
Hungarian history what crises constituted the greatest threats to the 
survival of the state that had been established by Geza and Stephen, they 
would probably list the wars and conflicts that resulted in the occupation 
of Hungary by enemy forces: the Mongol conquest, the Ottoman occupa-
tion, the rule of the Habsburgs, as well as World Wars I and II. Such an 
explanation would be an approximation of the reality but it would not be 
a complete and entirely realistic answer to the question. The first great 
threat to the survival of the Christian Kingdom of Hungary founded by 
Prince Geza and St. Stephen came not with the Mongol invasion of the 
13th century but as early as the reigns of Stephen's immediate successors. 
Two great dangers faced the Hungarian nation in the decades after 
St. Stephen's death in 1038. One of these was the possibility that the 
work of the creation of the Christian kingdom would unravel through the 
resurgence of paganism and re-emergence of old Magyar tribal traditions. 
The other threat was that the country would be reduced to vassalage by 
one of its neighbours, most likely by the German realm of the Holy 
Roman emperors. 
As pointed out by Professor Kosztolnyik in his paper, the Arpa-
dian kings Andrew I and Bela I struggled relentlessly to avert these 
threats to Christian Hungary's existence. Although on some occasions they 
took advantage of their non- or not-yet-Christian countrymen's resentment 
of German influence in the country to oppose Germanic hegemonic 
ambitions with regard to Hungary, in the end they thwarted efforts to 
restore paganism in the Kingdom. They also pursued dynastic and foreign 
policies that were designed to assure their Kingdom's continued existence 
as a full-fledged member of Europe's Christian states. To this end they, 
and especially Andrew I, tried to establish dynastic links with most of 
Europe's ruling families. At the same time they cultivated friendly ties 
with both centres of Christendom: Rome and Byzantium. They also took 
advantage of the contacts they had made and friendships they had estab-
lished during their exile in neighbouring Kievan Rus and Poland. They 
tried to retain, or regain if the circumstances demanded, the good will of 
the Holy Roman Empire's German rulers; however, if and when they did 
not succeed in this, they were ready to use military force to repel German 
military incursions into Hungary. Above all, both of them, but especially 
Bela I, continued to lay the foundations of a viable Christian kingdom 
above all through administrative, political and fiscal reforms formulated in 
consultation with the country's temporal and religious lords as well as 
with the representatives of the realm's communities. 
The successors of Andrew I and Bela I could build on their 
accomplishments and thereby ensure the Hungarian Kingdom's survival — 
and even its development into a powerful medieval kingdom by the age 
of Bela III (ruled 1172-96). It was only under these circumstances that 
medieval Hungary could face further threats to its existence later, such as 
domestic disintegration during the reign of Andrew II (ruled 1205-35) or 
the Mongol invasion in the time of Bela IV (ruled 1235-70), or the 
extinction of the male line of the Arpadian dynasty in 1301. 
Early in the 14th century the Kingdom of Hungary acquired a new 
dynasty when Charles Robert (ruled 1307-42) became king after a six-
year long succession struggle. He was a member of the Neapolitan 
branch of the House of Anjou and his grandmother was an Arpadian 
princess. Hungary's Angevin rulers would occupy the Hungarian throne 
almost to the end of the century. Although they kept a keen eye on the 
dynastic interests of their family,11 they brought to Hungary stability and 
enhanced international reputation. In particular, Charles Robert strength-
ened royal power through curbing the power of Hungary's feudal lords, 
while his son Louis (also known as Louis the Great of Hungary, ruled 
1342-82) made Hungary the centre of a dynastic empire encompassing 
much of East Central Europe. He was followed on the throne by Mary 
Anjou (ruled 1382-95). She shared the throne with her husband Sigis-
mund of Luxembourg (ruled 1387-1437) who succeeded her upon her 
death. Being Holy Roman Emperor (1410-37), Sigismund's often focused 
his attention on the affairs of the Empire and neflegted those of Hungary. 
As a result he could not curb the re-emergence of oligarchic power and 
dissention within the kingdom.12 
The second half of the 15th century witnessed the ascent to the 
throne of Hungary by one her own sons as opposed to a member of one 
of Europe's royal houses. Matthias Corvinus (ruled 1458-90), the son of 
Janos Hunyadi, the legendary military leader in the struggle against the 
Ottoman Turks, was the last great ruler of an independent Hungarian 
kingdom. Under his immediate successors Hungary continued to survive 
as one of East Central Europe's sovereign states, but this situation was not 
to continue very long. 
The Ottoman Era 
The sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries constituted a period of great 
danger to the survival not only of a Hungarian state, but also of the 
Magyar nation. The historical origins of this threat can be traced back to 
the previous two centuries. Throughout the age of Hungary's Angevin 
rulers, and during that of Janos Hunyadi and his son Matthias, the Magyar 
Kingdom continued to enjoy its independence. Most of this time it was 
blessed by a degree of stability and even prosperity. During the reigns of 
Louis the Great and Matthias Corvinus in particular, Hungary was a 
power-broker in East Central Europe. Nevertheless, throughout much of 
this time, there existed an ever-growing threat to the country's security. 
This threat was the rise of Ottoman power. 
The Ottoman Empire, which constituted an important factor in the 
politics of the Near East and Europe from the fourteenth century to the 
twentieth, had its origins in north-western Anatolia (in Asia Minor) in the 
late thirteenth century. It made its debut on the international scene under 
the leader Osman I (also known as El Ghazi, "the Conqueror" — ruled 
from ca. 1281 to 1326).13 From this base not far southeast of the Byzan-
tine capital of Constantinople, Osman's successors expanded their territory 
into the rest of western Asia Minor and then into the southern Balkans, 
reducing the realm of the once-mighty Byzantine Empire to the region 
around the imperial capital. In 1453 the Ottomans captured Constanti-
nople and turned it into the seat of their state, under the name Istanbul. 
By this time they had come to control not only a large part of Asia Minor 
but also most of the Balkans, all the way to the Lower Danube River east 
of the land formation known as Iron Gates. 
During the last decades of the fifteenth century and the early part 
of the sixteenth, the Ottoman Empire continued to expand. In 1514 the 
Turks defeated the Persians, thereby eliminating the greatest threat to the 
eastern flank of their realm. Not surprisingly, the defeat of Persia was 
followed soon by the conquest of eastern Anatolia, then of Kurdistan 
(1515), Damascus (1516), much of Arabia (1516) and Egypt (1517). 
These victories elevated the state of Sultan Selim I to the status of a 
superpower in the Middle East and southeastern Europe.14 
The rulers of late medieval Hungary were slow to realize the 
danger posed to their kingdom by Ottoman expansion. Louis the Great 
waged numerous wars in the northern Balkans with the aim of extending 
his influence there. These campaigns resulted in the enlargement of 
Louis' influence in the region but their long-term effect was not so much 
the building of a powerful Hungarian bulwark against Turkish expansion 
but the weakening of the Balkan peoples' ability to resist the attacks of 
the Ottomans later. Two generations later, in the 1420s, Sigismund did 
lead campaigns against the Turks, without much success. Thereafter he 
confined his efforts to the improvement of Hungary's southern defences. 
In the 1440s new attempts were made to roll back Ottoman 
influence in the Balkans. The first of these were led by the above-
mentioned Janos Hunyadi, Hungary's first great military leader to concen-
trate on the "Turkish danger." The success of his campaigns emboldened 
Vladislav I, king of Poland and Hungary (ruled in the latter under the 
name Ulaszlo from 1440-44), to launch a major crusade against the 
Ottomans. It resulted in the disastrous defeat at Varna and cost Vladislav 
his life. More campaigns against the Turks followed with varying success. 
In 1456, only three years after the fall of Constantinople, the Turks 
marched on Nandorfehervar, the Hungarian kingdom's great frontier 
fortress in the South (today's Belgrade). Here they were defeated by 
Hunyadi's forces, reinforced by a hastily-improvised "crusading army" 
composed mainly of peasant volunteers. This important victory gave 
Hungary — and Christian Central Europe — a respite from the Turkish 
danger that lasted for two generations. Unfortunately for Hungary, 
Hunyadi was cut down on the morrow of his victory by the plague that 
visited the region in the wake of the battle. 
The reign of Matthias Corvinus should have been the time when 
Hungary and, in fact, all of Christian Europe concentrated on the Turkish 
danger and prepared for the time when the Ottomans would resume their 
advance. Indeed, Matthias did build an efficient standing army but used it 
mainly to try to gain the crowns of Bohemia and even that of the Holy 
Roman Empire. He did obtain the former but the latter eluded him. In 
the meantime, during his reign no major campaign was mounted against 
the Turks. Matthias' defenders argue that had his ambition of uniting 
Central Europe under one ruler succeeded, Matthias would have been able 
to concentrate this region's vast resources and inflict a decisive defeat on 
the Turks. His premature death — he was not yet 50 when he died — 
prevented him from realizing what he had always claimed to have been 
his life's ambition.15 
After Matthias' death, the prospects of defending Hungary against 
Ottoman expansionism rapidly deteriorated. He died without leaving a 
legitimate male heir. Hungary's magnates, having grown resentful of a 
powerful monarch who did not tolerate centrifugal tendencies in the 
kingdom, looked for a weak or absentee monarch to succeed him. They 
found one in Ulaszlo IIAVladyslaw (ruled 1490-1516) of the Polish 
Jagiellonian dynasty who had become king of Bohemia (as Ladislav II) in 
1471. Upon his death in 1516, Ulaszlo was succeeded by his 10-year-old 
son, Lajos/Louis II (Ludvfk I in Bohemia). The task of defending Hun-
gary against the next Ottoman onslaught would fall on the shoulders of 
this young and inexperienced ruler. 
To make matters worse, in 1514 Hungary was shaken by a 
traumatic experience of a different kind. On the urging of the Pope, 
preparations were made for a great crusade against the Turks. Before the 
campaign could get under way acrimony between Hungary's magnates and 
the assembled army's leaders degenerated into a peasant uprising against 
the land-owning aristocracy. The rebellion was put down with much 
cruelty and was followed by wide-spread repression. Under the circum-
stances it became dangerous for Hungary's rulers to call upon the peas-
antry to take up arms against the Turkish foe when it again threatened to 
invade the kingdom. 
In the meantime, in the Ottoman Empire Selim I was succeeded 
by his son Suleiman I, later known as "the Magnificent" (ruled 1520-
1566). With the Near East under his control and its riches at the disposal 
of the Ottoman war machine, the able and ambitious Suleiman turned his 
attention to Europe. In 1521 his armies took Nandorfehervar (Belgrade), 
the fortress that guarded the approaches to the Hungarian Plain. Five 
years later, Suleiman embarked on another campaign, aimed at continuing 
his conquests, this time north of the Danube River. The court of King 
Louis II tried to gather an army to meet the danger but the response to its 
call-to-arms was disappointing. The forces that set out to meet Suleiman's 
vast army did not include all or even most of Hungary's military re-
sources, let alone any large contingents from Central Europe's other 
Christian states. Not surprisingly, Suleiman's army had no trouble in 
scattering Louis II and his feudal knights in the famous Battle of Mohacs. 
Louis himself lost his life while fleeing from the battlefield. In the 
decades following, Suleiman's armies occupied central Hungary and 
reduced the eastern part of the country, including Transylvania, to vassal-
age. The rest of the Kingdom (the so-called Royal Hungary) came to be 
ruled by the relatives of Louis' widow, the members of the Austrian 
branch of the Habsburg family. Thus began one of the dark ages of 
Hungarian history, the more than century-and-a-half-long Ottoman 
occupation. 
As Dr. Geza Palffy points out in his study in this volume, 
Ottoman rule had many negative consequences for Hungary's evolution, 
from some of which the country has yet to recover. The most serious 
political impact was the kingdom's division into three parts. Those who 
think that this division lasted only for the duration of the Turkish occupa-
tion are not quite correct. The formation of a separate principality out of 
Transylvania, which became a largely self-governing vassal-state of the 
Ottoman Empire, had lasting consequences for the future of that region. It 
pre-saged the coming of an age when that part of the Carpathian Basin 
would no longer be a part of Hungary. What happened was that, after the 
Turks were expelled from Central Europe, the region's Habsburg rulers 
continued to maintain Transylvania as a separate administrative unit of 
their empire. Though for the last third of the nineteenth century it 
reunited with Hungary, after the First World War the peace-makers 
deemed it in their interest to detach this land from Hungary and award it 
to their erstwhile ally in the conflict, the Kingdom of Rumania. 
For the duration of the Ottoman occupation, Hungary's division 
had consequences that went beyond the realm of the governance of three 
distinct administrative entities. The physical division of the country also 
resulted in the dividing of Hungarian society into two irreconcilable 
camps. One of these was made up of those members of Hungary's elite 
that wanted to oppose further Turkish expansion — and, in fact, roll back 
Turkish influence — without enlisting foreign help and thereby compro-
mising the little freedom of action that the nation had retained. The other 
camp comprised of those members of Hungary's nobility who had come 
to the conclusion that fighting the Turks could not be done without 
outside help, in fact the help of Central Europe's most powerful dynasty, 
the Habsburgs. Indeed, Habsburg aid was enlisted and with it came the 
loss of a large measure of sovereignty for the part of Hungary that was 
spared of long-term Turkish occupation. 
The conflict between the pro-Habsburg and anti-Habsburg camps 
of Hungary's elite was bitter and long-lasting — it periodically transmuted 
from a war of words into a civil war. What was worse, as the Reforma-
tion spread throughout Europe, this conflict assumed the attributes of a 
religious war as the supporters of the "Habsburg idea" tended to be 
Catholics while their opponents were, especially by the seventeenth 
century, predominantly Protestants. Distrust and hatred between members 
of the two camps would continue long after the end of the Ottoman rule 
in the Carpathian Basin. 
Equally damaging and long-lasting were the Ottoman occupation's 
economic and demographic consequences. As Dr. Palffy points out, the 
16lh and 17th centuries were times of prolonged and repeated wars in 
Europe; however, few parts of the continent suffered as much as Hungary. 
Much of this period saw constant warfare in the country. Even in the 
periods of nominal peace, low intensity warfare continued with raids and 
counter-raids taking place in the ever-shifting military frontier between 
the Ottoman and Christian realms of East Central Europe. Villages were 
repeatedly razed and some fortified cities changed hands again and again. 
Livestock were killed or driven away and crops were burned or could not 
be planted or cultivated. Food supplies and fodder were taken away to 
feed the armies passing through the region. Many commercial centres 
declined while a few, usually those beyond the reach of marauding troops, 
prospered. Overall, economic output greatly declined, price inflation was 
rampant and trade was disrupted. 
The constant warfare and the disruption of economic activity had 
severe effects on the country's population. Countless thousands fell victim 
to military action, were driven away to the slave markets of the Near 
East, or were killed by the epidemics (usually smallpox) that often 
accompanied the military campaigns. Thousands of others fled the regions 
that were most frequently affected by warfare. Suffering was inflicted not 
only by the Turks, but also the Christian armies sent to stop them or, as it 
happened increasingly in the second half of the seventeenth century, to 
drive them out from Hungary. In some districts, especially in southern 
Hungary, and in cities that became Turkish military outposts, nearly all of 
the original population disappeared. Some communities vanished altoge-
ther while in others the original residents were replaced by newcomers, 
often from Ottoman possessions in the Balkans or beyond. In a study 
published in an earlier volume of this journal, Professor Oliver Botar 
observed that by the early years of the seventeenth century, the Magyar 
population of Buda had dwindled to a handful of families. At the same 
time, this royal Hungarian city turned Turkish military fortress remained 
a cosmopolitan centre, only by this time its population consisted not so 
much of Magyars, Germans and Jews, but of people from all parts of the 
Ottoman realm, with the majority being South Slavs from the Balkans.16 
The dramatic change in the ethnic make-up of the population was 
not confined to the former Hungarian capital. The Ottoman occupation 
affected the ethnic composition of most regions of Hungary. In some 
areas, especially in the south of the country, in some former royal cities, 
and in river valleys along transportation routes, the decline of the original 
population was the most marked. Eventually, and in some cases only 
after the expulsion of the Turks, these populations were replenished, but 
not with the members of the same ethnic groups. 
The regions most affected by the Ottoman occupation and the 
wars of the period, had been populated originally by Hungarians. When 
the demographic losses of these areas were replenished through the influx 
of newcomers, it was mainly non-Hungarians that filled the void. Frcm 
the North, Slovaks and Ruthenians migrated from the periphery of the 
country that had not been affected by warfare and marauding. From the 
East came Rumanians, and from the South, South Slav refugees from the 
Balkans. Dr. Palffy places the number of those who came during the age 
of the Ottoman occupation at "at least" half a million, with additional 
hundreds of thousands coming during and in the wake of the Turks' 
expulsion from the country during the last two decades of the seventeenth 
century. In areas where some Hungarian population remained, these 
newcomers in time assimilated. In other regions where few if any 
Magyars had remained, or where the newcomers established homogeneous 
settlements of their own, the ethnic character of the land became other 
than Hungarian. Whole regions or counties changed their ethnic trait, 
especially in what then was southern and southeastern Hungary and what 
today is the southern and eastern parts of the Vojvodina region of 
Yugoslavia. Dr. Palffy's conclusions about these changes are worth 
quoting: 
... during the 150-year Ottoman rule in Hungary, the ethnic 
map of the country underwent fundamental changes. While in 
the Middle Ages Magyars accounted for approximately 75 to 80 
percent of the Hungarian Kingdom's population, during the 16th 
and 17th centuries they gradually became a minority in their 
own country. The situation deteriorated further in the 18th 
century by the resettlements designed to revive the country's 
economy and stimulate its demographic growth. 
Though these changes did not pose a threat to the unity of Habsburg-
controlled Hungary in the eighteenth century, since in those days peoples' 
ethnicity mattered less than their class status and religion, in the second 
half of the nineteenth century this ethnic factor became an acute problem 
that threatened the very existence of a highly multi-ethnic Hungarian 
Kingdom. 
Though the most dangerous long-term consequence of the Otto-
man rule in Hungary was this drastic re-shaping of the country's ethnic 
map, there were other negative consequences that have not been enumer-
ated hitherto. Most of these are outlined in Dr. Palffy's paper and need 
not be repeated here in any detail: the negative impact on monastic life, 
as well as on the arts and on educational and cultural institutions. 
Collections of manuscripts and art were destroyed, and cultural institu-
tions were closed. In the international arena, the damage to Hungary's 
status was especially long-lasting. Since the sixteenth century, Hungary 
has not been able to play, except in an ephemeral manner or under 
coincidental circumstances, an important role in the political evolution of 
Europe. Yet, and this should not be forgotten in an evaluation of the total 
impact of the Ottoman rule on Hungary, the Magyar nation survived the 
ordeal. As Dr. Palffy points out in his conclusions, it not only survived 
but retained one of the traits that had characterized it since the time of the 
Conversion to Latin Christianity: its orientation toward Europe. The 
survival of Hungarian trade with Central Europe, the spread of the 
Reformation to many areas of Hungary (including many Ottoman-con-
trolled territories), and the continuing tradition of young Hungarians 
attending universities in Central and Western Europe,17 can be cited as 
eloquent testimonials to the survival of a Western-oriented Hungarian 
nation through the ordeal of the Ottoman occupation. 
The Habsburg Era 
In the region known as Royal Hungary, the Habsburg era of Hungarian 
history began coincidentally with the onset of the Ottoman rule in the 
other parts of the country, in the 16th century. In the rest of the Carpathian 
Basin, Habsburg rule arrived with the expulsion of the Turks, starting 
with the 1680s. How long Habsburg supremacy lasted is also difficult to 
establish because of the circumstances under which it ended. Nominally 
at least, Habsburg sovereigns ruled Hungary until the proclamation of a 
republic in 1918, at the end of the First World War.18 It can be argued, 
however, that Habsburg control of Hungary came to an end in 1867 with 
the so-called Ausgleich or Compromise, which established the Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary and gave the Hungarian half of the realm 
complete autonomy in internal affairs. Hungarians usually talk of four 
centuries of Habsburg rule, but in most parts of the country, Austrian 
dominance lasted only for about a century and three-quarters, and the only 
century which saw Vienna's rule in Hungary from beginning to the end 
was the eighteenth. This period is the subject of Professor Janos Barta's 
study in our volume. 
As has been mentioned above and is explained in some detail by 
Dr. Palffy in his paper, one of the lasting effects of the Ottoman occupa-
tion of Hungary in the fifteenth century had been the ideological division 
of the Hungarian nation into two opposing camps. The civil strife of the 
sixteenth century continued in the seventeenth in the periodic attempts to 
defend and even expand the self-determination of Hungary, more pre-
cisely Royal Hungary, within — or outside of — the Habsburg realm. 
Attempts such as these usually provoked retaliation from Vienna and 
experiments in the fuller integration of Hungary within the Empire. 
Conflict in Hungarian-Habsburg relations was sometimes the 
result of misunderstandings. A case in point is the repression that was 
unleashed by Vienna against its Hungarian subjects in the 1670s. It all 
started with the Treaty of Vasvar or Esienstadt that the imperial govern-
ment signed with the Porte after the defeat of a Turkish army by imperial 
and allied forces in the battle of Szentgotthard (St. Gothard or St. Godard, 
or the battle of the Raab River, 1 August, 1664). Hungarians, even some 
of those who had previously supported the Viennese Court, were outraged 
by the terms of this treaty, which they considered humiliating for Hun-
gary and even for the whole of Christian Europe. They could not under-
stand why, after a victorious battle, the government of Emperor Leopold 
I had to sue for peace, rather than try to liberate at least those parts of 
Hungary that had been taken by the Turks in recent times. The event 
convinced many Hungarians, especially those who were inclined to think 
this way in the first place, that the Habsburgs were as bad, if not worse 
enemies of Hungary, as the Ottomans. The Treaty of Vasvar was soon 
followed by an anti-Habsburg conspiracy by members of Hungary's elite, 
which was crushed and resulted in years of severe repression in Royal 
Hungary and even beyond — wherever the Viennese authorities could 
reach their real or imagined Hungarian enemies. All this resulted from a 
miss-judgement of the military situation by the Hungarian public on the 
morrow of the "victory" at Szentgotthard. In fact, that victory was a 
quirk of fate and left a strategic situation in which the continuation of the 
campaign against the Turks could have easily resulted in unmitigated 
disaster for the imperial forces.19 
From mutual distrust to misunderstanding and then to conspiracy 
and repression, was a process that often characterized the story of the 
House of Habsburg's relationship with its Hungarian subjects.20 The 
process apparently did not apply to the next major conflict between 
Vienna and the people of Hungary, the war of liberation led by Ferenc II 
Rakoczi between 1703 and 1711. The was no misunderstanding on this 
occasion. After the Turks had been expelled from most of Hungary, the 
Viennese court treated the lands regained not so much as liberated territo-
ries but as conquered enemy lands whose economic output and commerce 
could be exploited by pro-Habsburg landowners and the imperial treasury. 
This policy caused resentment and discontent in the regions concerned, 
which in turn brought retaliation and repression. In 1703, at a time of the 
outbreak of a continent-wide struggle between the France of Louis XIV 
and Leopold's Austria over the issue of succession in Spain, the conflict 
in Hungary turned into a full-blown war between Vienna and Rakoczi's 
kuruc armies. 
The war began with Hungarian successes but became a protracted 
guerrilla-type conflict after it became evident that the Habsburgs were no 
easy prey for Louis XIV's ambitions. In the end war-weariness prompted 
some of Rakoczi's followers to end the bloodshed, as well as the suffering 
of the people of Hungary, by suing for peace. The resulting peace settle-
ment, the Treaty of Szatmar of 1711, was a compromise which served as 
the basis for Habsburg rule in Hungary, and for the protection of the 
Hungarian nobility's privileges, for the rest of the eighteenth century and 
even beyond.21 
The Thokoly war, but especially the bitter and protracted struggle 
under Rakoczi, constituted still more of those developments in the history 
of the Hungarian nation which witnessed much bloodletting, material 
destruction, the loss of life due to military action, and the malnutrition 
and epidemics that usually accompanied military struggles. Actually, 
military casualties from 1703 to 1711 amounted to "only" 80,000, in 
contrast to the over 400,000 people who died in the epidemics of that 
period.22 
From the Peace of Szatmar to the outbreak of the War of Inde-
pendence of 1848-49, no military conflict took place between Hungary 
and Austria. For nearly fourteen decades war between the Habsburgs and 
their Magyar subjects did not bring about the bleeding of the Hungarian 
nation or its demographic decline through the epidemics that 18th and 19th 
century warfare engendered. The absence of overt conflict did not mean 
that strife between the two sides was nonexistent during this protracted 
period. The sources of friction were numerous and complex. They are 
enumerated in the last part of Professor Barta's study. Though it is nearly 
impossible to come to generalizations in this connection, it is probably 
not inaccurate to state that two major factors contributed to the persis-
tence of discord between the Habsburgs and their Hungarian subjects. 
One of these was the desire of the Viennese Court to reform or modernize 
the administration of the Habsburg realm, the other was the insistence of 
Hungary's elite to preserve nobiliary privileges.23 
Historians of this age point out that in the Habsburg treatment of 
Hungary a sharp dichotomy existed. The trend to respect Hungary's 
distinct position in the Habsburg realm — her traditions, interests or, at 
least, the sensitivities of her elites — coexisted with the efforts to ratio-
nalize and even to centralize the Empire's administration.24 As Professor 
Barta points out, these two basically incompatible proclivities often oscil-
lated depending on who ruled in Vienna; and in some cases transmuted 
even during the time of an individual sovereign — as it did during the 
second half of the reign of Maria Theresa. Evolving circumstances, as 
well as a change in the advice a ruler received, often made the difference, 
and one trend in the Habsburg's treatment of Hungary yielded to the other 
one.25 
Recent historiography, including Professor Barta's findings, make 
it evident that most of the Habsburg Court's policies tended to — or, at 
least, were usually intended to — benefit Hungary and her peoples. It was 
in large measure due to the Habsburgs' military might that, after the last 
of the Turkish (and Tatar) wars on Hungarian soil in the early eighteenth 
century, no enemy forces entered the country for some nine decades. 
Habsburg economic policies cannot be deemed to have had such undispu-
table beneficial results for Hungary but as Professor Barta argues, their 
overall impact was positive. They did more good than harm to Hungary's 
economy, even though few Hungarian historians have admitted this in the 
past. The Viennese Court also tried to improve public health throughout 
the Habsburg realm and the fact that it achieved only meagre results was 
not for the lack of trying but because of the limitations of contemporary 
medical knowledge. In the advancement of culture, Habsburg efforts were 
somewhat more effective. A part of their enduring legacy was the estab-
lishment of new schools and even a few institutions of higher learning. 
Two policies of the Habsburg government, both byproducts of the 
age of enlightened absolutism, had negative implications for the long-term 
survival of Hungary as a distinct cultural community and a viable, 
autonomous, or at least semi-autonomous, political entity. These were 
Vienna's drive for the rationalization of the Habsburg Empire's administra-
tion, and its efforts aimed at the augmentation of the realm's population 
— efforts which were pursued often in complete disrespect of the tradi-
tional ethnic balance in the regions to which new settlers were directed. 
These two aspirations of the Habsburg regime caused not only distrust 
and strife between Hungary's Habsburg rulers and her elites, but resulted 
in the impairment of the Magyar nation's ability to sustain the prerequi-
sites of its long-term survival. It matters little that these efforts were in 
many respects counter-productive from the Habsburg point of view also, 
as they compromised the Empire's unity, and in the end, after the passing 
of several generations, contributed to its ultimate disintegration. 
The beginning of the efforts to reform the Habsburg Empire's 
administration are usually dated from the reign of Maria Theresa. They 
first focused on the Habsburg hereditary provinces but were in time 
extended to that "most ungovernable" part of the Habsburg realm, 
Hungary.26 The position of Hungary within the Habsburg realm had 
always been ill-defined and it remained such even after the Peace of 
Szatmar. As historian Franz Szabo put it, the country's "political institu-
tions and socio-economic structures,... remained largely intact and contin-
ued to exercise such control as to make the assertion of the royal preroga-
tive... virtually impossible.27 The limited nature of the monarch's power 
was best illustrated by the Crown's inability to tax the Hungarian nobility. 
This situation proved tolerable in peacetime but became unacceptable to 
the Monarchy's ruling elite in times of war. Not surprisingly the conflicts 
of the mid-18th century, the War of Austrian Succession and the Seven 
Years' War, resulted in persistent efforts by the Viennese government to 
make Hungary shoulder her "fair share" of the cost of the war effort. 
Since the Hungarian Diet proved recalcitrant to the endorsing of sufficient 
direct contributions to the imperial treasury, Vienna tied to squeeze funds 
out of Hungary through revised tariffs. When initial hopes for a quick end 
to the second of this period's wars were dashed, it became evident that 
more dramatic measures would be needed. From the point of view of 
Vienna, the situation had become intolerable: Austria and Bohemia were 
carrying an ever-increasing share of the fiscal burden of the war, while 
the land-owning nobility of Hungary was reaping greater and greater 
profits as a result of the wartime inflation in food prices. Appeals, 
ultimately made by Maria Theresa herself, to Hungary's estates to accept 
a greater share of war expenditures, elicited evasive response. As a 
result, the age of cooperation between the sovereign and Hungary came to 
an end — the "old politics of consensus" to use the words of Professor 
Szabo, "had been broken..."28 
The solution Vienna devised to remedy these and other problems 
was the creation in 1760 of the Council of State. Officially, this high-
powered committee was established for the Habsburgs' hereditary prov-
inces, but regularly discussed matters relating to Hungary. Because it was 
an advisory body, it could do so without violating the constitutional 
tradition that policy pertaining to Hungary had to be agreed to by 
Hungarians. At the same time, because the government was anxious to 
maintain the impression that the Council did not deal with Hungarian 
matters, it did not appoint any Hungarians as its members. Thus it came 
to pass that one of the Habsburg realm's most influential state agencies 
had no Hungarian representation on it. This development created a 
precedent for and in the long-run facilitated Vienna's new policy of 
keeping Hungarians "in the dark." "The conspiratorial dimension of 
Habsburg enlightened absolutism" writes Szabo, "was soon to be system-
atized."29 
What emerged was a complex, multi-pronged assault on those 
institutions of Hungary that the Viennese Court saw as obstacles to a 
more effective (i.e. centralized) administration of the kingdom. It was 
orchestrated by Chancellor of the State W.A. Kaunitz, who even devel-
oped a secret twelve-point program for this purpose.30 Everything was to 
be done without admitting that the ultimate goal was the introduction of 
wholesale change in the Habsburg Court's relationship with Hungary. In 
Professor Szabo's words this was a "pragmatic gradualist approach aimed 
at undermining the society of privilege of feudal Hungary."31 
Kaunitz's first task was the establishment of the bureaucratic 
infrastructure capable of implementing this program and staffing it with 
efficient personnel including a few "reliable" Hungarians. The reform of 
Hungary's administration was extended to the local level and involved 
such measures as the imposition of higher education standards for office 
holders and the introduction of more frequent elections for county offi-
cials. Kaunitz hoped that through a regeneration of the Hungarian bureau-
cracy the ideas of the Enlightenment would spread and the implementa-
tion of his enlightened absolutist agenda would be facilitated.32 
Another plank in Vienna's quest for reducing the influence of 
Hungary's nobility was the drive to regulate peasant-landlord relations. 
By protecting Maria Theresa's peasant subjects from undue and increasing 
burdens imposed by their Magyar noble masters, the Viennese Court 
wanted to kill two birds with one stone: to reduce the Hungarian nobility's 
power and make sure that Her Majesty's Hungarian regiments would be 
filled with contented and loyal soldiers. A further motive was the belief, 
held in particular by Kaunitz, that serfdom was an outdated institution and 
that the foundation of a prosperous Empire was a prosperous peasantry. 
In pursuance of these aims a decree was drafted and, after lengthy 
discussions, a watered-down version of it was promulgated in 1767. As 
Professor Barta explains, even this emasculated measure was implemented 
slowly and reluctantly in Hungary — and not at all in Transylvania. In 
the long run, however, the reform did help to further Vienna's quest: it 
began the establishment of a more positive relationship between the 
sovereign and Hungary's peasants — it started the process of making 
them "subjects of the ruler rather than of the [landlord]."33 
After Maria Theresa's death, the drive to reshape Vienna's rela-
tionship with Hungary went into high gear under her son, Joseph II. The 
whole process, which before had a certain degree of social and humanitar-
ian dimension, now became more of an ideological struggle. As is well-
known and as Professor Barta explains, Joseph, who had neither his 
mother's tact nor her patience, over-reached himself. He had stirred-up 
resentment in so many quarters that at the end of his reign he felt obliged 
to annul all but one (the Edict of Toleration) of his reforms concerning 
Hungary. The reason for this dramatic step on the part of Joseph II was 
not his recognition of the inequity of his reform program, but his realiza-
tion that its timing had been inappropriate. In the words of one historian 
of this age, "Joseph hoped that this conciliatory gesture would enable his 
younger brother and successor, Leopold II, to resume the work of enlight-
ened reform at a more auspicious time."34 
Viewed from the historical perspective of two centuries it is 
evident that the changes initiated during the time of Chancellor Kaunitz 
posed a greater danger to the prospect of Hungary's survival as a largely 
self-governing community than the far more radical reforms inaugurated 
by Joseph II — simply because they were introduced gradually and with 
circumspection. Yet they, too, had a limited impact and often came to 
nought during the process of implementation — especially at the local 
level. The Kingdom of Hungary would continue to be dominated to a 
large extent by its tradition-bound nobility and the introduction of enlight-
ened (or not so enlightened) royal absolutism remained the not-quite-
fulfilled dream of the Habsburg Court.35 
At this point the question might be asked what would have been 
the consequence for the Magyar nation had the Habsburgs' absolutist 
agenda for Hungary's governance been implemented? We can give only 
tentative answers to such questions of the might-have-been. A situation 
might have developed in which Hungary became just one of the Habsburg 
realm's many provinces. It would have been still dominated socially by 
an ultra-conservative nobility, one that would have had little political 
power. In such a land the bureaucracy might have been better qualified 
and more efficient, and German might have been more widely used in 
administration, commerce and even in education, especially in the cities. 
In the countryside, the peasants would have been probably more prosper-
ous and even perhaps better educated; nevertheless, most of them would 
have continued to speak their ancestral vernacular — in the Hungarian 
heartland, Magyar. How such a Hungary would have fared in the age of 
militant nationalism that surfaced in Central Europe in the nineteenth 
century, is not a question that we can answer. 
* * * 
While 18lh century Habsburg policies regarding the administration of 
Hungary cannot be deemed to have had a fundamental impact on the 
prospects of Hungarian survival through the ages, there was one program 
pursued by the Viennese Court in post-Ottoman times that had serious 
negative implications for Hungary's future, especially during the above-
mentioned era of assertive nationalism. This program was the Habsburg 
policy aimed at increasing Hungary's, particularly the former Ottoman-
occupied lands', population. 
This policy was driven by the mercantilist ideology of the age 
which prescribed that the wealth of the state was derived from the people 
and that an increase in population was a precondition for the enhancement 
of the state's prosperity and power. As both Drs. Palffy and Barta explain 
in their respective essays, these policies were pursued by Vienna already 
during the seventeenth century. They went into high gear during the 
decades which witnessed the expulsion of the Turks first from central and 
then from southern Hungary. As Dr. Barta points out, lands recovered 
from the Ottomans were usually handed over to members of the Habsburg 
establishment rather than to the descendants of their original Magyar 
owners. More importantly, the migrants that were enticed to settle these 
largely de-populated territories were recruited predominantly from outside 
of the Habsburg Empire. Settlers from the various Catholic states of the 
German realm were preferred, but peasants from Rumanian or Serb 
populated regions of Eastern Europe and the Balkans were also accepted 
even though they were Orthodox in religion — elsewhere in the Habsburg 
Empire they would have been deemed almost as much a threat to the 
established "Catholic order" as were the Protestants. 
In these lands of new settlement Vienna preferred not to have 
Hungarians either as landlords or as settlers. Allowing Magyar peasants 
from other parts of Hungary to re-settle here added nothing to the sum 
total of the Habsburg realm's population. In this respect the Viennese 
authorities were consistent: they also discouraged the immigration to the 
former Ottoman-occupied lands of peasants from the Habsburg hereditary 
provinces. But the impediments placed before those members of the 
Hungarian nobility who wanted to reclaim the lands of their ancestors had 
political motives. The Habsburg court wanted to curb the influence of 
Hungary's estates not only in the political sphere but also in the geo-
graphic sense. Viewed from this perspective, the exclusion of both the 
Magyar nobility and the peasantry from these regions coincided with the 
Habsburg regime's quest to expand monarchical absolutism throughout all 
the Habsburg lands. 
The settlement policies introduced for the formerly Ottoman-
occupied lands at the turn of the century were continued throughout much 
of the eighteenth century, especially in the so-called military frontier, the 
Hungarian lands administered directly from Vienna.36 The policy was 
administered with considerable success by the region's military governors 
in the 1720s and early 1730s: Claudius Florimund Mercy and his succes-
sor Johann Andreas Hamilton. The Turkish War of the late 1730s and the 
War of the Austrian Succession in the following decade halted these 
activities. In the wake of the latter conflict settlement resumed with 
newcomers recruited from the Habsburg realm's undesirable populations: 
criminal elements and deported Protestants. During the Seven Years' 
War, disabled war veterans and Prussian prisoners of war were offered 
lands in these regions. After the war more veterans arrived and Protes-
tants were enticed to come by offers of greater religious freedom. 
Hungary's estates viewed these developments with misgivings. 
Some Hungarian noblemen feared that the cost of these settlement 
policies would be passed on to Hungary's taxpayers (i.e. the Magyar serfs 
and townspeople) or that it would serve as justification for major tax 
reforms in Hungary. Other members of the Hungarian nobility complained 
that the granting of special privileges to the new settlers could create a 
precedent for the reform of peasant obligations everywhere — or worse, 
could fuel the demand for such reforms in the Hungarian countryside. 
The promotion of new settlements received a boost in 1766 with 
a reorganization of the administrative machinery for the handling of 
immigration to southern Hungary. That year saw the establishment of the 
Population Settlement Commission (Impopulationskommission), while the 
following year witnessed the promulgation of a decree offering both 
draught and milk-producing animals to newcomers. The success of these 
measures is illustrated by the fact that by 1772 over 50,000 new arrivals 
had settled in the southern regions of Hungary. The Habsburg court's 
efforts in this direction were moderated only when several German states 
protested Vienna's recruiting propaganda and a few even banned the 
emigration of peasants.37 
Although Hungarian historians have often accused the Habsburgs 
of deliberately creating mischief for Hungary through these settlement 
policies, it is difficult to argue that the various administrations in Vienna 
wanted to do more than increase the Empire's tax-base, curb the influence 
of the Magyar nobility, and promote the fiscal and administrative restruc-
turing of the Empire. No one at the time could have predicted with any 
degree of certainty that, a few generations down the road, the immigration 
of large numbers of non-Magyar settlers to Hungary would pose a threat 
to the unity of historic Hungary. In the 18th century, and even during the 
first decades of the 19th, religion and class determined people's identity 
and status in society. The idea that ethnicity could become the pre-
eminent determinant could not have been suspected, and the ethnic 
conflicts that the southern (as well as other) regions of Hungary would 
experience from the middle of the 19th century on, could not have been 
anticipated. 
As we know, as early as 1848, what was unthinkable only a few 
decades earlier had become the reality. In that very year southern 
Hungary became the scene of bloody ethnic conflict.38 The struggle 
subsided after Hungary's defeat in the 1848-49 War of Independence, but 
such ethnic tensions re-emerged with a vengeance during the First World 
War. The question by then should have emerged: would Hungary not 
have been better off abandoning these territories before bloody ethnic 
conflict could re-surface in them? Some historians answer this question 
in the positive. The abandoning of these territories, in most cases to states 
that were hostile to Hungary, would have required a degree of sophistica-
tion on the part of Hungary's body politic that did not exist at the time 
and rarely existed elsewhere in the world at the time, or even today.39 In 
an age of militant nationalism the shrinking of a nation's territory was 
regarded as a sign of weakness — and the admittance of weakness, one 
that could invite an invasion by an enemy country. Most European 
powers were trying to expand at the time; any Hungarian government that 
had abandoned "ancient Hungarian lands" to an "enemy" would have 
faced the ridicule and wrath of the general public — just as governments 
elsewhere, even today, would do, were they to undertake similar mea-
sures. Were it not so, many trouble spots in the world (Kashmir, Kosovo, 
Chechnia, Turkey's Kurdish provinces, to name just a few) might have 
long ceased to be places of potential or real conflict.40 Perhaps if in 1867 
Hungary had opted, instead of the Compromise with Austria, for Lajos 
Kossuth's plan of a Danubian Confederation, such transfers of land (to 
Serbia and Rumania) would have been possible, and the potential for 
ethnic conflict along the Danube could have ben reduced. This, however, 
is a might-have-been of history. The fact is that in 1867 — or in the years 
before or after — the prospects of the Kossuth Plan's implementation 
were virtually nonexistent. 
Much time has passed between the settlement by the Habsburgs 
of non-Magyar minorities in Hungary and the final demise of both the 
House of Habsburg and of the historic Kingdom of Hungary in the "revolt 
of the nationalities" at the end of World War I. The nineteenth century in 
particular witnessed the passing of opportunities for the true reconciliation 
of the nationalities, and even for the reconciliation of the Empire's two 
largest nations, the Austrian and the Magyar. 
One of these opportunities came in 1848. At the time it seemed 
that the young Francis-Joseph, one of the heirs-apparent to the Habsburg 
throne, was quite popular with the public of Hungary. After the revolu-
tionary fever of the "springtime of nations" had spread to Hungary, the 
embattled Viennese court made extraordinary concessions to the Hungari-
ans. These concessions could have been topped in October of 1848 by 
the crowning of the young Archduke as King of Hungary as a sign of 
reconciliation between the Habsburgs and their Hungarian subjects. Such 
an act might have forestalled a bloody conflict between the House of 
Habsburg and the new, liberal Hungary. Instead, the Viennese Court 
annulled all the concessions it had made to the Hungarian reformers six 
months earlier. It also persuaded Emperor Ferdinand to abdicate, Francis-
Charles (Francis-Joseph's father) to renounce his right to succession, and 
made Francis-Joseph the new Emperor. The new ruler had not made any 
constitutional promises to the Hungarians; in fact, he had been a minor 
when those concessions had been made. Nothing, it was believed in 
Vienna, could hold Francis-Joseph back from crushing the "revolt" in 
Hungary. The stage was set for another bloody conflict between the 
House of Habsburg and its Hungarian subjects. 
In this conflict the Viennese court actively encouraged the rebel-
lion of Hungary's nationalities, especially of the South Slavs, against 
Magyar control — in the tradition of the "divide and rule" principle that 
had served the Habsburgs so well over the centuries. This policy would 
leave memories of bloody ethnic conflict and fuel ethnic hatred. Like the 
Habsburgs' earlier practice of settling non-Magyar newcomers in Hungary, 
it would cause more trouble for the future than for the moment, even 
though it would greatly complicate the Hungarians' struggle for indepen-
dence during 1948-49. 
Hungary's War of Independence lasted a little over a year. It 
claimed 50,000 Hungarian lives, not counting the thousands who died in 
the ethnic violence that the war engendered in regions inhabited in part by 
non-Magyar ethnic groups, and the people who became victims of a 
cholera epidemic that accompanied the war.41 
The war was followed by years of repression. Inflicting vengeance 
on Hungarians began even before that war had ended when Francis-
Joseph, determined to "save" the Habsburg Empire and to destroy its 
"enemies," appointed General Julius Haynau to deal with the Hungarians, 
probably because he was known to be a ruthless person. Under Haynau, a 
reign of terror was unleashed on Hungary. Pleas for the magnanimous 
treatment of the vanquished came from both within and outside the 
Empire, but Francis-Joseph and his entourage disregarded these pleas. 
This period can be seen as the last of Vienna's experimentation with 
absolutist rule over Hungary. It was not to last very long.42 
The Habsburg regime's relationship with its Hungarian subjects 
began to change in the late 1850s. Several important developments took 
place beginning with 1859. In that year Austria was defeated by France 
in a war fought over the fate of Northern Italy. At about the same time, 
Prince Klemens Metternich and General Josip Jelacic died. They had been 
great enemies of Hungary and had acted as role models for Francis-
Joseph in his youth. In Hungary, there was increasing public display of 
dissatisfaction with Vienna's autocratic rule. Francis-Joseph reacted to 
these developments by attempts to appease Hungarian public opinion. 
The October Diploma of 1861 was followed by the February Patent of 
1862. Both offered limited concessions to Hungary, without abandoning 
the principle of absolutist rule by the Emperor. Neither of these attempts 
succeeded. Francis-Joseph even offered, for the first time, to be crowned 
King of Hungary, but not even that suggestion placated Hungarians who 
wanted their traditional rights and constitution respected by the person 
who ruled them. In the end, Francis-Joseph reverted to absolutist rule, 
but it was becoming more and more evident to him that he could not 
return to the order that had prevailed in the aftermath of 1849.43 
The early 1860s witnessed more events that made the Hungarian 
public more inclined to accept a compromise with the imperial court. 
Opposition to Hungarian influence kept growing in parts of the Kingdom 
inhabited by minorities. It was becoming increasingly evident that if the 
unity of Hungary was to be maintained, the country may need an ally. 
Most important of all, in 1863 Hungarians saw the Polish nation rise to 
regain its liberty. Aside from expressions of sympathy, no European 
government came to their aid when Tsar Alexander II decided to crush 
the rebellion. In Hungary itself, a number of conspiracies aimed at 
gaining Hungarian independence were discovered and liquidated. Those 
involved got lengthy prison terms. To many Hungarians it was becoming 
more and more obvious that the achievement of independence through 
confrontation was not a viable political option. Hungary would have to 
be satisfied with less than complete sovereignty. 
While many Hungarians, led by politician Ferenc Deak, gravitated 
toward accepting a compromise with Vienna, Francis-Joseph was also 
increasingly under pressure to do the same. His empire faced conflict 
with an emerging Italy over Venice, which was still under Habsburg rule. 
In the German realm, the Habsburg regime was confronted with the 
prospect of an ever-more powerful Prussia. The question was whether the 
young Emperor would hang on to his chimerical beliefs in absolutist rule 
and a united empire, or would be willing to abandon these and search for 
a solution to his empire's problems that had more solid foundations in 
political reality. The following years would bring events that would 
prompt Francis-Joseph to make conclusive decisions. 
1864 and 1865 witnessed more conciliatory moves by the Em-
peror: the opening of a new Hungarian parliament, this time in Buda; and 
more visits by the imperial family to Hungary — with speeches in 
Hungarian and the dancing of the csardas. Then, in 1866 came two blows 
to Habsburg great power ambitions: the loss of Venice in Italy, and the 
defeat at Koniggratz in the war with Prussia. The Habsburgs, who had 
for many centuries ruled parts of Italy and Germany, were now excluded 
from both. 
Despite the very difficult position that the Habsburg Dynasty had 
been placed into, Vienna took months to accept the compromise offered 
by Deak and his associates. In the end, the Ausgleich or the Compromise 
of 1867, was accepted by the Habsburg Court. It transformed the Habs-
burg Empire into the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Hungary 
received its long-coveted autonomy, and shared only foreign affairs, 
defence, and common customs and revenue policies with the Austrian half 
of the Habsburg state. Francis-Joseph became Emperor in the Austrian 
half of the monarchy, and King in the Hungarian one.44 
The Austro-Hungarian Compromise marked the end of a long 
period of history in which Habsburg rule posed a direct threat to Hun-
gary's survival as a state or even, to a lesser extent, as a nation. In fact, 
in Hungary the Compromise ushered in an age of unparalleled progress 
and prosperity. Association with Austria, as opposed to independence 
from her, actually helped to prolong the existence of the multinational 
kingdom that "historic" Hungary had been. From having been a threat to 
the Hungarian nation, Austria became an ally in preserving the status quo 
in the Carpathian basin. 
Though Austrian and Hungarian interest in preserving the post-
1867 order coincided, the ghosts of Vienna's earlier deeds continued to 
haunt Hungary — and in fact, the entire Dual Monarchy. These sinister 
legacies of the past were the demographic change, the "ethnic shift" that 
had transpired in Hungary during the 17th and 18th centuries, and the 
memories of the bloody ethnic conflict that had taken place during the 
War of Independence. 
The otherwise valuable link to Austria after 1867 posed one more 
danger for the future of Hungary. This was the possibility that Vienna 
would drag Hungary into a war, particularly through its territorial ambi-
tions in the Balkans or, as some might put it, as a result of its efforts to 
preempt Russian expansion into this region. In 1914, this threat became 
a reality with the outbreak of the First World War. As a result, Hungary 
entered another period of its history when its very existence as a state, or 
even as a viable nation, became threatened. 
The First World War and the Treaty of Trianon 
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries brought many disasters for 
Hungary. The next two, the eighteenth and the nineteenth, came with 
mixed blessings. The twentieth century constituted another age of great 
misfortunes. Only the very end of these hundred years saw developments 
that suggest that for Hungary the latest age of calamities might be over, 
but it is too early to tell. 
Actually, the twentieth century seems to have started with much 
promise for the Hungarian nation. The autonomy which Hungary received 
through the Compromise with Austria in 1867, along with the fact that 
she remained an integral part of a large Central European economic unit, 
benefitted Hungary a great deal and paved the way for her rapid though 
sometimes uneven economic development in the decades following. This 
age witnessed one of the most remarkable expansions of the Hungarian 
economy. "From a backward agrarian state," writes historian Ignac 
Romsics "by the beginning of the 20th century, Hungary had developed 
into [a country] with an advanced food-processing industry... [one which 
was] actively involved in exports."45 Manufacturing also expanded swiftly. 
Economic historians Ivan T. Berend and Gyorgy Ranki have pointed out 
that between 1898 and 1913, the number of factories in Hungary grew 
from 2,474 to 5,521.46 Similarly impressive was the increase in the 
country's gross national product or GNP. Although independent statistics 
do not exist for Hungary, it is possible to establish that the country's GNP 
in this period grew faster than that of the Habsburg Empire's western 
regions. Because the entire Empire's GNP grew about as fast as those of 
Great Britain, Italy, Holland, etc., it can be assumed that Hungary's 
expanded even faster. On the basis of such calculations, Romsics con-
cludes that Hungary's economic advance between 1867 and 1914 can be 
deemed "extraordinary," though not unsurpassed by contemporary 
European standards.47 
Especially important, according to Romsics, was the expansion of 
banking, transportation, and communications in Hungary in the decades 
before 1914. Between 1867 and 1913 the number of Hungarian banking 
institutions (banks, credit unions, etc.) grew from 107 to nearly 6,000. 
The length of railways doubled between 1890 and 1913, to 22,000 
kilometres. In terms of the length of railways per inhabitants in the 
country, by 1913 the figures for Hungary were exceeded only by those 
for France. Hungary's water-borne transportation also expanded, espe-
cially on the Danube, but also from the sea-port of Fiume on the Adriatic 
(today's Rijeka in Croatia). The length of telegraph lines increased in the 
country tenfold between 1867 and 1914, from 17,000 to 170,000 km. 
Telephone services were introduced in 1881 — only two years after they 
had made their appearance in Paris. By 1914 Hungary possessed 500,000 
km. of telephone lines, and some 20,000 telephones were in use in 
Budapest alone. The Hungarian post office that year handled 800 million 
pieces of mail, up from 51 million pieces in 1873.48 
Economic growth was accompanied by rapid advances in other 
facets of national life. The improvement in public education was both a 
by-product of and an important contributing factor to the country's 
economic progress. Many authors have pointed out that excellence of 
some of Hungary's turn-of-the-century schools has been illustrated by the 
fact that half-a-dozen of this educational system's "products" went on to 
become Nobel laureates, while several others also gained international 
acclaim.49 Of course, these men attended the best schools, while the vast 
majority of their compatriots, especially those in rural districts, had to be 
satisfied with spending a few years in one-room, one-teacher schools 
which offered only the rudiments of an education. Nevertheless, the 
increased availability of education resulted in the growth of the country's 
intelligentsia, the back-bone of the Hungarian middle-class. According to 
historian Janos Mazsu, between 1890 and 1910, the number of profession-
als in Hungary increased from 172,000 to "more than 311,000."50 
Increasing economic prosperity, the enlargement of the middle 
class, and the rapid development of urban centres such as Budapest, filled 
Hungarians with confidence and pride. In such an atmosphere many of 
the nation's problems, including those that were created by the country's 
uneven growth — such as poverty and overpopulation in districts and 
underdevelopment in sectors of the economy by-passed by the new 
prosperity — tended to be ignored. The nation was in an optimistic, even 
truculent, mood. It was under these circumstances that Hungarians 
undertook to celebrate the millennium of their arrival in the Carpathian 
Basin. The festivities accompanying this occasion encouraged the nation 
to focus too much on the progress it had made, at the expense of the 
many tasks that lay ahead in the quest for making Hungary a truly 
advanced society, one more in line with the norms prevalent in Central 
and Western Europe. Not surprisingly, Hungary's millennial celebrations 
were characterized by the overbearing patriotism of a people with exces-
sive pride and a false sense of its national security.51 
The majority of Hungary's Magyars were probably pleased with 
the way the millennial commemorations turned out — as were the tens of 
thousands of visitors who came to Budapest for the occasion. Not so 
satisfied were many of the citizens of the historic Kingdom of Hungary 
who felt that the celebrations had left them out: the impoverished masses 
of many regions of the Hungarian countryside, as well as the country's all 
too numerous non-Magyar minorities. Indeed, the years that followed the 
festivities were filled with increased tension between the rich and poor, 
and between the nation-forming Magyar majority and the country's hardly 
less numerous national minorities.52 Of the two problems, that of the 
national minorities was probably the more menacing from the point of 
view of historic Hungary's survival. The chauvinistic tone of the millen-
nial celebrations, and the enforced magyarization that the Budapest 
government had embarked on at the end of the 1890s, contributed greatly 
to the deterioration of relations between the country's dominant Magyar 
ethnic group and the national minorities. The rising mutual distrust and 
ill-feelings would help to prevent attempts at a solution of the country's 
nationalities problem in the years before World War I, and would result in 
the problem exploding in the face of the Hungarian nation during the war. 
Hungarians of the times, like "most nations," observed historian 
Geza Jeszenszky not long before he became a member of Hungary's first 
post-communist government after the collapse of communism, "...believed 
themselves politically chosen, with a special talent and a 'manifest 
destiny'... [but] it was a foolish luxury for [them] in their politically and 
geographically exposed position, to alienate the people with whom they 
had lived for centuries in pursuit of illusory national goals...."53 
Unfortunately, from the point of view of the survival of a vibrant 
and potentially powerful Hungarian state, very few Hungarians at the time 
realized or even remotely suspected that their "impatient nationalism" or 
"new chauvinism" (to use the words of Geza Jeszenszky and Alice 
Freifeld respectively), was a "foolish luxury." And the few that did, such 
as the sociologist Oszkar Jaszi, were not listened to by the vast majority 
of Hungarians, either before the war or after its outbreak.54 It should be 
added here that militant nationalism was not a unique Hungarian pheno-
menon: it could be observed throughout contemporary Europe and even in 
the New World. 
The war that broke out in Europe in the summer of 1914 proved 
to be one of the great turning points of Hungarian history. First of all, the 
war brought huge losses of life and human suffering to Hungary. In 
absolute numbers, the scale of destruction in terms of lives lost and 
disrupted was unprecedented in Hungarian history. When calculated in 
terms of their proportion to the country's population, such losses that had 
not been experienced since the Turkish Wars of the 16lh and 17th centu-
ries. According to Professor Peter Pastor writing in this volume, the 
Kingdom of Hungary lost 530,000 of its soldiers in this conflict. A much 
larger number, 1.4 million, were wounded, and 833,000 were taken 
prisoners of war. Many of these POWs returned only years later, some of 
them with their health impaired, while tens of thousands never returned at 
all, having succumbed to disease, malnutrition, and neglect in the POW 
camps. 
Even though the war brought physical destruction only to parts of 
Hungary (Transylvania in 1916 and 1918, in Sub-Carpathia for brief 
intervals, and in southern Hungary at war's end), it caused massive econo-
mic disruption and damage. Production and investment were diverted 
from peaceful pursuits to the war economy. Civilian economic activities 
became regimented to an unprecedented extent. The demands of the war 
effort and government interference in all aspects of economic life resulted 
in shortages of goods, inflation, and a steep decline in the standard of 
living. The result was labour unrest and other forms of societal tensions. 
1917 witnessed the beginning of hunger riots. With Hungary's cities going 
hungry, food shipments to Vienna were curtailed, an act which led to 
Austrian accusations of a "Hungarian boycott" of the war effort. 
Even before the onset of tension between Hungary and Austria — 
threatening with the dissolution of the Habsburg Empire — friction had 
started to develop between Hungary's authorities and the country's non-
Magyar nationalities. A large part of the problem was the fact that the 
former suspected the latter of sympathizing and even cooperating with the 
Allies, in particular with their co-nationals fighting against the Central 
Powers. Measures taken against the leaders of these minority groups only 
reinforced the determination of the masses of these nationalities to 
separate from Hungary. The government in Budapest offered certain 
concessions to some of Hungary's minorities, but as Professor Pastor 
points out in his essay, they saw these concessions as not going far 
enough. 
By the fall of 1918 both the social and the ethnic tensions in 
Hungary had reached a boiling point. Neither disciplinary actions nor 
government offers of compromises could diffuse the situation. Not sur-
prisingly, the thousand-year-old historic Kingdom of Hungary began 
disintegrating. In the Hungarian heartland this process manifested itself in 
political revolution, and on the periphery, in ethnic strife and the triumph 
of separatism. In Budapest power was gained first by supporters of 
radical democracy and independence from Austria, and then in March of 
1919, by a small group of left-wing socialists and their communist allies 
who had received their indoctrination in Soviet Russia. What ensued was 
a series of parallel conflicts, a bellum omnium contra omnes, motivated 
by ethnic, ideological and social agendas. While the Hungarian heartland 
lived through the Red Terror, foreign occupation (mainly by Rumanian 
troops), and then the White Terror, the geographic fringes of the Car-
pathian Basin in most cases witnessed the coming of foreign troops — 
Czechs, Rumanians, or South Slavs — whom some of the local inhabit-
ants greeted as liberators while others received as enemies. By the time 
the military conflicts subsided, the historic Kingdom of Hungary was no 
more, and what remained in the hands of the country's new ("White" i.e. 
counterrevolutionary) masters, was a pale shadow (93,000 km2) of the 
great kingdom Hungary had been when the war had started in 1914 
(282,000 km2).55 
The dismemberment of the Kingdom of Hungary was enacted into 
international law by the post-war peace settlement, the Treaty of Trianon 
of June 1920. To the vast majority of Hungarians, this treaty has been 
one of the great tragedies of their history, while to extreme nationalists 
among their neighbours, it has been as a callous denial of their "legiti-
mate" rights to even more Hungarian territory.56 
The Trianon peace settlement was patterned on the Versailles 
Peace Treaty with Germany. In fact, the vast majority of its clauses were 
the same or very similar. Hungary's armed forces (like Germany's), for 
example, were restricted to a tiny fraction of what they had been: 35,000 
"volunteer soldiers" with no heavy weaponry, no air power, and not even 
a General Staff. But it was the treaty's territorial provisions that were the 
harshest, and were unprecedented in terms of the other peace settlements 
devised after the war.57 
The territorial settlement imposed on Hungary and its conse-
quences for the Hungarian nation have been outlined many times. We 
might want to begin with a description provided by Professor S. B. 
Vardy, a perceptive student of the psychological impact of this treaty on 
subsequent generations of Hungarians: 
The terms of this treaty were so harsh and punitive that 
one looks in vain for parallels in modern European 
history. On the basis of this treaty Hungary lost 71.4 
per cent of her territory and 63.6 per cent of her popula-
tion. Of the four beneficiary states Rumania alone 
received a larger share... of the country's former territory 
than that which was left to Hungary.... While some of 
this loss could be justified on the basis of ethnic-linguis-
tic considerations, this was not true about a sizable 
portion of the lost territories historic Hungary's 
dismemberment also entailed the transfer of large 
Magyar-inhabited territories, along with close to 3.5 
million ethnic Hungarians — fully one-third of the 
nation — to the new successor states.58 
The justification or excuse for this territorial settlement was the 
principle of national self-determination, but in the application of this 
principle the rights of millions of Hungarians to self-determination were 
disregarded. Furthermore, Hungarian calls for plebiscites in the territories 
concerned were ignored, with the minor exception of the case of the town 
of Sopron/Odenburg on the Hungarian-Austrian border. As Professor 
Vardy points out, the irony of the act of dismembering the multinational 
Kingdom of Hungary was underscored by the fact that the states that 
benefitted most from this process, and in general from the destruction of 
the Dual Monarchy of Austria-Hungary, were themselves multi-national, 
in some cases even more mixed ethnically than Hungary had been before 
1918.59 
With the territorial losses came the loss of resources and infra-
structure. To illustrate this point a few examples will have to suffice. As 
a result of the country's dismemberment, Hungary lost 89 percent of its 
iron-production capacity, 84 percent of its forests, and 62 percent of its 
railway lines.60 What was left of the country had to rely very heavily on 
imports of raw materials. Although the country retained most of its food 
producing capacity, it had to depend on fickle and greatly disrupted 
export markets to produce any income from exported produce to pay for 
the imports that became essential for the national economy. Especially 
hard hit were Hungary's food producers. Having lost most of their 
traditional markets, the people involved in Hungary's agriculture saw their 
incomes plummet. Poverty became rampant in the country's villages, just 
at a time when emigration to the United States ceased to be an option for 
Hungary's rural poor because of the imposition of the "quota laws" by the 
American Congress which severely restricted immigration to the US from 
Eastern Europe. 
The treaty also disrupted Hungary's transportation and communi-
cation systems. As has been mentioned, most of Hungary's railway lines 
found themselves in detached territories. Even lines in the Hungarian 
heartland ended up with parts of them passing through foreign territory. 
The same happened to some roads and telegraph lines. Water transporta-
tion systems were also disrupted. Some navigable rivers that previously 
were entirely under Hungarian jurisdiction, became either boundary waters 
(as in the case of the Drava/Drava River) or international waterways 
controlled by four different countries (as in the case of the Tisza/Tisa 
River). The entire previously geographically united Carpathian drainage 
basin became controlled by four nations. The consequences of this 
development are still with us today and are exemplified by the prolonged 
and bitter debate between Hungary and the Slovak Republic concerning 
the regulation and development of the Danube River, and the controversy 
between Hungary and Romania over the pollution of the Tisza\Tisa's 
headwaters in Romania which at one point had resulted in the near-
complete extinction of aquatic life throughout the Hungarian section of 
this waterway. 
A further disruptive impact of the Treaty of Trianon had been the 
mass migrations that it caused. Even though living standards in Hungary 
had plummeted as a result of the war, the post-war revolutions, and the 
economic disruptions caused by the country's dismemberment, Trianon 
Hungary was still a more attractive place than its neighbour states for 
many Hungarians whose native communities the peace settlement had left 
in foreign-controlled lands. During the treaty's gestation period and 
immediately after, some 426,000 refugees left the successors states and 
settled in Hungary, often swelling the ranks of the unemployed, especially 
among the professions and the ranks of the intelligentsia. In the interwar 
years there would be a further out-migration of Hungarians from the 
successor states, this time mainly overseas, as many ordinary Magyars 
found life in these countries — and, especially, service in their armed 
forces — unpleasant and readily exchanged it for the relative economic 
and political security of a country such as Canada.61 
By far the most dangerous long-term consequences of the Trianon 
Treaty, according to a few researchers, were the impact they had on the 
Hungarian national psyche. The post-1920 generations of Hungarians, 
especially the upper and middle classes as well as the vast majority of 
refugees from the "lost lands," were intensely preoccupied with the 
"tragedy of Trianon" and with schemes for reversing it, and reversing it 
completely. "Given the shock effect of Trianon," explains Professor 
Vardy, "Hungarians apparently were unable to follow a path of compro-
mise. They stressed their unwillingness to ever give up the idea of 
reconstituting historic Hungary, which they embodied into the slogan 
'Nem! Nem! SohaV (No! No! Never!)."62 
One negative consequence of this type of intense preoccupation 
with "treaty revision" particularly in the immediate post-Trianon era of 
the early 1920s, was the tendency to blame all the country's wrongs on 
the peace settlement instead of looking for other possible causes of 
national problems and finding solutions to them. Not surprisingly, many 
of early interwar Hungary's economic and social woes were not effec-
tively debated, analyzed and solved. 
There were, however, even more menacing psychological effects 
of Trianon. As Professor Vardy has observed, the initial Hungarian 
reaction to Trianon "was emotional, haphazard, misdirected and outright 
wrong...." What was most misdirected and wrong in these reactions was 
the tendency to blame Trianon on Hungary's millennium-long ties to 
Europe. In a way, this type of reaction is understandable. In the destruc-
tion of their 1,000-year-old Kingdom many Hungarians saw the betrayal 
of their nation by Europe, the very Europe to which Hungarians through-
out the centuries had tried so hard to belong to. The national disenchant-
ment with everything Europe stood for led many Hungarians to search for 
alternative identities, to a reexamination of their roots and history, and to 
the embracing of their Eastern heritage and cultural connections. It led to 
the rise of the "Turanian" movement in Hungary with its nostalgia for the 
pre-Christian values and traditions of the Magyars. It also led to what 
Vardy calls the rise of the "new-Paganism" i.e. fascism, a political 
movement that "offered quick, simplistic and often less than moral 
solutions to the nation's complex and long-standing problems."63 
While many in Hungary searched for salvation from the wrongs 
and humiliations imposed by Trianon in a new, largely un-European 
national identity combined with right-wing radicalism, the country's 
leaders sought to reverse the judgement of Trianon through various 
means. These included sustained efforts to convince the governments of 
the powers primarily responsible for the drafting of the treaty's provisions, 
of the injustice of those terms. Hungary's leadership also embarked on a 
propaganda campaign, conducted both at home and abroad, to rally public 
support to the cause of treaty revision.64 On the international level, the 
campaign achieved little beyond attracting a few converts to the cause, 
including the British newspaper magnate Lord H. S. Rothermere (1868-
1940). At home the campaign preached to the converted but managed to 
keep the frenzy of revisionist clamour at a near-constant boiling point. 
The Second World War and its Aftermath 
Beginning with the late 1930s, the rise of Nazi German power and the 
formation of the Rome-Berlin axis opened the prospect for the revamping 
of the territorial regime imposed on Central and Eastern Europe by the 
Versailles system of peace settlements. Hungary's leaders came to the 
conclusion that their best chance of achieving revisions to the terms of the 
Trianon Treaty was through friendship with Italy and Germany and 
collaboration in the Nazi attempts to revise the territorial provisions of the 
Versailles Treaty. Some of Hungary's politicians realized the risks that 
this collaboration implied: entanglement in the Axis web and even 
possibly involvement in a new war in Europe. For this reason they were 
reluctant to commit themselves to an overt alliance with Nazi Germany; 
nevertheless, they continued to try to pry the doors open to the recovery 
of some of the territories lost in wake of the First World War. They were 
successful in this twice, without going to war: in the fall of 1938 and 
again in the summer of 1940 they manoeuvred Germany and Italy into 
arbitrating Hungary's territorial disputes with Czechoslovakia and Roma-
nia respectively, and through this they regained the largely Magyar 
populated regions of these countries for Hungary.65 
Unfortunately for Hungary, these triumphs did not come without 
cost: in the wake of each of these arbitrations, the Hungarian government 
had to make economic and other concessions to Nazi Germany. In 1941 
there came another opportunity to regain more Hungarian lost lands, when 
Hitler decided to invade Yugoslavia. He needed permission to move 
some of his troops through Hungary and even asked for limited Hungar-
ian military help. As an enticement, he offered further revisions of the 
Trianon territorial settlement. The Nazi dictator's demand for cooperation 
and proposal for frontier revision precipitated a crisis within Hungary's 
leadership. Some of Hungary's leaders counselled caution, while others 
insisted on collaboration even if it cost Hungary's neutrality in the war. 
On realizing that the latter were about to carry the day, Prime Minister 
Pal Teleki committed suicide. 
Hungary got involved in the war. The search for treaty revision 
finally drove the country into the arms of Hitler. It is a moot point 
whether refusing cooperation would have brought with it a German 
occupation of Hungary, and more importantly, whether a denial of Hitler's 
offer of more Magyar territory would not have brought about a political 
crisis in Hungary in which a reluctant government would have been 
ousted by extreme revisionists and other right-radical groups. After being 
deluged by incessant revisionist propaganda for more than two decades, 
the public of Hungary was probably not willing to forgo an opportunity to 
achieve the country's revisionist aims even if it meant involvement in the 
war on Germany's side. By 1941, Hungary's best statesmen, including 
Teleki, had realized this danger, but were impotent to do anything about 
it.66 
Hungary's involvement in the Nazi campaign against Yugoslavia 
was a direct consequence of the Hungarian policy of "revisionism." It 
brought association with the Nazi German war effort, but not a final and 
irrevocable involvement in the Second World War on Germany's side. 
The military operations the Hungarian government undertook were limited 
in scope — most Hungarian troops served only in formerly Hungarian 
territories. Unfortunately for the Hungarian advocates of neutrality in the 
war, Hungary's next military venture, the involvement in Hitler's invasion 
of Soviet Russia, proved to be an irreversible descent for the country to 
the status of an Axis satellite state. There has been considerable historio-
graphical controversy as to why this development came about. Certain 
historians, including the writer of these lines, have argued that the country 
became involved in this venture as a result of Nazi pressure or, at least, a 
misunderstanding. Furthermore, on first examination, the decision of the 
Hungarian government to become involved seemed to have little or 
nothing to do with the issue of treaty revision; however, on closer scru-
tiny of events it becomes evident that a large part of the Hungarian 
decision to join the Nazi "crusade against Bolshevism" was motivated 
exactly by the question of territorial arrangements in the Carpathian 
Basin. To put it briefly, the Hungarian politicians of the time worried 
that if Hungary stayed out of the war while Romania participated in it, 
Hitler would never consent to Hungary recovering more Hungarian lands 
from that country and, in fact, might lose some or all of the lands that she 
had recovered only a year earlier.67 In this manner one tragedy of Hungar-
ian history, Trianon — or, more precisely, the Hungarian desire to 
expunge it — led to an even greater tragedy, Hungary's involvement in 
the Second World War. 
This war had a more devastating impact on Hungary than World 
War I mainly because of three circumstances. Unlike during the Great 
War, when there was only limited destruction on Hungarian soil, during 
World War II the front passed through Hungary with full force, starting 
with the Allied bombing of industrial and strategic targets in the spring of 
1944 and ending in the occupation of the country by the Red Army from 
the late summer of that year to the spring of 1945. The second reason for 
the greater damage inflicted on Hungary in World War II was the fact 
that the country's occupation at the end of the war, first by Nazi Germany 
and then by Soviet Russia, proved much more deadly than any of the 
wartime and post-war occupations after World War I. In fact, the occupa-
tion of Hungary by the Soviets did not really end till after the collapse of 
Soviet empire in East Central Europe in 1989. The third factor that made 
World War II more costly for Hungarians was the fact that this conflict 
claimed a far greater number of civilian casualties than the previous one. 
Losses suffered by Hungary's military forces were serious enough. 
Some 350,000 of the country's soldiers perished in the war, and hundreds 
of thousands (some estimates are as high as 900,000) fell into Allied, 
chiefly Soviet, captivity. Many of these returned only years later, often 
with their health permanently impaired, while tens, if not hundreds of 
thousands, never returned. Civilian casualties were similar in magnitude. 
The systematic bombing of cities, the fighting throughout the country, 
resulted in the deaths and maiming of further hundreds of thousands. The 
imposition of the "final solution" against the Jews, while the country was 
in Nazi German hands, brought with it the deportation of over half-a-
million of Hungary's citizens (predominantly Jews but also thousands of 
Gypsies) to labour and death camps in Nazi-occupied Poland.68 Further-
more, during the final months of the war, still another wave of deporta-
tions took place, this time by Soviet military commanders who collected 
people for "reconstruction work" in the U.S.S.R., more precisely for 
captivity in the Gulag. Some time later the post-war government of 
Hungary, following the example of some Soviet-controlled regimes in 
Eastern Europe, embarked on still another wave of deportations, expelling 
a large portion of the country's ethnic German population. And there were 
other human losses as well. In the first half of 1945 approximately half a 
million people fled Hungary. These refugees included members of the 
bureaucracy, the military, and the professions — including technicians, 
engineers, plant managers and owners — as well as thousands of ordinary 
working people.69 What prompted most of these people to flee were 
above all rumours of atrocities committed by the advancing Red Army. 
These fears proved correct. The population that remained was subjected to 
brutal treatment. Women were specially targeted: thousands of them were 
raped.70 
Hungary's involvement in World War II had another casualty 
which few people ever think of. This little-known but important victim 
was the prospect of reversing the Treaty of Trianon. Although in the 
interwar years there was a great deal of opposition to the idea of revising 
the treaty, there was also some latent — and growing — support for it. 
Given time, further support could have been garnered internationally — 
and modest revisions, especially in the case of predominantly Magyar-
populated areas adjacent to the Hungarian border, and international near-
consensus in the matter might have been achieved. Indeed, it has been 
argued, that the 1938 revision to the border in the North — today's border 
with the Slovak Republic — was not a violation of international law and 
in fact received some sympathy in great power circles. According to 
Professor Eva S. Balogh, the British government "tacitly" recognized this 
change in the border as "binding" and the British Foreign Office received 
this revision of the 1920 Trianon settlement "with satisfaction and even 
relief."71 
After the outbreak of the war in September 1939, Hungary's 
prospects for regaining more territory from Slovakia seemed to have 
improved even further. The newly-created Slovak state was seen as a 
vassal of Nazi Germany. Furthermore, Slovakia joined the German war 
against Poland, which Hungary refused to do. "As a result," according to 
Dr. Balogh: 
sympathy towards Budapest,... began to grow both in 
Great Britain and in France. British diplomats, for 
example, repeatedly announced that "the British govern-
ment did not tie herself to Mr. Benes' plans (concerning 
the restoration of Czechoslovakia) and (that) the main 
goal of the war... (was) to achieve a lasting peace based 
on solid foundations," thereby indicating that a Czecho-
slovakia reestablished within its former borders was not 
considered to be conducive to peaceful conditions in the 
area. The French attitude, although on the surface 
warmer to Benes, was essentially similar to that of 
Britain.72 
Revising the territorial settlement decreed at Trianon in a way 
acceptable to many elements of the international community was possible, 
as had been demonstrated in the late 1930s. With careful and patient 
diplomacy, further changes might have been implemented in such a 
manner on later occasions. They were not. Hungary's 1940 success in 
revising the border with Romania gained only limited international 
support — and, coincidentally, left the country greatly indebted to Nazi 
Germany. Furthermore, as has been pointed out above, the territorial 
revisions "achieved" in the spring of 1941 alienated the British govern-
ment and ended the last vestiges of British sympathy for Hungarian 
revisionism. Finally, Hungary's involvement in the war against Russia in 
the summer of the same year stamped Hungary as a Nazi ally. The irony 
of the situation was conspicuous: Hungary got involved in the war mainly 
because of the Magyar nation's desire to revise, even to annul the Treaty 
of Trianon. Involvement in the conflict, however, served to achieve 
exactly the opposite: to carve the territorial provisions of the Trianon 
Treaty forever into international law through the peace treaty Hungary 
had to sign with her erstwhile enemies after the war, in 1947, once again 
in Paris.73 
Whole books could be written about the economic losses suffered 
by Hungary during and immediately after the war. To begin with, 
Hungary's transportation infrastructure was left in ruins. From March 
1944 on, when Hungary became occupied by the Wehrmacht, the country 
was no longer spared by Allied air forces. In the balance of that year and 
during early 1945, Hungary's railways, bridges, roads, as well as rolling-
stock and motor transport manufacturing establishments were the targets 
of repeated attacks by the British Royal Air Force, the American Air 
Force and by Soviet bombers. During the struggle for Hungary between 
the Axis forces and the Red Army, much additional damage was inflicted. 
As if this was not enough, further destruction was inflicted by retreating 
German and Hungarian forces. In their flight westward they blew up 
most of the country's river and railroad bridges. They ripped up railway 
tracks in many places and took most of the country's rolling stock to the 
Third Reich. Many merchant ships were sunk by the retreating forces, 
while the rest, including all barges and tugs, were taken upriver to 
Germany. The same fate befell most of the country's automobiles and 
motor transport vehicles. 
With regards to the state of the Hungarian economy during 1945, 
it might be added that, during the last phase of the war, the German High 
Command ordered a policy of systematic industrial dismantling and 
removals with the aim of denying the Red Army the chance of drawing 
on Hungarian economic resources. The consequence of this policy has 
been aptly described by economic historian Andras Gollner: 
about 500 important factories not severely damaged by 
Allied bombs were either wholly or partially dismantled, 
their equipment requisitioned or scattered around the 
countryside. Paralleling this action, a considerable 
quantity of immovable property was destroyed by Nazi 
demolition experts. The list of removals and destruction 
is very long indeed, consisting of vast amounts of indus-
trial and agricultural goods. Even the country's entire 
gold and silver reserves were taken to Germany.74 
The overall impact of the physical damage combined with the loss 
of manpower has been described, among others, by economist Dr. Susan 
Glanz: 
Before the war Hungary had been an agricultural and 
industrial nation. In 1938, the last peace year, 37% of 
the national income was generated by agriculture and 
38% by industry. Due to the demands of war, in the 
period of 1943-44, the ratio changed to 43% of national 
income generated by industry and 28% by agriculture. 
But after the war the destruction of the industrial sector 
left the country paralyzed. The damage,... caused, 
amounted] to $4.27 billion — which represented five 
times the national income of that year and 40% of the 
national wealth. The country's infrastructure was 
destroyed, and agricultural activity also almost came to a 
standstill as the armies moved through Hungary. Over 
90% of all industrial plants suffered some damage and 
nearly all inventories disappeared. Coal mines ceased to 
function.... The economic situation was made even 
worse by Hungary's foreign and domestic debt. By 
September 1945 the foreign debt had amounted to... 
$578 million.... [and] domestic debt [had reached] 14.2 
billion pengos [already on the eve of 1945],75 
As if the destruction and disruption caused by the war were not 
enough , Hungary suffered fur ther economic losses in the immedia te post-
wa r era, mainly as a result of the occupation reg ime imposed on it by the 
All ies and, in particular, the country 's occupation by the Red A r m y . 
In the armist ice agreement that Hungary's Provisional Government 
s igned early in 1945, the country was compel led to pay a very stiff 
penal ty for its involvement in the war. The terms of this agreement gave 
Sovie t Russia the rights to war booty. Furthermore, all German or 
I tal ian-owned assets in the country had to be transferred to Soviet owner-
ship. Moreover , Hungary was denied generous financial and material 
support f rom the U N R R A , while some other states in East Centra l Europe 
received much he lp f rom this agency. And, Hungary was conf ron ted by 
o ther burdens, as described by Professor Gollner: 
After 1945 the difficulties stemming from the economic 
havoc wreaked by the war were accentuated unexpect-
edly by another obstacle: Soviet economic exploitation.... 
As the Red Army advanced westward through Hungary, 
all enterprises falling within its territory — some va-
cated only a few hours earlier by Nazi demolition 
experts — were assigned Soviet military commanders. 
These saw to it that factories still in working order 
began producing immediately for the war effort against 
the retreating Germans.76 
In fact, documentary evidence published in Hungary in the early 1970s 
describes the overall impact of Soviet military management on Hungary 
between the early winter of 1944 and the late summer of 1945. In the 
words of Professor Gollner this "management" resulted in: 
1. The complete depletion of economic stocks... 
2. Wholesale removal of all liquid assets from Hungar-
ian banks and enterprise safes... 
3. Widespread dismantling and removal of equipment 
from factories; 
4. Breakneck production under difficult working condi-
tions, heedless of the need for maintaining equipment; 
5. Soviet requisitioning of industrial products without 
remuneration; 
6. The difficulty of ensuring labour supply because of 
arbitrary street arrests by Soviet patrols and deportation 
of large numbers of skilled workers to the Soviet Union; 
and 
7. The non-payment of workers' wages by Soviet 
military managers.77 
By the time Soviet military management had ended in Hungary 
during the summer, the country's economy was in worse shape than it had 
been six months earlier. The firms "managed" by the Soviet military 
were in "utter chaos." Stocks and tools disappeared, "...and machines 
[were] left badly damaged." Most of these firms were left "hopelessly in 
deficit...." In agriculture the situation was similar. The Red Army had 
requisitioned "vast quantities of agricultural goods without payment, and 
drove away tens of thousands of cattle, horses, and other livestock...." 
All-in-all, "Soviet military management," Gollner concludes, " accelerated 
the collapse of Hungary's private sector,... impoverished millions of 
Hungarian workers and peasants, and confounded the country's new and 
inexperienced public administrators." Under such conditions it became 
necessary to introduce "the most thorough and encompassing central 
planning." "In 1945," Gollner goes on, "the Communist Party captured a 
commanding position in economic reconstruction — the Supreme Eco-
nomic Council (SEC). This important instrument enabled it to sever the 
jugular vein of private capital..."78 
The situation was exacerbated by the regime of reparation pay-
ments which was imposed on Hungary. In compliance with the Repara-
tions Agreement of June 15, 1945, the country was obliged to pay heavy 
compensation to the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia. The 
total sum of $300,000,000 does not seem excessive at first glance; 
however, when we consider the price structure, the product mix, and the 
timing of the deliveries, we realize how onerous this regime was for 
Hungary's postwar economy. The agreement on retribution did not take 
into consideration the fact that in the summer of 1945 much of Hungary's 
manufacturing was in shambles. Furthermore, no credit was given for the 
deliveries Hungary had made to the Soviet Union prior to the signing of 
the agreement. As a result, "almost 90% of Hungary's heavy industrial 
production [became] tied down by reparations orders." According to 
figures produced by the Hungarian General Creditbank — "[by] August 
1946, 76,000 out of 95,000 employees in heavy industry were engaged in 
retribution work,..."8 A further problem was the fact that the value of 
retribution goods delivered was calculated at the level of 1938 dollars, 
which in effect meant that Hungary had to deliver three or four times as 
much goods as would have been the case if 1945 dollars had been used to 
determine their value. Underpricing, however, "was not the only factor 
substantially raising the nominal costs of the reparations package." The 
reparation agreement also overvalued the Hungarian currency. The net 
result, in the words of Professor Gollner, was that "these factors pushed 
up the reparations bill's real value to about 1.5 billion 1946 U.S. dollars." 
It is not surprising that in the immediate post-war era Hungary made little 
or no progress in economic reconstruction and her people experienced 
widespread privations and even starvation.79 
There was only limited political freedom in the immediate post-
war Hungary, and whatever freedom there was, existed by the grace of 
the Soviet leadership which was not ready for the time being to try to 
impose complete control over Hungary. Nevertheless, it did want to 
create conditions which would facilitate the imposition of complete 
control later and did not hesitate to use any means in achieving this. 
Some of the better-known methods used were the domination of such 
bodies as the Allied Control Commission for Hungary, the country's 
Supreme Economic Council, as well as the Ministry of the Interior, and 
through it, the security police forces. At the same time, the media under 
Soviet control — as well as military transportation facilities — were 
placed at the disposal of the Communist Party of Hungary. Concerning 
the political "agenda" of the Communists in 1945, Professor Bennett 
Kovrig's words are worth quoting: 
Stalin was intent on fostering compatible regimes in his 
newly acquired sphere of influence, but in the case of 
Hungary he proceeded more cautiously... Following his 
advice,... the [communist] party's... leaders developed an 
incremental strategy... Putting on a conciliatory mask, 
they called for national unity and set the pace for the 
implementation of the land reform... At the same time 
they sought to expand their power base by indiscrimi-
nate recruitment, by seizing a dominant position in the 
Trade Union Council and the police, and by creating a 
political police to pursue their enemies.... 
[After their defeat in the elections] the disap-
pointed communists intensified their struggle from 
above and from below. Control over the interior minis-
try helped them to purge their opponents from the state 
administration, to persecute their enemies at large, to 
disband noncommunist youth organizations, and to 
harass workers into joining the party.... At the same 
time, while rejecting Western aid, they could not counte-
nance criticism of Russian pillage, of the heavy burden 
of reparations, and of disadvantageous commercial deals 
with the Soviet Union.... 80 
The takeover of power in Hungary, accomplished by 1948, was probably 
the greatest tragedy that the Hungarian nation suffered as a result of the 
Second World War. Volumes could be written about the immediate and 
long-term impact of this development, and the many ways it threatened 
the long-term existence of a Hungarian state and even the Hungarian 
nation. A few words should suffice, as the total impact of Communist 
rule, and especially its long-term effects, have not been assessed com-
pletely to date, and in fact cannot be evaluated as some of them continue 
to be with us even today. 
Communist takeover resulted in a ruthless and systematic drive to 
destroy many of the thousand-year-old traditions and fundamental values 
of Hungarians. The country's new rulers, following the teachings and 
orders of their Soviet masters, aimed to annihilate Hungary's pluralistic 
society and replace it with a one-party, totalitarian system. The country's 
multi-party parliamentary system (not always free of blemishes) was 
abolished. The freedoms of speech and of religion were observed de jure 
but never de facto. The straightjacket of Marxist-Leninist dogma was 
imposed on Hungarian society, on economic life, the media, education 
and even the arts and sciences. Intellectual development was stifled and 
the country became deliberately isolated (not for very long and never very 
successfully) from what the country's rulers called "the capitalist West." 
Hungary's economic potential and her people's energies and talents were 
harnessed to serve the Soviet leaders' quest for superpower status and 
world conquest. 
Because a great majority of Hungarians found all this frightening 
and repulsive, they resisted the regime's efforts, and the country's leaders, 
backed by the presence -— and in some cases the active involvement — 
of Soviet occupation forces, responded by ruthless repression. Despite 
this, Hungary's "socialist transformation" proceeded, often in an awkward, 
haphazard manner, and we can only guess what could have happened if 
the Soviet Empire had not begun to experience serious problems by the 
last quarter of the 20th century and collapse by the end of the 1980s. Had 
this not come about, we can wonder for how long Hungary could have 
avoided the fate of becoming just one of the members of an enlarged 
Soviet Union — a new community of socialist states under the direct rule 
of the Kremlin — and how acute the Magyar nation's alienation from 
western culture and traditions could have become in this process. 
Fortunately, the great transformation of 1989 intervened, and we 
need not contemplate these questions. Since the collapse of communism, 
Hungary has been returning to most of her pre-1948 traditions and, 
especially, to her time-honoured European orientation.81 
The Threat of Demographic Decline 
The survival of a state or even a nation can be placed in jeopardy not 
only through the ravages of wars and foreign occupations but also as a 
result of peacetime developments. We have noted above that devastating 
epidemics were common in Hungarian history until the nineteenth century 
and, even on occasion — such as in the case of the "Spanish flue" of 
1918-19 — even in the twentieth. Populations can also dwindle as a 
result of emigration and the decline of birth rates. 
Several of the papers in this volume point out that the wars 
Hungary had been involved in, resulted in extensive out-migrations from 
parts or all of the country. The Ottoman wars fought on Hungarian soil 
were accompanied by the fleeing of populations from Turkish-controlled 
territories, and especially, from zones of frequent and/or intense military 
conflict. These migrations, however, probably did not result in a net loss 
of population in the Hungarian homeland, as the refugees of these con-
flicts more often than not settled in remote, more peaceful regions of the 
Carpathian Basin. 
In the post-Ottoman era, the exodus of people, especially of 
political elites and soldiers, was also most likely the consequence of wars. 
The Rakoczi War of Liberation of 1703-1711, the War of Independence 
of 1848-49, the post-World War I civil turmoil, and the Second World 
War, all resulted in the departure from Hungary of tens, even hundreds of 
thousands of Hungarian citizens. An exodus of similar magnitude took 
place during the communist period when, despite the existence of the 
"Iron Curtain" — with its barbed wire fences and minefields — tens of 
thousands of Hungarians risked their lives to flee the country, and in the 
wake of the Revolution in 1956, over 200,000 did. 
At other times no wartime conditions or foreign occupation 
proved necessary to prompt Hungarians to leave their country. Emigration 
from Hungary went on during even the most perfect of peacetimes and in 
the absence of any foreign oppression. The most remarkable of such 
periods, from the point of view of the magnitude of emigration, were the 
three decades before the outbreak of the First World War. Over two 
million citizens of the country left in this period for other lands, both in 
East Central Europe and overseas, with a large majority of them choosing 
the United States of America as their destination. 
In recent years historians have revised many of the earlier 
misconceptions about this mass exodus. One of the early "myths" about 
emigration to the New World was the idea that it was extreme poverty, 
pure and simple, that drove people from Hungary to other lands, espe-
cially to America. Immigration historian Julianna Puskas has emphasized 
the fact that this emigration took place at a time of rapid economic 
development in Hungary. In fact, she had pointed out that the peak of 
Hungarian emigration to the United States coincided with times of the 
most rapid economic progress in Hungary. In fact it seems that people 
were driven from the country not so much by poverty but by the fact that 
economic development in Hungary was uneven and caused dislocations 
for a large number of people, for example craftsmen whose skills became 
redundant as a result of the expansion of factories. The other factor was 
the rise of expectations that rapid economic development caused. These 
expectations could rarely be satisfied in Hungary, but could be in the very 
swiftly developing United States. In fact, Puskas also points out that the 
peaks of Hungarian influx into the US almost invariably coincided with 
times of economic prosperity in America.82 
Many of the Hungarian citizens who emigrated to the United 
States were from among Hungary's linguistic and religious minorities. For 
the longest time the usual explanation given for the departure of many of 
these people was their being "oppressed" by the Kingdom's Hungarian 
majority. Julianna Puskas exposes this myth as well. She admits that a 
few intellectuals might have left Hungary for such reasons, but argues that 
most of the migrants who went to the United States did so in search of 
economic opportunities and, in fact, some of them discovered their 
national identity only there — after being subjected to nationalistic and 
anti-Hungarian and anti-Habsburg propaganda by enemies of the Dual 
Monarchy of Austria-Hungary. Puskas points out that the minority of 
non-Magyar ethnics who were most likely to leave Hungary in this period 
were Germans and Jews, two groups that were least likely to suffer 
oppression in the pre-1914 Kingdom of Hungary.83 
The most prominent characteristic of the emigration from Hun-
gary in this period, according to recent researches, was its temporary or 
impermanent nature. People from Hungary, both Magyars and members 
of the minorities, went abroad not to leave their homeland permanently, 
but to make some money and return with it to improve their and their 
families' economic prospects. The "emigration" of people from Hungary, 
argues Puskas, was a "temporary emergency solution to a problem at 
home." Because such migration was transient, there was a lot of cris-
crossing of the Atlantic by Hungarian "immigrants." It was only the First 
World War and the subsequent social and economic upheavals in East 
Central Europe that dampened the migrants' enthusiasm for returning to 
their homeland "rich" and starting a new life there. As a result, these 
transients became settlers and began to put down roots in their new North 
American cultural and social environment.84 
After the imposition of the infamous American "quota laws" in 
the 1920s restricting immigration from Eastern Europe, Hungarians could 
not emigrate there, either as temporary or long-term residents. Because 
economic conditions in Hungary had become even worse than they had 
been before 1914, Hungarians still desired to emigrate, perhaps more 
likely permanently than had been the case with the pre-1914 migrants. 
Not being able to go to the United States, they went to Canada or to 
South American countries such as Argentina or Brazil. We have men-
tioned the out-migration to these countries, in particular Canada, from the 
Magyar-populated counties of the successor states. But there was consid-
erable migration from Hungary as well: to Canada alone, over 30,000 
immigrants migrated from Hungary in the period from 1924, when the 
gates were opened to immigrants from former enemy lands, to 1931 when 
they were shut because of the economic depression that had started in the 
fall of 1929.85 
As has been mentioned, the Second World War and its aftermath 
constituted another period of great demographic losses to Hungary as a 
result of the exodus of refugees. The two largest waves left the country 
in 1944-45 and 1956-57 respectively, but there was an outflow of political 
refugees at other times as well. These losses, when added to the loss of 
life due to war and the forcible removal of populations, go a long way in 
explaining the very slow growth of Hungary's population from the 1930s 
to the 1990s. Illustrative of this is the fact that the country's population 
passed the 9,000,000 mark some time during the second half of the 
1930s, and it passed the next milestone, the 10,000,000 mark, only a 
generation later, and it has not been able to reach the 11,000,000 figure. 
In stark contrast stand the population growth statistics of Canada, for 
example. That country passed the 7,000,000 mark in the first decade of 
the 20th century, the 10,000,000 one two decades later, the 15,000,000 
figure in the early 1950s, and the 25,000,000 mark three decades later. 
The annual rate of population growth in Hungary has not passed the 1 
percent figure since the early 1900, while Canada has experienced annual 
growth rates as high or almost as high as 3 percent both before World 
War I (due mainly to immigration) and after World War II (due mainly to 
high birth rates, i.e. the post-war "baby boom").86 
Though emigration had contributed to the stagnation of Hungary's 
demographic growth, it never constituted the great loss to the Hungarian 
nation that some Hungarian historians have made it out to be. Hungarians 
who left Hungary, did not leave the Hungarian nation. In fact, they 
became the builders of the Hungarian diaspora that had been so prominent 
and active in many countries of the world, especially the Western demo-
cracies, during the 20th century. Hungarians in emigration spread knowl-
edge about their country and culture among the receiving populations, and 
helped their relatives at home financially. They also served as personal 
contacts and sources of information for their countrymen in Hungary in 
times when the country's foreign rulers wanted to isolate the Magyar 
masses for Western and democratic influences.8' Many Hungarian immi-
grants took their Western-acquired experience and knowledge back to 
Hungary with them on extended visits or when they re-migrated to their 
country of origin. 
For the past century-and-a-half, the slow demographic growth of 
the Hungarian nation has been a source of concern to many Hungarians, 
especially to members of the country's nationalistic elite and intelligentsia. 
Many of these people complained about mass emigration and a few of 
them even lobbied for such legislative measures as the curbing of emigra-
tion propaganda spread by immigration agents of New World countries 
eager to recruit prospective settlers.88 The efforts of the anti-emigration 
lobbyists met with limited success. The most effective measure that could 
have reduced emigration from Hungary would have been meaningful land 
reform, but opposition to such reform was wide-spread in both pre-World 
War I and in interwar Hungary. Emigration could not be curbed easily, 
and it was also difficult to blame the country's poor, especially its landless 
proletariat, for trying to improve their economic prospects by emigrating 
to lands where opportunities were more plentiful. 
Hungary's concerned elites and patriotic-minded intellectuals also 
worried about the increasingly low birth rate that their nation began 
experiencing more or less concurrently with the increase of emigration 
from the country. Mass emigration in the decades before 1914, huge 
losses in lives during the Great War, the even greater demographic 
catastrophe imposed by the Treaty of Trianon, accompanied by declining 
natural population growth, raised the spectre of demographic extinction 
for the Hungarian nation. Not surprisingly, the interwar years were times 
of intense debates about the Magyar nation's survival. 
Of particular interest to concerned Hungarian intellectuals and 
politicians was the spread of the custom of the single-child family in the 
Hungarian countryside. Called the "egyke phenomenon," the practice of 
peasant families raising only one child, first came to national attention 
long before the debate about low birth rates reached its zenith after World 
War I. It was noticed as early as the 1840s in certain counties of south-
ern Hungary. Several decades later demographers and sociologists found 
the practice widespread in many regions of the country and the debate 
about the "threatening" consequences of the egyke system became ele-
vated to a burning national controversy. 
Those participating in the debate tried to explain the roots of this 
phenomenon. As Professor Bela Bodo outlines in his study in our volume, 
these people identified the cause of this practice by references to one or 
another of the socio-economic trends experienced by contemporary Hun-
gary. Some pointed to the increased influence of women in Hungarian 
peasant society, others to the growing trend on the part of peasant parents 
to be indulgent to their children, or to the decline of age-old folk tradi-
tions and culture. Still others sought the cause of the increasing use of 
contraception by peasants in what they perceived to be the decline of 
morals, especially of sexual morality. 
The debate on the "egyke question" was more emotional than 
scientific. For many Hungarian intellectuals, as Dr. Bodo points out, it 
was fuelled by a fear for the nation's future, and for the racists among 
them, even an apprehension about the survival prospects of the "white 
race." The debate, almost inevitably, assumed political overtones. 
Arguments for, and in most cases against, birth control by Hungary's 
country folk, became parts of the official or unofficial political platforms 
of certain parties. The country's Conservatives, Dr. Bodo argues, used the 
arguments against the egyke practice to emphasize the harmful effects of 
urbanization and the dangers of the spread of urban values to Hungary's 
villages. At the same time, Hungary's Populists demanded the elimination 
of the conditions (rural poverty, lack of opportunities for peasant youth, 
etc.) that in their view gave rise to the single-child families in the coun-
tryside. Above all, in their discussions of the egyke phenomenon, the 
Populists called for effective land reforms. The Populists' arguments 
found no sympathy with the Conservatives, and got little support f rom 
Social Democrats and other city-based left-of-centre intellectuals who 
often envied the literary success of some of the Populist writers and were 
concerned about the overly nationalistic and sometimes even anti-Semitic 
overtones of the debate. 
In the end little was a achieved in the quest for greater population 
growth among the country's peasantry. The Populists, often confident that 
their literary accomplishments would pave the way to social and eco-
nomic reforms, failed to create a political force that enjoyed the support 
of Hungary's peasantry. Without such a party they made no progress 
toward meaningful land reform. Furthermore, after 1945 when such 
reform became viable, the peasant masses of the country lacked a cohe-
sive political movement that might have been able to prevent, or at least 
delay, a takeover of the country by the Communists. The national debate 
over population growth not only failed to precipitate increased population 
growth, but also it failed to deliver the political dividends that the propo-
nents of such growth and the friends of the peasantry had hoped it might 
bring about. 
It is not within the scope of this inquiry to treat in more than the 
most peremptory manner the population policies of Hungary's post-1948 
communist regimes. On the whole, the demographic policies of the 
country's successive communist governments can be characterized as 
being the imitation, as in virtually every other sphere of national life, of 
the "Soviet model." Nevertheless, even the communist era experienced at 
least one period of great concern for population decline. This was in 
1952-53 when the sale contraceptive devices were curtailed and abortion 
was made illegal in the vast majority of circumstances.89 This anti-
abortion campaign, however, made only a slight dent in Hungary's birth 
rate, which continued to stagnate throughout the entire communist era. 
Conditions did not change dramatically with the passing of 
communism in 1989. The deplorable housing conditions of the previous 
decades, the diminished influence of the churches — and especially, of 
the Catholic Church — lingered on throughout the 1990s and it was only 
towards the end of the decade that some slight improvement appeared in 
regards to the birth rate. The fact that, in the post-1989 age, women on 
the whole did not feel any more empowered economically or politically, 
nor better provided for socially, no doubt also contributed to birth rates in 
Hungary not rebounding in the last decade of the 20th century.90 
Despite the rather uninspiring experience in regard to demo-
graphic growth of the first decade of the post-communist age, Hungary's 
future prospects appear promising. The economic hardships of the 
transition from a command economy to a market economy, from an 
economy dependent on the markets of the "Socialist camp" to one in 
which Europe and the West have become the country's major trading 
partners, are being gradually overcome in Hungary and most economic 
indicators predict a better future. Within a few years the economic 
inhibitors of faster population growth, such as poor housing conditions 
and shortages in accommodation, should start disappearing. A concurrent 
increase in family incomes might also encourage larger families. Only 
time will tell if the re-emergence of the churches as viable institutions in 
a pluralistic Hungary, would also have a positive impact on birth rates in 
the country. 
More important in the opinion of the writer of these lines is the 
fact that Hungary is undoubtedly on its way to become a country of 
immigration. With economic conditions in the country considerably 
better than those in neighbouring countries to the east and south-east, and 
in many countries of the developing world, and with a stable (or, at least, 
relatively stable) political situation prevailing in the country, Hungary 
should be able to attract immigrants of high calibre. The prospect of 
Hungary's European Union membership should make the country even 
more attractive to newcomers. And, membership in the EU could make 
Hungary (already a NATO member, the only one in the middle Danube 
Basin) a very desirable place to settle in. Judicious immigration policies 
could materially benefit the country both in the short term, by providing 
skilled labour and technical expertise, and in the long run, by counteract-
ing the negative effects of slow natural population growth. 
Heightening the prospects of effective immigration policies by 
future Hungarian governments is the fact that there is a large pool of 
people who would find relocating to Hungary an attractive proposition. 
The people's of many East and South-Eastern European countries would 
find Hungary, with its expanding economic opportunities and stable 
political system, a desirable place. And so would many educated individ-
uals from other places in the world, and even retirees from Western 
Europe and North America. As these immigrants would come from 
different countries and would represent people of diverse ethnic and 
religious backgrounds, there is little chance that they would create irre-
dentas, as the immigrants of the early modern period had created, once 
they became conscious of their ethnic "otherness" and their cultural and 
political affinities with "their" peoples living on the other side of Hun-
gary's boundaries. Furthermore, Hungary, unlike most other countries in 
Europe but not unlike West Germany of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, is 
in position to receive immigrants of non-foreign ethnic background. Just 
as the West German regimes of the above period actively encouraged the 
immigration to their country of people of German ethnicity from all parts 
of Eastern Europe, Hungary should encourage the immigration of people 
of Magyar stock from the neighbouring countries with Hungarian minori-
ties. Of course, such a policy is bound to be controversial among people 
who still have lingering hopes of rectifying somewhat the frontier settle-
ment proclaimed at Trianon. However, such hopes are fading, and will 
continue to fade as the decades pass and as the position of these minori-
ties will continue to weaken demographically, culturally and politically. 
In the 21st century, there are even more arguments for saving 
Hungarians for the Hungarian nation as opposed to aspiring for some kind 
of a territorial solution to the problem of the Hungarian irredenta in 
neighbouring lands. One old argument that without substantial, i.e. 
populous, Hungarian communities in these countries, autonomous Hungar-
ian regions — with extensive cultural rights and self-government — 
cannot be established, commands less and less weight. If such autono-
mous Hungarian cultural communities could not be established on a 
lasting basis (some existed for shorter or longer periods of time) in the 
eighty years since Trianon, the prospects for their creation are dim. With 
the hopes for territorial revisions dashed long time ago, and with dimin-
ishing prospects for the creation of autonomous Hungarian cultural 
districts in the neighbouring countries, Hungarian governments of the 
immediate future will be confronted with the question: why not save the 
members of these Magyar communities for the Hungarian nation through 
their emigration to Hungary? After all, in the 21st century the situation is 
changing drastically. In the 19th and even in the 20th centunes, territory 
was more important than populations; today, increasingly the most 
valuable commodity for a nation are its citizens, e.i. their talents, skills 
and knowledge. 
The Hungary of the future is likely to be an increasingly stable 
and prosperous place. The arts and learning will no doubt also flourish 
there with increasing vitality. The prediction of the 16th century Flemish 
scholar Nicasius Ellebodius, quoted by Dr. Palffy at the end of his paper 
in this volume, that a Hungary free of war and turbulence might "become 
the most suitable place for accomplishing academic plans as well," may 
come true — after half-a-millennium of delay. 
Should political stability and affluence come to Hungary in the 
21st century, the Magyar nation will probably grow again, as it often did 
in times of peace and prosperity in its thousand years of evolution. As it 
had been often throughout the centuries, it could be a country of immigra-
tion again, rather than one supplying settlers for other parts of the world 
as it did in the 19th and 20th centuries. On the surface at least it seems, 
the crises of Hungarian survival, so acute often in the past and so gravely 
threatening in the 20th century, might be behind us at least for the foresee-
able future. Not wishing to end the introduction to this volume of essays 
on a negative note, I left the discussion of some lingering doubts about 
Hungarian nation's long-term survival — and, especially, about the 
survival of Hungarian communities beyond the borders of Hungary, — to 
the postscript. 
NOTES 
Several people, most of them contributors of this volume, have com-
mented on all or parts of the text of this introduction. To them I extend my 
thanks and remind the readers that the responsibility for any errors of fact, inter-
pretation or omission rests on my own shoulders. 
A special note on sources: it is not possible for an essay on thousand 
years of history of a nation to have adequate and up-to-date references to the vast 
literature on the subject. The selection of sources in such a case is bound to be 
arbitrary. In the citing of literature, in this introductory essay I gave preference to 
articles and books that have been published by Canadian authors or to works that 
had appeared in Canada — in many cases in our journal. A lesser degree of 
priority was accorded to authors and publications of the English-speaking world. 
I adopted these priorities mainly to publicize the research that has been done in 
the field of Hungarian history in the United States, the United Kingdom and, 
especially, in Canada. 
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 Those who might question the applicability of the Malthusian analysis 
to twenty-first century conditions should watch the daily news from parts of the 
world such as Ramallah or Belfast. It must be admitted, however, that in most 
parts of the world the struggle for territory and resources has taken on an air of 
apparent civility and transpires not by armed force and not on the frontlines but 
often through takeovers devised in the boardrooms of giant corporations. 
The literature of the emergence and persistence of nations is enormous. 
A prominent Canadian contribution to this literature is Michael Ignatieff, Blood 
& Belonging: Journeys into the New Nationalism (Toronto: Viking, etc.; London: 
BBC Books, etc., 1993). Other relevant works are: Ernest Gellner, Nations and 
Nationalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1983); Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic 
Origin of Nations (London and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1987); Benedict 
Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of 
Nationalism (London: Verso, etc., 1983); Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and National-
ism since 1870 (London: Cambridge University Press, 1990); William H. 
McNeill, Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History (Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1986); and specifically on the subject of survival, Anthony D. 
Smith, "Chosen peoples: why ethnic groups survive," Ethnic and Racial Studies, 
15 (July 1992): 436^458. A classic Hungarian contribution to the subject of the 
rise of the nation-states and nationality problems is Oszkar Jaszi, A nemzeti 
allamok kialakulasa es a nemzetisegi kerdes [The development of nation states 
and the nationality question] (Budapest, 1912; a new, abbreviated edition, edited 
and introduced by Gyorgy Litvan, appeared in 1986, in Budapest, published by 
Gondolat). 
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 Smith, "Chosen peoples," 438. For discussions of such terms as 
"nation," "nationalism" and "national identity," see Thomas Spira ed., National-
ism and Ethnicity Terminologies: An Encyclopedic Directory and Research Guide 
(Gulf Breeze, FL: Academic International Press, 1999f)-
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 For a detailed history of Poland in English see Norman Davies, God's 
Playground: A History of Poland (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982), 
2 vols.; for a shorter account see the relevant parts of Piotr Wandycz, The Price 
of Freedom: A History of East Central Europe.... (London & New York: Rout-
ledge, 1992); and for a brief overview see Anna M. Cienciala's entry "Poland 
(History)" in the Encyclopedia of Eastern Europe, ed. Richard Frucht (New York 
and London: Garland Publishing, 2000), 590-617. 
4
 Orest Subtelny, Domination of Eastern Europe: Native Nobilities and 
Foreign Absolutism, 1500-1715 (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's Press, 
1986), 130-37. 
5
 Archeologist and historian Gyula Laszlo has argued, in the numerous 
studies and books he published from the 1940s to the early 1990s, that the "Late 
Avars" were in fact the first Magyar settlers of the Carpathian Basin. They were 
joined some four generations later by Arpad's Hungarians, in an occupation of 
this land that some contemporary chroniclers referred to as the secundus ingres-
sus or "second coming" of the Magyars into what is now Hungary. 
6
 One legendary Slav principality of the period was Magna Moravia or 
Great Moravia. According to Czech historians it existed in the lands that later 
became Moravia in what is now the Czech Republic. Historian Imre Boba 
(1919-1996) argued that this early Slav principality was situated south of the 
Danube River, near the ancient city of Sirmium (near the latter-day town of 
Marava, today's Sremska Mitrovica). Imre Boba, Moravia's History Recon-
sidered: A Reinterpretation of Medieval Sources (The Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1971). 
This monograph has been reviewed at length in our journal by Veronica Gervers-
Molnar (1939-1979): vol. II, no. 2 (fall, 1975): 123-29. 
7
 For recent literature on the external context of this age of Magyar 
history see Zoltan Kosztolnyik, "Nemet politikai fejlemenyek a magyar tortenet 
hattereben..." [German political developments in the background of Hungarian 
history...], Acta Universitatis Szegediensis 109 (1999): 3-11. As Dr. Veszpremy 
hints in his study, in discussing the acts and deeds of these men, we should not 
forget those (even though not nearly as well documented) of Henry II's sister 
(and King Stephen's wife), Gisela. 
8
 More than one state or empire owes its emergence to the succession of 
capable leaders. In Hungary's immediate neighbourhood one thinks of the rulers 
of Kievan Rus from Sviatoslav to Iaroslav the Wise, spanning almost a century 
(from the mid-960s to the mid-1050s). One of the most remarkable examples of 
the succession of able rulers is the first series of sultans of the Ottoman realm, 
starting with Osman and ending with Suleiman the Magnificent, covering a time-
span of over two centuries. The Ottomans were not so lucky with Suleiman's 
successors. 
9
 These policies, and especially the wise state-building efforts of St. 
Sephen, are described by historian Gyorgy Gyorffy. See his magnum opus: 
Istvan Kiraly es muve [King Stephen and his work] (Budapest: Gondolat, 1977). 
A shorter version of this work of his is available in English: King Saint Stephen 
of Hungary (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995). 
1(1
 It should not be forgotten that the tribes that arrived on the Hungarian 
Plain under Arpad's leadership at the end of the 9th century included the Kabars, 
Turkic-speaking Khazar allies of the Magyars. They settled in the midsts of a 
variety of peoples. Indeed, the Carpathian Basin of the 10th century must have 
been a highly multi-ethnic society! Furthermore, Arpad's successors, starting 
with Stephen's grandfather Taskony, regularly admitted refugees to their lands, in 
most cases fragments of the beleagered Pecheneg nation. The new arrivals were 
usually settled on the periphery of Hungary, often in the marshlands guarding the 
approaches to the heart of the Carpathian Basin. They fulfilled the dual tasks of 
settling the realm's inhospitable regions and reinforcing its military frontiers. The 
words of St. Stephen's Admonitions to his son are often quoted as evidence of his 
belief in what we today would call multiculturalism: "For the country that has but 
one language and one custom is weak and frail." 
An English-language monograph that deals with multicultural aspects of 
post-conquest Hungary is Andras Paloczi Horvath, Pechenegs, Cumans, lasians: 
Steppe peoples in medieval Hungary, transl. Timothy Wilkinson, (Budapest: 
Corvina, 1989). For earlier, Hungarian-language works, see Laszlo Rasonyi, 
Hidak a Dunan. A regi torok nepek a Dunanal [Bridges on the Danube: Ancient 
Turkish peoples by the Danube] (Budapest: Magveto, 1981); and Gyorgy 
Gyorffy, Besenydk es magyarok [Pechenegs and Hungarians] (Budapest, 1940). 
11
 For one of our journal's articles touching on Louis the Great's invol-
vement in Italian affairs see Carla Corradi Musi, "The Hungarian Military in 
Northern Italy during the Reign of Louis the Great," Hungarian Studies Review 
17 (fall 1990): 11-19. 
12
 For one of our journal's articles dealing with King Sigismund's inter-
ests in the wider affairs of Europe see Norman Simms, "The Visit of King 
Sigismund to England, 1416," Hungarian Studies Review 17 (fall 1990): 21-29. 
13
 Osman's subjects were Turks and were followers of Islam. The outside 
world came to know them as Ottomans — meaning the people of Osman or 
Othman — and the empire they built, as the Ottoman Empire. The term "Otto-
man" is in fact a corrupted version of Osman I's name. 
14
 The military decline of the Byzantine Empire is outlined in Mark C. 
Bartusis, The Late Byzantine Army: Arms and Society, 1204-1453 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1992), while the post-medieval wars of 
Ottoman expansion are discussed at length in Rhoads Murphey, Ottoman warfare, 
1500-1700 (London: UCL Press, 1999). 
15
 The circumstances of Matthias' death are examined in L.S. Domonkos, 
"The Medical History of a Medieval Hungarian King: Matthias Corvinus (1458-
1490)," in the R. Varkonyi Agnes Emlekkonyv [The Agnes Varkonyi Festschrift] 
ed. Peter Tusor (Budapest: Eotvos Lorand Tudomanyegyetem, 1998), 133-47, 
especially 141-44; and the same author's "The Tragedy of the Hunyadi Dynasty," 
Essays in Church History in Hungary 3-4 (1999): 19-28. Professor Domonkos 
prepared a paper, entitled "The Nature of Royal Power in the Age of Matthias 
Corvinus" for the conference at which the studies printed in this volume were 
presented. It will be printed in our journal as soon as its notes will be completed. 
16
 Oliver A.I. Botar, "From European Capital to Ottoman Outpost: The 
Decline of Buda in the Sixteenth Century," Hungarian Studies Review 14 (Spring 
1987): 10. The most dramatic decline in Buda's Magyar population, according to 
Botar, took place in the wake of the sieges of Buda during the Long War of the 
turn of the 16lhand 17lh centuries. Botar cites the report of an Italian traveller to 
the effect that the language heard most often in the Buda of the time was 
Croatian. 
17
 For an article of our journal that deals with a part of this subject see 
Peter Sarkozy, "Links to Europe: Hungarian Students at Italian Universities in the 
13-18th Centuries," Hungarian Studies Review 17 (Fall 1990): 45-55. 
IX
 Francis-Joseph, who occupied the imperial throne in Vienna for the 
entire second half of the nineteenth century and the first sixth of the twentieth, 
was for much of this period the Emperor of Austria and King of Hungary. 
Though considered an enemy of Hungary at first during his long reign, it has 
been argued that by the time of the First World War he had become accepted by 
Hungarians as "their King." See Andras Gero, Emperor Francis Joseph, King of 
the Hungarians, translated from the Hungarian by James Patterson and Eniko 
Koncz (Wayne, N.J.: Center for Hungarian Studies and Publications, 2001; 
distributed by Columbia University Press, New York.) 
19
 In the battle a coalition army made up of Habsburg, imperial (i.e. 
Holy Roman), Rhenish and French units, numbering hardly over 20,000, battled 
a smaller contingent of a much larger Ottoman Army that had been able to cross 
the Raba (in German, Raab) River near the village of Nagyfalu (today's Morgens-
dorff, in Austria). Though the Turks lost several thousand first-line soldiers in the 
engagement, the bulk of their army, originally numbering about 80,000, remained 
intact. Though the Christian forces won, they were in no position to continue the 
fight. They had been caught unprepared for the fight on the day of the battle and 
they ran out of munitions as well as food and fodder by the end of the day. Their 
losses in the battle were probably lighter than those of the Turks, but they had 
lost a far larger portion of their total force. The French troops among them had 
wanted to begin their return to France even before the battle; only some arm-
twisting convinced their commander to stay and fight. Risking another battle 
would have been foolhardy for Raimondo Montecuccoli, the commander of the 
Christian forces — and he was not the type who would try. We can only guess 
why, under the circumstances, Grand Vizier Ahmet Koprulii, the leader of the 
Turks, did not resume his advance. The answer might be that he had lost 
precious time and realized that he could not arrive near Vienna early enough to 
undertake a successful siege before the onset of the cold and rains of autumn. 
Geza Perjes, "The Zrinyi-Montecuccoli Controversy" in From Hunyadi to 
Rakoczi: War and Society in Late Medieval and Early Modern Hungary, ed. 
Janos M. Bak and Bela K. Kiraly (New York: Social Science Monographs, 
1982), 335-49; the same author offers a detailed account in "A szentgotthardi 
csata" [The Battle of St. Gothard] in Szentgotthard (Szombathely, 1981), 117-
175; and Professor Murphey also makes scattered references to the battle in his 
Ottoman warfare {op. cit.). Contemporary accounts of the battle have been 
written among others by Montecuccoli, the French officer Count Colignny-
Saligny, the German writer Johannes Gradelhnus, and Findikh Mehmet Aga 
Silahdar. 
20
 The severity of the repression that followed the discovery of the 
conspiracy that had been sparked by the Treaty of Vasvar contributed to the 
outbreak in 1678 of still another anti-Habsburg uprising, led by Imre Thokoly, 
the son of one of the conspirators who had been executed. The fate of his war 
against the Habsburgs was sealed by the latter's successes against the Turks in 
the mid-1680s. For an overview of this period see Laszlo Benczedi, "The Warrior 
Estate in the Seventeenth Century with Special Reference to the Thokoly 
Uprising (1678-1685)," in From Hunyadi to Rakoczi, op. cit., 351-365. 
21
 A succinct English-language overview of this war can be found in 
Charles W. Ingrao, "Guerrilla Warfare in Early Modern Europe: The Kuruc War 
(1703-1711)," in Special Topics and Generalizations on the 18th and 19th 
Centuries Vol. I of War and Society in East Central Europe, ed. Bela K. Kiraly 
and Gunther E. Rothenberg (New York: Brooklyn College Press/ Columbia 
University Press, 1979), 47-65. See also Ingrao's The Habsburg Monarchy, 1618-
1815 (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) 2nd ed., 
84-118 in passim. For papers relating to Rakoczi's war that had appeared in our 
journal see Linda Frey and Marsha Frey, "The Rakoczi Insurrection and the 
Disruption of the Grand Alliance," vol. 5, no. 2 (Fall, 1978): 17-29, and John B. 
Hattendorf, "The Rakoczi Insurrection in English War Policy, 1703-1711," vol. 
7, no. 2 (Fall, 1980): 91-102. For further English-language literature see chapters 
22 to 28 of the above-cited volume by Bak and Kiraly (with papers by historians 
Agnes Varkonyi, Geza Perjes, Kalman Benda, Bela Kopeczy, Peter Pastor and 
others). Szatmar, or Satu-Mare, is part of present-day Rumania. 
22
 Balint Homan and Gyula Szekfu, Magyar tortenet [Hungarian 
history], 5 vols. (Budapest: Kiralyi Magyar Egyetemi Nyomda, 1935) 2nd, 
expanded edition, vol. IV (written by Szekfu), 309. 
23
 Even the terminology of this conflict tends to obfuscate the subject. 
Resistance to Habsburg designs for the elimination of Hungarian nobiliary 
privileges was offered in the name of the Magyar "nation," but the term "nation 
or natio" in its contemporary definitions denoted the members of the Hungarian 
estates (primarily the very numerous nobility) and not the plebs of Hungary, the 
multitude of serfs and agricultural and other labourers. 
24
 The point is emphatically made in the works of R. J. W. Evans, one 
of the English-speaking world's foremost experts on the Habsburg Empire. 
According to him, these "two lines of policy... pursued in Habsburg governance 
of Hungary right down to 1918 — by turns essentially respectful or disrespectful 
of constitutional tradition — were... first clearly elaborated in the context of [the] 
Empress's [Maria Theresa] transformation of the whole Monarchy." R. J. W. 
Evans, "Maria Theresa and Hungary," in Enlightened Absolutism: Reform and 
Reformers in Later Eighteen-Century Europe, ed. Hamish M. Scott (London: 
Macmillan, 1990), 189. Another of Evans' several relevant works is "The 
Habsburgs and the Hungarian Problem, 1790-1848," Transactions of the Royal 
Historical Society, 5th ser. 49 (1989): 41-62; see also his The Making of the 
Habsburg Monarchy, 1550-1700 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979). Evans' home 
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Hungary's Conversion to Christianity: 
The Establishment of Hungarian Statehood and its 
Consequences to the Thirteenth Century 
Laszlo Veszpremy 
The Carpathian Basin occupies a peculiar place in history. It was the 
ground where Roman-Germanic world met that of the Slavs and mounted 
nomad peoples, where no group had achieved sustained unity before the 
state of Hungary was founded.1 Its function was more as a kind of 
channel through which nomadic peoples, like the Ostrogoths, Gepids and 
Longobards, launched successful drives into the heart of Europe, or failed 
in the attempt, as in the case of the Huns (420-455), and subsequently 
broke up. The Huns opened up the road to Europe for the Germanic 
tribes, and the Avars opened up the Balkans to the Slavs, until the Hunga-
rians finally closed the channel off. The dominion of the Romans and the 
Huns was confined to certain areas of the basin. The Avars (568-803) 
took control of the whole of it, while Charlemagne's Frankish empire 
extended only to Transdanubia, the region's most developed area. 
It was here, on the remains of the Roman, Avar, Frankish and 
Frankish-Slav cultures, that the Hungarians settled in the tenth century. 
After Arpad and his successors secured the area, they set up the first 
bishoprics and organized the first counties. This basin can be regarded as 
a missing piece of an enormous jigsaw, filled in by the establishment of 
Hungarian power, aided to some extent by accidental events. After the 
Huns and Avars, the setting up of Hungarian rule was accompanied by 
consolidation and modernization of the basin, and was assisted by hitherto 
unknown stability in East Central Europe. The Slav peoples occupying the 
borders of the German empire were split into two parts that would never 
reunite. The Northern and Southern Slavs, after being separated, set out 
on their way to the founding of their states and the discovery of their 
national identities. The pattern for development was the same everywhere: 
multi-centred, i.e. tribe-centred, development had to be replaced by a 
process of creating a unitary state. This is what took place among the 
Hungarians, the Czechs and the Poles in the tenth century.2 The furthest 
progress down this road was achieved by the Czechs in Prague, where a 
secular centre coincided with an ecclesiastical one, whereas in Hungary 
and Poland at first several ecclesiastical and temporal centres developed in 
parallel: Esztergom, Szekesfehervar / Gniezno, Poznan, Wroclaw, Cracow. 
The formation of communities with national identities was not a necessary 
concomitant, however, and did not occur among the Slavs of the Elbe, for 
example. 
The claim concerning parallelism among Czech, Polish and 
Hungarian development is not made purely from the considerations of 
present-day politics. The events in the second half of the tenth century are 
indeed very close to each other: for example, the Polish king Mieszko I 
sought relations with Christendom in 963. The establishment of first the 
bishopric in Prague took place about a decade later. References in the 
chronicles about Hungarians starting to convert to Christianity appear at 
the same time. For the ruling elite of these emerging states, taking up the 
Christian religion presented an excuse for attacking and eliminating their 
pagan rivals. However, the assumption of Christianity was more than a 
political tool: the Christian faith was truly the basis of legitimacy for 
these new state entities. It was the medium through which they could 
access and become a part of the socially and culturally dynamic world of 
the Christian peoples, represented by the two "Roman" emperors: the 
German and the Byzantine, and stretching from the Kievan principality in 
the East to the land of the Franks in the West, and from Scandinavia in 
the North to the Mediterranean in the South.3 
The enterprise of founding the state of Hungary was undertaken 
by the Arpad dynasty, under the leadership of the first king's father, Duke 
Geza, who still bore a pagan name. Specific knowledge of the radical, 
bloody nature of the process only comes to us from the time of Stephen's 
rule, apart from the terse reference to the "bloody-handed" Geza in the 
legend of St. Stephen. Spreading from the top down, conversion was 
clearly forcible. It was directed not only against pagans but also against 
every centre of power that defied central — ducal and later royal — 
power in the name of non-Latin Christianity. Arpad's princely successors 
on certain occasions brought their might down on both pagans and Chris-
tians oriented toward Byzantium (Koppany, Gyula, Ajtony), in the process 
spreading their dominion to the East (i.e. Transylvania) and the south.4 
Under Stephen's rule Hungary would be converted to Christianity 
and the Christian Church would be organized in the country. With the 
help of the legends of the times, by the end of the eleventh century the 
memory of Stephen (by then canonized and referred to as Saint Stephen) 
as the man who had forced Hungary's conversion, had faded.5 Part of this 
process was the relegation of the achievements of Geza, Stephen's father, 
into the background and the emphasis on Stephen as an apostolic king. 
One legend claimed that a celestial apparition had prohibited Geza from 
laying the foundations of Christian Hungary and of the Church, since his 
hands had been smeared with human blood.6 According to this tradition, 
if there had been bloody measures taken to force Hungary's conversion, 
they took place during the time of Geza, and King Stephen had no 
conflict with his people over faith — he only confronted a few rival 
noblemen whose defeat automatically ensured the victory of the new faith 
in the country. 
Heavenly apparitions, however, were not only characteristic of the 
legend as a genre, but could also be used to obscure the external circum-
stances of conversion, its international implications, and above of all, the 
role of Henry II, German King and (later) Holy Roman Emperor. Who 
initiated the conversion is an important factor because this act earned him, 
i.e. Henry, certain right of suzerainty over the converted area and legitimi-
zed his influence there.7 Not surprisingly, the polemicists in the service 
of the Holy Roman emperors kept referring to Henry's deeds for centuries. 
Countering the tendencies emerging from such claims, in the Hungary of 
the latter half of the 11th century there emerged an emphasis on Stephen 
as the state- and church-founder and the apostolic king. It has to be kept 
in mind that at the time the kingdom was in the cross-fire of papal and 
German political ambitions. It was the legends of the late 11th and early 
12th centuries that made the pope and contemporary Europe recognize the 
apostolic right of the Hungarian king.8 
The chroniclers of the Hungarian Kingdom's early history treat the 
subject of the conversion reticently, a fact which indicates that they did 
not want to depict conversion to Christianity as a radical transformation. 
They date the history of the Hungarian people from far before the 
Christian era because a sharp dividing line between the pagan and 
Christian ages would have questioned the justification of discussing 
Hungarian prehistory at length.9 Hungarian legends treat the subject 
similarly. This is not surprising in view of the fact that both they and the 
chronicles were part of, or were inspired by, the Kingdom's court litera-
ture. At the court, those who commissioned works expected the authors to 
apply the ideological and legal arguments prevalent at the time. The 
Greater Legend of St. Stephen stresses continuity just as the chronicles 
do. The former makes explicit mention of the fact that imperial Rome, 
just as the Kingdom of Hungary, became Christian after a period of 
paganism. In this manner it justified the ravaging of Christian Europe by 
the pagan Hungarians — upon divine inspiration — before their conver-
sion.10 This argument suggested that the German emperors, who professed 
continuity with the Roman Empire, had no valid ground to reproach the 
Hungarians for their pagan past. 
The best example of this position can be found in the Gesta 
Hungarorum. It was written by an anonymous chronicler around 1200 and 
is devoted exclusively to the prehistory of pagan Hungarians.11 It depicts 
these pre-Christian Magyars — the flagellum Dei or God's tool for 
punishing sinners — as being governed by the Holy Spirit even in their 
raids against the Christians and in their seizure of the land where they 
settled. The author of this gesta, known as Anonymus to Hungarians, con-
sciously searched for evidence of continuity in Hungarian history before 
and after the settlement. He found such evidence or historical link in the 
person of Attila, the king of the Huns, whom he inserted in the family 
tree of Hungary's Arpadian kings. With his Gesta Hungarorum Anonymus 
laid the foundation of a view prevalent in Hungary up to the nineteenth 
century. This view held that the occupation of the Carpathian Basin by 
the Magyar tribes in 896 had been preceded by the capture of the region 
by the Huns, a fact which legalized and justified the area's subsequent 
Hungarian settlement. Attila, another "scourge of God", could thus be 
more easily fitted into the early history of the pagan Hungarians.12 
The ultimate version of the theory of continuity between the 
Hungarians' pagan and Christian history was created by the chronicler 
Simon of Keza in the 1280s. To him the Huns and Magyars were not 
merely related peoples but they were identical; accordingly the settlement 
of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin in 896 was none other than 
their second settlement in the region.13 Simon of Keza also derived the 
origin of the community ("communitas") of Magyar noblemen and their 
claim to sovereignty over the land, from pagan, Hunnish traditions.14 
What partly explains Simon of Keza's views is the serious controversy 
into which the king of the period, Ladislas IV, got with the Pope. The 
author, who was the king's court priest, probably wanted to prove that 
Hungarian history was guided by divine will even before the conversion 
and that the charge of heathendom against Hungarians and their ruler was 
senseless. As late as 1279 the papal legate to Hungary reminded the 
Hungarian king, Ladislas IV, that St. Stephen had subordinated his 
country to St. Peter, that is to the Apostolic See, repeating the papal 
court's well-known argument — which was consistently rejected by 
Hungarian elite. This argument had appeared for the first time in Gregory 
VII's letter to Salamon, the king of Hungary between 1063 and 1074, 
albeit some modern-day historians suggest that King Stephen himself had 
offered the country to the Virgin Mary in order to disarm any hegemonic 
claims to his kingdom by the papal court.15 
The main motive of those who stressed continuity between pre-
Christian and post-conversion Hungarian history was undoubtedly the 
desire to counter foreign accusations that were flung at the Hungarians 
already in the 11th century. Both the papal and the imperial propaganda 
questioned several times — not unreasonably in view of the large-scale 
pagan revolt of 1046 — the completeness or the sincerity of the Hungari-
ans' conversion. A similar situation existed in regard to Poland. In the 
11th century German-Polish historiographical polemics, the German 
writers equated the Poles' refusal to obey the German emperor with 
rebellion against the Christian church, citing the Poles' alleged or real 
superficial Christianity as proof.16 For revolting against the Germans, 
Thietmar of Merseburg in 1018 called Boleslav the Bold the "foe of all 
believers," just as 12th century writers Gerhoh of Rechersperg and Otto of 
Freising found correlation between the Hungarians' anti-German senti-
ments and their "infidelity" to Christendom.17 The latter even questioned 
the sainthood of King Stephen even though he was already widely revered 
as a saint at the time. These Germans emphasized a certain continuity in 
the Hungarian history as well: the Magyars' enduring "pagan" and "bar-
baric" traditions. The arguments of the Hungarian chroniclers and legend 
writers must be seen in the context of these anti-Hungarian polemics. 
There can be no doubt that this is why the spokesmen of the Hungarian 
nation stressed the continuity of Hungarian history, its divinely-ordered 
nature, as well as the rapid and complete success of Hungary's conversion 
to Christianity under St. Stephen. 
The Hungarian raids that plagued tenth century Europe had been 
ended through a political reconciliation between Germans and Hungarians. 
The process started with the arrival of a Hungarian delegation at the 
German emperor's court in Quedlinburg in 973, and ended with the 
Hungarian ruler Geza's son marrying Gisela some time in the 990s, the 
sister of the future German king and Holy Roman Emperor, the later 
canonized Henry II.18 It is clear from the historical evidence that the 
conversion must have been carried out with German assistance, probably 
with the substantial support of the Stephan's German wife and her retinue. 
As in Bohemia and Poland, German influences, chiefly Bavarian, left their 
mark also in Hungary in the areas of social life, culture and ecclesiastical 
organization — from the minting coins and making of laws to the produc-
ing liturgical books and issuing charters — paving the way for an intel-
lectual revolution in the recently Christianized country.19 
Gizela's marriage to Stephen paved the way for a turning point in 
Hungarian internal and foreign affairs: it cemented the Magyar nation's 
orientation towards the West. Under Geza, as recorded by contemporary 
chronicler Bruno of Querfurt, the first western missionaries (who included 
St. Vojtech [Adalbert]), took the Hungarian court only a little away "from 
sin," and only wreathed the Magyars in the shadow of Christianity: Geza 
paid homage to both pagan and Christian gods. Around the year 1000, 
however, an fundamental turn of events must have taken place. This is 
evident from the founding (in 996?) of the country's first - and still 
active - Benedictine abbey at Pannonhalma which was followed by the 
establishment of the first bishoprics in the kingdom. It is important to 
note that this commencement of ecclesiastical organization in Hungary 
preceded Stephen's coronation as king. 
While medieval Hungarian historiography acknowledged the role 
of German warriors in the consolidation Geza's and Stephen's temporal 
power, it refused to admit the existence of any such assistance in the 
sphere of church organization. The country, it was claimed, was converted 
by King Stephen I, a real apostle as it were, who also founded the 
Kingdom's archbishopric and chain of bishoprics. Hungary's medieval 
chroniclers attribute to no role in this work to Stephen's father; and they 
give no concrete information about how far Geza got in converting the 
Magyar people to Christianity. 
It is a telling sign that not a single exact date of the early phase 
of conversion survives in these Hungarian works — including the year of 
Stephen's baptism or of his wedding. It is most likely that historiography 
of that time deliberately shunned the subject, reckoning with Hungarian 
history from the year of the coronation in 1000/1001. Typically enough, 
the Bavarian version of the St. Venceslav legend (Crescente fide) also 
distorts the facts when describing the very first phase of Bohemia's 
conversion, keeping silent about the details of earlier Moravian-Slavic 
evangelization.20 Not even the names of German missionaries survive in 
the Hungarian sources, except that of St. Adalbert, mentioned as the 
bishop of Prague, who became the patron saint of the first Hungarian 
archbishopric.21 
Nevertheless, the organization of the church did not become the 
subject of an open historiographic controversy because — unlike the 
bishopric of Lund in Scandinavia or that of Prague in Bohemia — Eszter-
gom, the Hungarian ecclesiastic centre, was raised to the rank of an 
archbishopric parallel with Gniezno in Poland (established around the year 
1000). This happened during the early phase of Hungary's conversion 
when the issue of "German dependency" was not as acute as it was later. 
The only moot question that remains is whether Stephen converted his 
people to Christianity out of his own conviction or in deference to his 
wife's wishes.22 
Several analogies can be cited to exemplify the "converting royal 
spouse."23 In the Polish chronicles, Princess Dobrava, the daughter of the 
Bohemian duke Boleslav I, helped the work of missionaries in Poland. In 
965 she married Mieszko, the duke of the Poles, an event that was 
followed a year later by the duke's baptism. Contemporary German 
historiographers emphasize the fact that "the poison of inborn heathendom 
left him [Mieszko] upon the frequent urging of his beloved wife." The 
missionary role of the royal spouse was accepted in Poland probably be-
cause Queen Dobrava's family ties with German imperial family were not 
close. 
The image of the royal spouse as an instrument of conversion was 
stressed by German chroniclers in connection with the Hungarians as 
well. Chroniclers of the mid-11th century, Wipo and Herimannus Augien-
sis, make the pointed remark that Gisela "converted her husband Ste-
phan," and through him, the entire Hungarian nation, by marrying him.24 
Medieval Hungarian historiography ignored Gisela's supposed missionary 
role. Quite the contrary, the Hungarian chronicle makes quite unfavoura-
ble mentions of Gisela, attributing cruel deeds to her. Underlying this was 
more of a wish to blur or discredit her role deliberately than reality itself. 
German liturgical sources on the other hand — the readings and prayers 
of the feast of St. Henry — propagated the opposite view. His vita, 
composed for his canonization in 1146, called Emperor Henry II "aposto-
lus Ungarorum" who "converted" the Hungarians with the help of his 
sister.25 
This historiographical dispute regarding the identity of the con-
verter of Hungary extends beyond the realms of the Germans and the 
Hungarians. The fact is that even some chroniclers in Poland commented 
about evangelizing in Hungary. Being aware of the controversy about the 
role of Queen Dobrava in the conversion of their own country, they 
present the converting of the Hungarians as their own achievement. They 
admit that Hungary's conversion might have been helped by missionaries 
such as St. Adalbert, whose activity in Hungary during Geza and Stephen 
was preserved by legends and chronicles alike. In fact in 12th to 15th 
century Czech and Polish sources he is depicted as the converter of "both 
Hung aria and Po Ionia." 
Consequences 
All that we know about the first royal coronation in East Central Europe 
is that Stephen received "a crown and a blessing at the mercy and behest 
of the Emperor," according to Thietmar of Merseburg, "to establish the 
bishoprics." Hungarian historical tradition (the Pozsonyi/Bratislava 
Chronicle) dates this to 1000, the Varad-Oradea/Zagreb Chronicle to 
1001, and prevailing opinion to Christmas or January 1000/1001.26 Other 
modem-day historians note that Holy Roman Emperor Otto III (ruled 983-
1002) was in Rome between August 1000 and February 1001, and then in 
Ravenna in April, where he would have had occasion to attend to the 
matter of the Hungarian coronation in consultation with Pope Sylvester II, 
his former teacher and close confidant, and with the duke of Bavaria.27 
Historian Janos M. Bak recently reminded us that Otto and Sylvester 
acted several times hand in hand.28 The story of the Hungarian delegation 
to Pope Sylvester II requesting a crown was written down only at the 
beginning of the 12th century (the Hartvic legend) on the basis of a 
possibly true historical tradition that is now completely unknown, and was 
the subject of an attempt at substantiation around 1630 by means of the 
fake papal bull attributed to Sylvester II. 
Unlike previous German emperors, Otto III viewed East Central 
Europe as an enormous political chessboard or, rather, as a region fantas-
tically favourable for a religious revival, the Roman "renovatio" in the 
strictest sense of that term.29 His vision took in the entire area from the 
Adriatic to the Baltic Sea, and he planned to spread his empire from 
Venice, through Prague, to Gniezno, by founding new kingdoms and 
archbishoprics.30 For diverse reasons, his efforts had only varying degrees 
of success. Among the region's new states, only in Hungary was a king 
crowned during Otto's reign, in 1000 or 1001. Much ink has been ex-
pended on the question of why such coronation did not happen in 
Bohemia and Poland. Among the Poles, it was probably impediments of 
the canon law that prevented both Gniezno's establishment as an arch-
bishopric and Boleslaw Chrobry's coronation. A contributing factor to 
Otto's failure to have a Christian king crowned in Bohemia was the 
intensification German-Czech tensions, the Premyslida-Slavnik conflict 
and the Czech leaders' anti-Otto and anti-Piast policies. Most important of 
course, was the untimely death of the "great chess-player." 
Otto's successors, Henry II and Conrad II, understood the lan-
guage of armaments much better than the refined manners of political 
negotiations. The victims of this turn of events were Poland and Bohemia, 
whose incipient development as Christian kingdoms came to a temporary 
halt, as is illustrated by the long wait for the Prague bishopric, which had 
been founded around 972, to be raised to an archbishopric — which did 
not actually take place until 1344. The duke of Bohemia assumed the title 
of king on a continuous basis only in 1197. (Although this did happen 
earlier on occasions on an individual basis: Vratislav II became king in 
1085 and Vladislav II in 1158.) The Poles had to wait until 1025 for the 
first coronation, and until 1300 their ruler bore the title of king only 
sporadically. These problems were felt least in Bohemia, which was 
throughout this period the closest to Western standards: statistical indica-
tors for the country during the Middle Ages — such as population 
density, the density of parishes, and degree of urbanization — consistently 
surpassed those of Hungary and Poland.31 
A key characteristic of Hungarian development was the fact that 
the Arpad dynasty held sway over the entire country which had been 
presented to Stephen I as a kind of "tabula rasa', that is he was left with 
a free hand in setting up Hungary's ecclesiastical organization. Stephen 
founded bishoprics without papal interference throughout his whole life, 
even if not twelve of them as a legend claims. By virtue of this central-
ized development and the good relations that prevailed between Hungary 
and the Holy Roman Empire during the reign of Henry II, the Hungarians 
were able to stand up to the German armies in 1030 during the first post-
1000 Hungarian-German armed conflict, when the attackers were forced 
back and dealt a humiliating defeat at Vienna.32 The Hungarians were 
assisted by the swamps and rivers that defended their western frontier. 
These wastelands, augmented by castles and water defences, helped to 
fend off what were in every case militarily much stronger attackers, right 
up to the last German onslaught in 1108. 
The constant border disputes between the Czechs and the Poles 
were not paralleled in the Hungarians' relations with their neighbours. 
The country's boundaries along the Carpathian mountain ranges presented 
effective defense, except for the debacle against the Tartars in the thirt-
eenth century. Another factor that may have reduced the number of 
conflicts the Hungarians had to cope with was the incomplete settlement 
of the Carpathian Basin's frontier areas, as a result of which internal 
population surpluses — as well as the influx into the country of large 
numbers of refugees — could be accommodated through the process of 
the settlement of these regions. No lasting military threat arose from the 
country's immediate neighbours: the Austrian or Moravian dukes, or from 
those of Galicia, Wallachia or southern Slav areas. At the same time, the 
vastness of the Carpathian Basin was one of the impediments to the 
expansionist ambitions of Hungary's rulers: population growth could not 
be sustained at a rate sufficient to support political and military expan-
sion. Expansion into Galicia (Halic) and the Balkans would only have 
been viable in the long term if it had been possible to Magyarize the Slav 
populations there, which was not feasible. Prior to the appearance of the 
Turkish threat, Hungary's rulers had surprisingly wide strategic and 
political freedom of movement, sufficient even to enable them to find the 
means and the time to correct their bad decisions, and win back the 
territories and fortifications that they had lost. 
Despite the challenges to the throne in medieval Hungary, the 
kingdom was rarely seriously threatened by lasting territorial divisions, 
and the chiefs of the administrative units along the borders (the Transyl-
vanian or Slavonian officials), more often than not remained loyal vassals 
of the king. Indeed the extent of the Hungarian king's power was written 
about with astonishment by the German historian Otto of Freising in the 
middle of the 12th century.33 This situation presented some disadvantages. 
Being a centralized country, in Hungary regional political centres that 
could have led to the formation of local centres of culture and learning 
failed to develop. Furthermore, since Hungarian-language literature was 
associated throughout this age with paganism, the written language of the 
realm remained Latin. There are only two short Hungarian-language 
sacred texts that survive from before 1300, although there is some oral 
record of Hungarian heroic poetry.34 
The foundation of the Hungarian state had a determinative influ-
ence in the history of what are now the Central European countries of 
Croatia, Slovakia and Romania, since their present-day territories partly or 
wholly consist of land that lay within the Kingdom of Hungary. By the 
end of the 11th century, Hungarian expansion had secured for its kings the 
crown of Croatia, a country that was coveted by both the Venetian and 
Byzantine empires and had already adopted the Latin Christian faith. The 
Croatian crown was retained by the Hungarian kings right up to 1918, but 
Croatia retained its territorial integrity throughout, largely as the result of 
the inability of the medieval state of Hungary to bring about the devel-
oped coastal areas' full economic and political integration into the 
Kingdom of Hungary. It is not an unrelated fact that the borders of Latin 
Christendom in the Balkans have remained coincident with the borders of 
Croatia right up to present times. 
A particular mention should be made of the Hungarian Kingdom's 
relations with Europe's great powers, or more precisely, with the Holy 
Roman and Byzantine empires. As a medium-sized power, Hungary 
could not take up the struggle against either of these with any hope of 
success; however this did not have to be done often in the period under 
discussion. In the challenge from the Holy Roman, i.e. the German 
Empire, the years between 1030 and 1108 were critical: there was a real 
danger that in the midst of the country's periodic civil warring the 
German Emperor could reduce Hungary to vassalage.35 Fortunately, 
Hungary's natural defences, in particular the marshlands of the kingdom's 
western approaches, often helped to thwart German incursions. When the 
imperial armies managed to penetrate the kingdom and it came to open 
warfare, the situation was different. Under these circumstances the 
Hungarian army never won a significant battle during this period, and 
indeed in 1044 (at Menfo not far from the fortified city of Gyor), it 
suffered a spectacular defeat. Crucial to Hungary's success in avoiding 
subjugation was the intensifying struggle between the emperor and the 
pope, which relegated the Hungarian front to a second-rank theatre of 
conflict for the German imperial court. 
We can reach a similar conclusion regarding Hungarian-Byzantine 
relations. During the resurgence of Byzantine power in the 12th century, 
Hungary had to retreat in the face of Constantinople's belligerent military 
and foreign policy. An event of major significance was the defeat in 1167 
(at Zimony, today in Belgrad) suffered by what was the century's stron-
gest Hungarian army — comprising half of the country's total military 
forces and equipped with Western European-type armour and arms. The 
territory given up to Byzantium as a consequence was only regained by 
the Hungarians (by King Bela III) after the death of the Byzantine 
Emperor Manuel at the end of the century. It was partly in response to 
these events that the above-mentioned chronicler Anonymous felt obliged 
to deny the justifiability of the Byzantine territorial claims, and to bolster 
his argument, began tracing the Arpads' rightful title to the entire Carpa-
thian Basin as far back as the Attila the King of the Huns, thus laying the 
foundations for a virulent Hungarian political myth that lasted for centu-
ries. 
A peculiar and fortunately exceptional event of Hungarian history 
prior to 1300 was the clash between the Mongol Empire and Hungary. 
Although the Mongol-Tatar advance did not catch the country unawares, 
the kingdom's army nevertheless suffered a catastrophic defeat at Muhi 
(not far from modem city Miskolc), in the spring of 1241. Afterward the 
invaders took possession of large parts of the country, with the exception 
of some fortresses.36 The massive demographic losses suffered as a result 
of this conquest by the kingdom's Magyar ethnic group became a political 
question only several centuries later, and the Mongol occupation's rather 
short duration did not undo the country's international reputation. Indeed, 
the country's reconstruction resulted in economic and social advances and 
the attainment of a new level of modernity. It was the defeat at Muhi that 
first generated the idea of seeking Western assistance for the country. In 
response to the defeat of the Hungarians the Pope and the German 
emperor started to recruit a Christian army, but their efforts were frus-
trated by distrust between the two and by the pope's untimely death.37 
This would not have been the first instance that an international peace-
making force did not get organized in time, and the Mongol victory 
certainly demonstrates that without foreign assistance, Hungary had little 
chance against the vast conquering empires emerging from Asia even in 
the days of its greatest military glory. 
Population density figures offer a further insight into the situation 
in East Central Europe of the times.38 Unfortunately, the data available is 
unreliable and is somewhat contradictory. The reconstruction of the demo-
graphic situation in the Carpathian Basin between the 9th and 13th centu-
ries is very difficult. No censuses were conducted in Hungary until the 
eighteenth century. The first Hungarian census, that of 1784/87, gave the 
population of the kingdom as 8,492,000. Estimates for the country's 
population in 1495 range between 2 and 3.5 million. The first reference to 
the numbers of the Hungarians before the conquest comes from the 
writings of the Arab historian Ibn Rusa, who claimed that around 880 the 
Hungarians had 20,000 armed horsemen. Some modern-day historians 
(Gyorgy Gyorffy in particular) infer from this that there were 400,000 
Hungarians and 200,000 Slavs in the Carpathian Basin at the beginning of 
the tenth century. Others (Gyula Kristo for example) have recently 
proposed radically smaller figures, putting the Hungarian population at 
120,000, with a local non-Magyar population being about the same size. 
The calculations rest largely on whether the Hungarians are thought to 
have been semi-nomads, as in Gyorffy's view, or full nomads, as in 
Kristo's, because the population of semi-nomads derived from the number 
of warriors is estimated using a multiplier that is twice as high. Another 
recent reassessment challenges the proposition that the Hungarians 
necessarily required superiority in numbers to assimilate the existing Slav 
population and to retain the Hungarian language. Of the Carpathian 
Basin's 330,000 square kilometres, some 200,000 may be taken as being 
inhabited at that time, which with Gyorffy's figures gives a population 
density of 3 per sq. km., and at the end of the 11th century, the population 
figure of 1 million gives a density of 5 per sq. km, which matches the 
figures for Poland of the time. The lower estimates put population at the 
end of the 11th century as only half a million. The comparative figures 
around 1000 are: Italy, 7 million with a population density of 24/sq. km; 
Germany, 5.4 million, with 10/sq. km; and Bohemia, 1 million, with a 
population density of 7.8/sq km. 
Conclusions 
Even Stephen's contemporaries must have been in awe of the enormous 
significance of his life's work, because they usually referred to him as a 
saint long before his canonization in 1083. The turning point from a 
constitutional point of view came with the rule of the Hungarian king, 
Andrew I, who came to power after the bloody civil wars that followed 
Stephen's death. He anchored the legitimacy of his rule directly to the 
person of Stephen, by seeking out Stephen's coronation jewels when he 
took the throne. The canonization of Stephen, the first in Hungary, took 
place during the rule of Ladislas I (ruled 1077-95). Stephen was the first 
in the ranks of European royal saints who did not suffer martyrdom; he 
achieved his elevation by virtue of his distinctions as ruler and spreader 
of the faith.39 
The recognition of Stephen as an apostolic king and a founder of 
church and state became particularly important to Hungary in the second 
half of the 11th century, when the kingdom became caught up in the 
crossfire between papal and German imperial claims. Legends from this 
time relate the quest for recognition of the Hungarian king's apostolic 
rights from the pope and contemporary Europe. These legends were the 
basis for the Hungarian kings' petition for papal recognition of Stephen's 
virtues, and indeed it was the writer of the third legend of St. Stephen, 
Hartvic, whose ecclesiastical-legal arguments gained the approval of a 
later pope, Innocent III, in 1201 — with the exception of the parts most 
offensive to the papacy. In 1233, King Andrew II ascribed the origin of 
his power expressis verbis to Stephen. The process went in parallel with 
the cult of St. Wenceslas in Bohemia and partly with that of St. Vojtech / 
Adalbert in Poland, where the key figures in the formation of Christian 
nations became the patron saints of the countries and kings in perpetuity 
("rex perpetuus"). 
From the time of Ladislas and Coloman (in Hungarian, Kalman, 
ruled 1096 to 1116) the source of legitimacy for Hungary's kings was the 
person and reign of Stephen, and so matters related to him took on a 
unique significance. Stephen has nearly every virtue of the mythical state-
founders of medieval legends: he makes laws, mints coins, makes peace, 
adopts literacy, founds towns and churches.40 Much of court pomp and 
ceremony is associated with Szekesfehervar, made by the king into the 
country's sacred centre, on the model of Aachen: from Coloman onwards 
most Hungarian kings were buried here, they were crowned here, the 
royal throne was kept here. A condition of legitimacy was that the 
coronation be carried out with St. Stephen's crown and take place in 
Szekesfehervar. It was here that the royal archives and treasury were kept. 
The royal assizes that involved court and legislative sessions were also 
held here, on the holiday of the sainted king. This date has a particular 
significance in the history of legislation in Hungary.41 
The beginning of the 11lh century marks the end of the first great 
stage in the process of founding church and state in Hungary. Hungarian 
Christianity and the kingdom's ecclesiastical and temporal administrations 
survived the onslaughts of pagan uprisings (in 1046 and 1061) and 
reached consolidation towards the end of the 11th century, especially 
under Ladislas I and Coloman when the feudal order was finally estab-
lished, the first saints were canonized, and new dioceses were founded. 
The canonization of Stephen I constituted the recognition that Hungary 
had finally arrived among the Western, Latin Christian kingdoms. Even 
among contemporaries, this process became merged, partly unconsciously 
and partly by design, with the memory of the first king. By around 1100 
it had become widely believed that the state of Hungary and its church 
had been founded by King Stephen as the single resolution of a sovereign 
ruler. 
King St. Stephen himself regarded the conversion to Christianity 
to be the main achievement of the age of the Hungarian kingdom's 
establishment. This is the message of his "Admonitions," the earliest 
"king's testament" in East Central Europe. Written by an anonymous 
ecclesiastic but attributed to the king, this document expressly links the 
future of the country with the keeping the Christian faith. In his Admoni-
tions Stephen counsels his son, and all his descendants, to act accordingly. 
The posterity took St. Stephen's advice to heart: his Admonitions were 
embodied in the Laws of St. Stephen and remained the basis of the 
Hungarian Corpus Iuris up to the twentieth century.42 
In time, the three news states of Hungary, Bohemia and Poland 
became part of Christian Europe, "Europa occidens" as opposed to the 
world of the Byzantine Orthodox Christendom. In medieval times the 
modern political terminology of "Central Europe" or "East Central 
Europe" were unknown.43 In the first centuries of these kingdoms' exis-
tence, the dynasties of the new states forged close relations with each 
other and with the ruling houses of their "Western" neighbours through 
marriage alliances. These three countries also joined the world of the 
Western, Latin church and accepted its traditions including monastic life. 
Nevertheless, modern historians have rightly pointed out that the new 
states that occupied the swathe of land between the Adriatic and the North 
Sea bear similarities in their statistical indicators which, despite variations, 
classed them as a group of countries undergoing a shared process of 
social and economic development. Having started off with clear disadvan-
tages, these countries' social and economic development during the 11th 
and 12th centuries had brought the region very close to the standards of 
more advanced Western lands by the following century. Total integration 
into — and complete catching up to — "Western" Europe was never 
achieved and the new lands remained a zone of the frontier or periphery. 
The eleventh century in Europe gave birth not just to new states but to a 
new region which later became known as East Central Europe.44 
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Dynastic Intrigues and 
Domestic Realities during the Reigns of 
Andrew I and Bela I 
Z. J. Kosztolnyik 
Porro dux Andreas a perturba-
cionibus hostiumsecurus effectus 
in regia civitate Alba regalem 
coronam est adeptus. 
Chronicon pictum, c. 86. 
In the mid-1030s, the cousin of King Stephen I of Hungary, Prince Vazul 
(the son of Michael, the younger brother of Geza, Stephen's father) 
conspired to assassinate the elderly and ailing king. The conspiracy was 
discovered and the king's court had Vazul blinded and his three sons: 
Levente, Andrew and Bela, banished from the kingdom.1 Next, a new 
article was added to the recently promulgated Laws of King Stephen (art. 
ii: 17) regarding conspiracy against king and country. The article pro-
claimed that the organizer of such conspiracy may find no refuge in a 
church. Although this decree shows similarity in concept and wording to 
the brief entry 5 of the Synod of Mainz (847 a.d.), the phrasing of the 
Hungarian article is firmer: it outlaws the traitor not only from the 
community of believers, but from the Church itself. 
Upon the death of King Stephen in 1038, his nephew, Peter the 
Orseolo — the son of one of Stephen's sisters, and the favourite of Queen 
Gisela, Stephen's widow (and the sister of the Holy Roman Emperor, 
Henry II) — ascended the Hungarian throne. His tyrannical rule (from 
1038 to 1041 and from 1044 to 1046) encountered strong opposition. In 
1041 Peter fled the realm after which his opponents elected Samuel Aba, 
the Palatine of the country and husband of Stephen's other sister, as their 
king. Unfortunately for Aba, the German imperial court refused to recog-
nize his election to the Hungarian throne and Emperor Henry III invaded 
Hungary.2 
Henry's armies first seized the frontier fortress of Pozsony (Press-
burg, today's Bratislava), then advanced along the left bank of the Danube 
to the Garam (Hron) River taking possession of nine other Hungarian 
fortifications. Aba reacted to this invasion by offering peace to the 
Emperor. Henry refused this offer and embarked on a new invasion this 
time along the right bank of the Danube. His forces, however, bogged 
down in the marshes of the Rabca River. In the fall of 1043 Henry 
concluded peace with Aba, thereby recognizing his royal status. 
On the domestic front, however, King Aba's opponents, consisting 
of Orseolo sympathizers and Church leaders, were gaining strength. The 
King, fearing another conspiracy, early in 1043 ordered the slaughter of 
the dignitaries who had conspired against him. The following year the 
nobles who survived the massacre asked for the Emperor's intervention. 
Henry III once again entered Hungary with his armies and on July 5 
defeated Aba's forces in the Battle of Menfo (Gyor county, in western 
Hungary). The King fled to the east but was captured and killed by his 
Hungarian opponents. Soon thereafter Henry entered Szekesfehervar (Alba 
Civitas or Alba Regia — Arpadian Hungary's second most important 
city), where he restored Peter the Orseolo to the Hungarian throne. 
Peter's throne rested on shaky foundations. In order to secure his 
reign and the unqualified support of the Emperor, in the spring of 1045 
he offered Hungary as a fiefdom to Henry III.3 And yet, the Orseolo did 
not feel secure in his kingdom, in spite — or, perhaps, because — of his 
feudal relationship with the imperial court. Accordingly, he had the 
district forts garrisoned by German and Italian troops — to the consterna-
tion of the Hungarian nobles who, led by Boja and Bonya, formed a 
conspiracy against him. The Orseolo had the conspirators executed. 
Thereupon in the spring of 1046, the nobles gathered at Csanad and sent 
envoys to Kiev to recall from their exile the Arpadian princes Andrew 
and Levente (Vazul's oldest sons), to rule over the country. 
In the early fall of 1046, the two princes — along with their 
Kievan auxiliaries — entered the realm, where they were joined by a 
multitude of King Peter's opponents, led by Vata from the region of 
Bekes who wanted to restore paganism in the land. In order to gain time, 
the two princes seemingly consented to Vata's demand, thereby opening 
the floodgates of an anti-Christian uprising all over the land.4 Simul-
taneously, an abortive uprising also broke out in the camp of the Orseolo 
at Zsitvatorok (the estuary of the Zsitva stream). The king next tried to 
enter the city of Szekesfehervar, but the city gates remained shut before 
him. He was captured at Zamoly and was blinded. 
It was Peter the Orseolo's tragedy that he, a ruler of non-Arpad 
blood, had been unable to comprehend that it was his sole responsibility 
to maintain the country's public institutions his predecessors had estab-
lished. It was his personal tragedy that, in spite of the many years he had 
spent in the country, he was unable to understand the spiritual inner world 
of the Magyar people. 
At the end of September, three bishops who had escaped the 
bloodbath of the pagan uprising, crowned Andrew I king in the royal 
cathedral (coronation church) of Szekesfehervar. 
The Reign of Andrew I 
The invitation of Andrew and his accession to the Hungarian throne 
proved a mixed blessing to both the nobles who had invited him, and to 
Andrew himself. During his prolonged stay in Kiev, Andrew had gained 
the hand in marriage of Anastasia, daughter of Jaroslav the Wise, grand-
prince of Kiev, and through this marriage he assured himself of the 
political — and, possibly, the military — support of the Kievan Empire 
for the realization of his own dynastic ambitions. The other daughter of 
Jaroslav, Anna, was the queen of Henry I, king of the Franks, whereby 
the recently anointed and crowned Hungarian monarch could hope to 
obtain diplomatic and cultural aid from his Frankish royal brother-in-law. 
The founding by Andrew of the abbey of Tihany in 1055 in the honour of 
the Frankish saint, Anian, may serve as proof that the establishment of 
Franco-Hungarian cultural ties had been realized.5 
King Andrew's first concern was to restore peace in the land, to 
put Vata's pagan insurgents into their place, and to fill unoccupied 
ecclesiastical positions in the country with the twenty-four canons who 
came to Hungary after their canonry at Verdun had burned down. In the 
late 1040s, he provided military aid for the Croats against Venice and the 
Dalmatian cities, and in the early spring of 1050, he staged a counter 
offensive against Bishop Gebhard of Regensburg who had invaded 
Hungary's frontier region. When the Hungarian scouts noted that on the 
German side of the border the Germans were rebuilding the fort of Ham-
burg, Andrew's border guards harassed the builders and brought construc-
tion to a near standstill. To reach a peace agreement with the Holy 
Roman Empire, Andrew sent envoys to Emperor Henry III, and dis-
patched Archbishop George of Kalocsa to Pope Leo IX, who was at that 
time visiting in Lorrain, with the request that his Holiness intervene at the 
imperial court on behalf of the peace offer made by the Hungarian 
monarch. 
In 1050, Prince Bela also returned to Hungarian soil with his 
Polish wife. Andrew rewarded him with a princely share of Hungary's 
territory that meant, among other things, that Bela had the right to mint 
money. In his exile Bela had made a reputation for himself as a military 
strategist and a brave soldier.6 In the summer of 1051, King Andrew 
needed all of Bela's military know-how when German imperial forces 
gathered at Passau and, led by the Emperor Henry III in person, invaded 
Hungary and marched against Szekesfehervar. Bishop Gebhard was in 
charge of the imperial supply ships on the Danube carrying food for the 
Emperor's troops. The imperial high command had learned a lesson from 
past mistakes; it organized supplies of food provisions for the troops 
before actually starting the campaign. But Andrew's men — or Bela's 
scouts — in a cleverly written mischievous letter had caused the ships to 
return home prematurely, thereby leaving the German troops heading 
toward Szekesfehervar without food supplies. Consequently, Andrew's 
and Bela's forces easily out-manoeuvred and then defeated the imperial 
forces at Bodajk near Mount Vertes (Hill of [the lost] Shields). 
The imperial court next planned a new offensive. In the follow-
ing year its forces besieged the fortress of Pozsony for eight weeks — to 
no avail. The imperial naval vessels on the Danube — it is not clear 
from the text whether the boats were armed ships, or food supply vessels 
— were sunk by a clever Hungarian frogman named Zotmund, whereupon 
the Emperor withdrew his troops. Since Pozsony was located near the 
German border, and the imperial high command could easily have 
provided for the needs of its forces by means of land transportation. 
Actually, Henry III was forced to withdraw his armed forces not so much 
because of Zotmund's brave deed, but because he had to face domestic 
troubles: Duke Conrad of Bavaria had revolted against him.7 
Unfortunately for Hungary, this was the last occasion when 
Andrew and Bela cooperated with each other. In 1053, a son and heir: 
Salomon, was born to Andrew, and the king had a Basilian monastery 
erected at Visegrad to please his Kievan-born Queen Anastasia who had 
been brought up in Byzantine Christian traditions. In 1054 the schism 
between Byzantium and Rome became open. In order to make sure that 
he did not appear to favour either side in this religions quarrel and that he 
did not offend the sensitivities of his Queen's sister Anna, the wife of the 
west-Frankish monarch, in 1055 King Andrew established a Latin-rite 
monastery in Tihany. Through these acts Andrew sought to have peace 
and balance between the religious and political interests of the two 
churches and wanted the Frankish court to know that his realm formed a 
part of western, Latin Christendom. 
Peace had prevailed in the land. Archbishop Benedict of Eszter-
gom and Zach[eus] the Palatine (comes palatini) were the country's head 
officials. In the 1050s, Sarchas, Judge of the King's Court, prepared a 
census of the personnel serving on the royal estates. It may have been at 
this time that Edward Aetheling (also known as Edward the Exile) — the 
son of King Edward's brother, Edmund (known as "Ironside") — who 
had been banished to Hungary by King Cnut the Great, allegedly married 
Agatha, a daughter of Stephen I. To quote from the Anglo-Saxon Chroni-
cle, Edward "won a kinswoman of the Emperor for his wife," that is, a 
daughter of Queen Gisela, the sister of Emperor Henry II, but returned to 
England where he died shortly thereafter. "[H]e so speedily ended his life 
after he came to England." An explanation for Edward's sudden death 
may be provided by a remark in the less-known Florence manuscript of 
the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle: "for the king — that is, Edward the Confes-
sor — had determined to make Edward heir to the kingdom after him." 
Perhaps certain individuals at the English court disliked the idea of a 
prince who had been living abroad for years and had married into a 
"foreign" royal family, thereby establishing a dynastic blood tie with the 
Holy Roman imperial court, being allowed to ascend the English throne.8 
Another entry in this Florence manuscript of the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle may, however, reveal a further dynastic aspect of this story, 
that is that Andrew I of Hungary might have made plans with Edward the 
Exile, heir presumptive to the English throne, to expand the Hungarian 
Kingdom's diplomatic influence beyond the confines of the Germanic 
world. In such a manner, through family connections with the Frankish 
and English royal houses, to which he could add his family ties with the 
ruling house in Kiev (and the religious-political ties with Byzantium), 
King Andrew I wanted to bring about a far-reaching dynastic network by 
arranging for a well placed marriage alliance between his son Salomon 
and Judith, the sister of the new German ruler, the future Holy Roman 
Emperor Henry IV.9 
The dynastic marriage relationship in the making between the 
House of Arpad and the Franconian dynasty of German rulers — against 
the background of Arpadian blood ties with the west-Frankish and English 
kingdoms, and family and religious ties with the eastern, Kievan and 
Byzantine, courts — provided a seemingly firm foundation for the 
position of Andrew I, as well as his son Salomon, in a central Europe. 
A well-informed Hungarian chronicler of the times who probably 
had a clear picture of Andrew's dynastic goals,10 commented on the case 
from an entirely different perspective. Blood ties often hinder the truth, 
he complained. Also, fatherly concern in the heart of Andrew, he wrote, 
defeated justice, in that Andrew, by now old and invalid — and yet, in a 
manner unworthy of a king — broke the promise he had made to his 
younger brother Bela that, upon his death, it will be Bela who shall 
inherit the Hungarian throne. Instead, Andrew had Salomon, his five-year-
old son, anointed and crowned king, "in regem fecit iniungi et coronari." 
The chronicler excused the King's behaviour by saying that he had acted 
out of national interest: the German court would not have consented to 
the arranged marriage without Salomon's coronation; and yet, the chroni-
cler also pointed out, the king had made a mistake. When Bela found out 
what really had happened, he justly grew indignant and, what was worse, 
became suspicious. 
Later Andrew once again met his younger brother at the royal 
hunting lodge at Varkony. There he, without the knowledge of Bela, put 
his brother to a test. Would the prince accept political reality? Would he 
be satisfied with his princely title and landholdings, and continue as the 
realm's military defender during the minority of the child king, Salomon; 
or, would he reach out for the crown, thereby voiding Andrew's dynastic 
ambitions? Accordingly, at Varkony, Andrew placed before Bela the 
crown and a sword and asked him to chose. Bela, following the advice of 
Nicholas, reeve of the royal court: "Si vitam optas, accipe gladium," 
chose, out of fear, the sword, that is, the princely title. After he had 
made his choice, Bela with his family immediately left the kingdom. 
Regardless of the fact that he had acted out of fear, the prince, in decid-
ing to flee to Poland, simply refused to identify himself with — and may 
have decided to undermine — his brother's pro-German game of dynastic 
chess. 
In the fall of 1060, Prince Bela returned from Poland with three 
divisions of Polish auxiliaries and took up position east of the Tisza river. 
King Andrew grew concerned, sent his family to safety in Austria, and 
asked for German military aid. Through this twofold act the already very 
ill monarch committed a fatal mistake. He had fully weakened his 
position on the home front and demolished any prospect of success he 
could have claimed for his foreign diplomacy. The king was no match 
for Bela's military know-how, not to mention the fact that the majority of 
his subjects sided with the prince. Bela deployed his forces in the Tisza 
region — a region that formed part of his princely territory, whose terrain 
he knew well, where he could easily provide logistics for his men — and 
encircled the German troops that had arrived to help Andrew. The King 
fled to Moson on the western border, was severely wounded in an acci-
dent, was captured by Bela's men and, because of incompetent medical 
treatment, soon died in the royal hunting lodge at Zirc. 
A word of explanation will be in order here. In this writer's 
opinion, King Andrew I must have become overconfident by the pros-
pects of his marriage-bound diplomacy: his links to Kievan Rus, to the 
Frankish Kingdom, to the Germanic world of the Holy Roman Emperors, 
and his expected ties to England, blinded him to realities. 
In connection with the latter it might be mentioned that there is 
no record of Edward Aetheling's stay — that lasted well into King An-
drew's reign — in Hungary by the Hungarian chroniclers. If, however, 
Edward did not marry one of King Stephen's daughters but only a 
Hungarian noble woman (an unlikely scenario knowing King Stephen's 
warm hospitality extended to all "foreigners") the Anglo-Saxon prince, 
who had lived and raised a family in Hungary, still had to have active 
contacts with the Hungarian royal court. 
King Andrew wanted to crown this complicated and perhaps 
unrealistic policy with the marriage of his son to the sister of the ruling 
German monarch, the future Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV — who at 
the time was still a minor. It was the Andrew's personal tragedy that his 
overbearing dynastic ambitions lacked political reality. On the one hand, 
the imperial court's advisors and dowager empress Agnes (Henry II's 
widow), viewed the proposed marriage between Salomon and Judith as a 
means to draw the Magyar kingdom back into the sphere of imperial 
influence, from which it had only recently pulled away. This German-
Hungarian marriage alliance sooner or later would have restored the 
Magyar court's dependency on the Holy Roman Empire. On the other 
hand, Andrew's diplomacy lacked domestic reality: it ignored his subjects' 
deep-seated distrust of foreign influences and their attachment to ancient 
Magyar habits and manner of life. Many in Hungary of the times were 
searching for an excuse to revolt — with armed force, if needed — 
against the "foreign" politics of their monarch. 
The Reign of Bela I 
In early December 1060, Bela I became king. The Hungarian chronicler 
called Bela Benin (the warrior). Bela entered Szekesfehervar in triumph, 
where the bishops anointed and crowned him — "regali dyademata... est 
coronatus," the chronicler reported. This writer, however, believes that the 
circlet used at the coronation was not the crown that touched King 
Stephen's forehead, but "[the] ruler's diadem with which the bishops, 
after anointing him, had crowned him." If this ruler's diadem happened 
to be the circlet sent by the Byzantine Emperor Monomachos, a diadem 
that the Latin-rite bishops had placed on Bela's head, the new king 
through his coronation wanted to signal his determination that during his 
reign he shall maintain good relations with the eastern Greek court, and at 
the same time also continue the Arpads' western orientation. The new 
king's first task was to deflate once and for all the still vigorous "pagan" 
revolution in the land. Bela first tried persuasion but made only slow 
progress; in the end he had to rely upon military force to restore law and 
order. The chronicler's statement that the king summoned, countrywide, 
two well-spoken men from every village to his Royal Council to aid him 
in decision making — "misit etiam rex... per totam Hungariam precones, 
ut de singulis villis vocarentur duo seniores facundiam habentes [italics 
mine] ad regis concilium" — may refer to this resolution of the monarch. 
The chronicler's choice of Latin terms meant that two well-spoken elders 
invited from every village were, "facundiam habentes," actually represen-
tatives of the villages in, or before, the King's Council, whose framework 
King Bela now expanded from the size the council had earlier been 
established by King Stephen. 
In other words, King Bela I in the early 1060s had — together 
with members of the high clergy, nobility, and elected representatives of 
the people — enacted effective legislation, placed the dismal financial 
problems of the country in order, and realized his clearly set domestic and 
foreign political aims. It might be pointed out that Bela's example would 
be emulated by other European rulers. In Aragon of the 1080s, it would 
be rex et regina who would call upon the representatives of the towns to 
participate in the discussion of public matters — and enact legislation. In 
England, it will be Henry II who, according to the resolutions of his 
Assize of Clarendon of 1166, through statements taken from the local 
legaliores (who knew of a certain crime, at the certain time, at a certain 
place) before courts of law, would conduct legal proceedings by the 
"Justices in the eyre." 
It was through his expanded Council that Bela had successfully 
handled financial matters, minted money, determined prices and wages, 
punished black marketeering, supported laissez faire, introduced Byzan-
tine gold coins into circulation — his forty silver denars were worth one 
Byzantine gold coin. This writer agrees with historian Balint Homan who, 
in his assessment of late eleventh century reforms in Hungary, said that 
the economic-financial improvements in the realm reached back to the 
days of King Bela I. The fiscal improvements "introduced" by King 
Salomon, for instance, would not have been possible without the fiscal 
initiatives under King Bela." 
One cannot leave out of consideration the fact that Bela had 
grown up in the Polish court, where fiscal reforms had been carried out 
already in the first half of the eleventh century. Bela had been aware that 
no matter how important his domestic and diplomatic efforts would be, he 
could not realize them without at first placing his country's economic and 
monetary state on solid foundations. In the spirit of King Stephen, he did 
this at the beginning of his reign, acting with the full cooperation of the 
high clergy, the nobility, and the peoples's representative spokesmen in 
the Council. 
It was also with the consent of his spiritual and temporal lords 
that Bela had, at the beginning of his reign, suppressed the pagan up-
heaval countrywide. This is evident from the remark of the Chroncile 
that it took Bela three days to take action; as soon as he had obtained the 
consent of his lords, and re-grouped his available army units, he mastered 
the situation. (The monarch had been aware that it was dangerous to use 
troops to quell domestic unrest; the experience could have backfired: 
"Hungaria ad Christum convertita bis ad paganismum versa est.") 
During the summer of 1063, the imperial diet meeting at Mainz 
decided on a military campaign against Bela in order to restore King 
Salomon to the Hungarian throne. The king, because he wanted to delay 
the invasion, or to avoid it by diplomatic means, sent envoys to the 
German court, but Empress Agnes was (rather, her advisors were) unwil-
ling to negotiate. Bela spent the early fall of 1063 at his hunting lodge at 
Domos to prepare for the Germans attack, when his throne literally 
collapsed under him — it depends how one reads the sentence in the 
Chronicle as the text also reads when the roof of the building fell upon 
him." Was the event a coincidence or sabotage organized from abroad — 
an attempt upon the king's life? Historians do not know the answer to this 
question. 
Bela never recovered from his wounds. From Domos he was 
taken on a stretcher to fort Moson so that he could direct military opera-
tions against the approaching imperial forces, but his health did not hold 
out. He had to be carried semi-conscious to the Kanizsa [Kynisua] Creek, 
where he died, "et ibi migravit e seculo." 
His sons fled to Poland to return with Polish troops by the end of 
the year. In early 1064, at Gyor in western Hungary, the headmen of the 
realm negotiated a peace between Salomon's supporters and Bela's sons: 
Geza, Laszlo [Ladislas], and Levente. On Easter Sunday, Prince Geza 
crowned Salomon anew in the cathedral at Pecs. Thereafter, the court of 
Salomon and his wife Judith revived — one ought to say: implemented 
— the financial reforms of Bela by establishing a system of monetary 
exchange of new coins (only) every two years. 
Conclusions 
King Bela had followed a very successful domestic and foreign policy 
based on common sense; unexpectedly, and, perhaps, too rapidly, did he 
achieve success with his military, administrative, fiscal and judicial 
policies. He had reached his triumphs far too soon for some of his — 
mostly non-Magyar — adversaries who wished nothing more than Bela's 
failure while his nephew, Salomon was still alive. Although collapsing 
buildings, or royal thrones, had buried ruling monarchs before, judged by 
the overly brief report by the Hungarian Chronicle on the reign of Bela I, 
the dying monarch had been aware that the Franconian [i.e. Holy Roman] 
court just would not refrain from using any Byzantine political method — 
including assassination — in removing him from the throne of the 
Arpads. 
The politics of both Andrew I and Bela I can only be character-
ized as cautious. Both monarchs passed resolutions, issued directives, 
undertook no action without the consent of the Council made up of the 
spiritual and temporal lords, as well as the well-spoken elders represent-
ing the people's interests. Their diplomacy relied upon marriages, form-
ing blood ties with various ruling families, in order to counterbalance any 
threat from the imperial Franconian court. Domestically, both had 
achieved great accomplishments. Because of the tragedies — accidental or 
premeditated — that cut their lives short, their dynastic policies remained 
unfinished, unsuccessful attempts. 
NOTES 
1
 Stephen I (the Saint, ruled 997-1038) is known to Hungarians as Szent 
Istvan, Vazul is also known as Vaszoly, Michael as Mihaly, and Andrew as 
Andras or Endre. 
Vazul's three sons fled first to Bohemia. Later, Levente and Andrew 
found refuge in the court of Jaroslav the Wise (ruled 1015-53) in Kiev, while 
Bela, at that of Casimir I (the Restorer, ruled 1038-58), the King of Poland. 
For information on primary and secondary sources relevant to this paper 
see the bibliographical essay at the end of these notes. 
2
 Henry III (b. 1017, d. 1056), duke of Bavaria and of Swabia, German 
king (1039-56) and Holy Roman Emperor (1046-56), was a member of the Salian 
or Franconian dynasty of Holy Roman Emperors. Henry was a highly educated 
and a very religious ruler who devoted much of his energies to serving the 
interests — as he saw them — of Christianity and the Germanic realm he ruled. 
He was the last of the emperors who was able to dominate the papacy. 
For an overview of the international context of this age see my article 
"Nemet politikai fejlemanyek a magyar tortenet hattereben..." [German political 
developments in the background of Hungarian history...], Acta Universitatis 
Szegediensis 109 (1999): 3-11. 
3
 The odd nature of the situation was depicted by the mid-XIVth century 
illuminator of the Chronicon pictum, which showed the Orseolo receiving the 
crown while standing from the hands of the Emperor who was sitting on the 
throne, as he, presumably, received the crown that had touched the forehead of 
King Stephen so that the Emperor could, upon performing this act, send the 
crown back to Rome. The return of the crown to the Roman See is witnessed by 
the testimony of the letter, dated October 28, 1074, of Pope Gregory VII, in the 
sense that, in that letter, the pontiff laid claim as a papal fief to the Magyar realm 
of King Salomon (1063-74, son of Andrew I). 
One has to assume that the crown used at Peter's coronation (if there 
ever was a coronation) was the diadem [circlet] sent by Pope Sylvester II to 
Stephen, if one is to believe the assertion made by Pope Gregory VII in his writ 
to King Salomon. However, one should remember that the Chronicon pictum, c. 
71, mentioned no coronation! "Postquam autem Petrus factus est rex" (after they 
had made him king), the statement does not necessarily imply coronation. In 
order to be "crowned" king, one needed the presence of bishops, and the anoint-
ment by bishops (like, in the Old Testament, Samuel anointing Saul king of 
Israel, ca 1025 BC). The "P" initial on fol. 24a of the Chronicle manuscript, 
depicted King Peter dressed in a shirt of mail, holding a sword in his right hand, 
and in his left a [the] crown. The crown could have been any circlet, perhaps 
Peter's house-crown. On the other hand, in c. 77, the Chronicle recorded that the 
Emperor, Henry III, upon the defeat of Aba, restored Peter to kingship with the 
royal insignia of King Stephen; "Petrum regem regali corona plenarie restitutum, 
et sacris insignibus sancti regis Stephani more regio decoratum." The Emperor 
could do that to a vassal, as, indeed, in the following year, Peter submitted 
himself as vassal, and his realm as benefice, to the Emperor (Chronicle, c. 78; 
and, the drawing in the "S" initial on fol. 27b of the Chronicle manuscript, where 
Peter, standing in front of, handed a [the] golden lance to, the Emperor sitting on 
a [the] throne). 
4
 In the meanwhile at the Pest shore ferry on the Danube the pagan 
insurgents murdered Gerard (known to Hungarians today as Szent Gellert), the 
bishop of Csanad and Szolnok, a royal reeve. 
5
 During his exile in Kiev, Andrew came under Byzantine religious 
influence which would accompany him long after he returned to Hungary. 
6
 During his exile in Poland, in a duel Bela had defeated a Prussian 
duke, an opponent of Casimir I, who had refused to pay feudal dues to the Polish 
court. As a reward for his deed, Bela was given the whole amount the Prussian 
duke owed to the King of Poland. 
7
 The insurgent duke later fled to the court of Andrew, and, probably 
encouraged by Andrew and Bela, the duke's armed men harassed the Bavarian 
border lands from a base in Hungary. 
x
 This is reported in the D and E manuscripts of the Anglo-Saxon 
Chronicle. 
9
 Henry IV (b. 1050, d. 1106), duke of Bavaria (1055-61), German king 
(from 1054) and, later, Holy Roman Emperor. Henry IV was second member of 
the Salian or Franconian dynasty Holy Roman emperors. The most notable 
development of Henry's long reign was his conflict with Pope Gregory VII. 
10
 According to historian Janos Horvath this chronicler was non other 
than Bishop Nicholas, the chancellor of King Andrew I, "qui tunc temporis vicem 
procurabat notarii," whose name appeared twice on the Tihany founding charter 
(he had witnessed and signed the document). 
11
 I am aware that some historians argue that the segment of the 
Chronicle which describes King Bela's reforms could be a later addition to the 
text that summarized fiscal reforms in the realm in the second half of the 
eleventh century. 
A note on sources for the study of the age of Andrew I and Bela I 
Related data in the mid-fourteenth century Chronicon pictum [Illuminated 
Chronicle], based on contemporary informative evidence of the 1040s through the 
1060s, provide information on the reigns of Andrew I and Bela I, 1046 through 
1063; for text, cf. "Chronici Hungarici compositio saeculi XIV," cc. 70 to 99, in 
Scriptores rerum Hungaricarum, ed. Emericus Szentpetery, 2 vols. (Budapest, 
1937-38; rev. ed. edited by Kornel Szovak and Laszlo Veszpremy, Budapest, 
1999) [cited hereafter as SSH] I, 32Jff.; for added comments, cf. ibid., II, 750ff.; 
also, Dezso Dercsenyi, ed., Chronicon pictum: Kepes Kronika, 2 vols. (Budapest, 
1963), vol. I: facsimile, f. 23v to fol. 35r. For an analysis of contemporary 
evidence, see Janos Horvath, Arpad-kori latinnyelvu irodalmunk stilusproblemai 
[Stylistic questions in the Latin-language literature of the Arpad age] (Budapest, 
1954), 305ff. 
The late-thirteenth century chronicler, Simon de Keza, provided some 
observations in his "Gesta Hungarorum," cc. 45 to 60; cf. SSH, I, 173ff.; annalis-
tic entries in the "Annales Posonienses," as, for example, under a. 1041: "Petrus 
rex elicitur et Aba in regem elevatur;" or, anno 1044: "Aba rex interficitur et 
Petrus rex in pristinum restituitur;" anno 1047: "... et Andreas rex elevatur;" also, 
anno 1052: "Henricus imperator Pannomam ingreditur;" and, anno 1057: "Andre-
as rex infirmatur et Salamonem filium suum coronavit;" further, under anno 
1060: "inter Andream et fratrem suum Bela gravie discordia oritur et rex Andreas 
moritur," etc., provide brief but valuable historical data — see SSH, I, 125, while 
additional remarks were made in the "Chronicon Zagrabiense," cc. 3 - 7, ibid., I, 
207ff. For a critical analytical summary of the material, see C. A. Macartney, 
The medieval Hungarian historians (Cambridge, 1953), 11 Iff., 133ff., 89ff., and 
109f., respectively. 
The Hungarian royal writs, documents — as, for example, the founding 
charter of Tihany abbey, 1055 — were carefully logged in Emericus Szentpetery 
et ai, eds., Regesta regum stirpis Arpadianae critico-diplomatica, 2 vols. (Buda-
pest, 1923-87), cited hereafter as RA, n. 12; for text, cf. Henrik Marczali, ed., 
Enchiridion fontium historiae Hungarorum (Budapest, 1901), 81 ff.; or, Emil 
Jakubovich and Dezso Pais, eds., O-magyar Olvasokonyv [Old Hungarian reader] 
(Pecs, 1929), 19ff.; also, SSH, I, 354, 17-19. For papal documents — as, for 
instance, the writ, dated Oct. 28, 1074, of Pope Gregory VII addressed to King 
Salomon, logged under ii: 13 in the papal Register — see Erich Caspar, ed., Das 
Register Gregors VII, MGH Epp., sel. II, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1920-23), I, 145. 
Among the non-Hungarian western Latin sources, one may refer to the 
Annales Altahenses, rev. ed., ed. E. ab Oefele, SSrG (Hannover, 1891), aa. 1041 
through 1046, 1050, 1051, 1052, 1053, 1056, 1058, 1060, 1063, etc.; the Annales 
Hildesheimenses, ed. G. Waitz, SSrG (Hannover, 1878; reprint 1947), aa. 1041-
1046; Herriman Contractus, "Chronicon," aa. 1038-46, Monumenta Germaniae 
historica, Scriptores, ed. G. H. Pertz, 30 vols. (Hannover, 1854etc.), cited 
hereafter as MGHSS, V, 126, 127. Under 1047, the entry records that Henry III 
would not enter Hungary because of the revolt in Flanders; under 1050; another 
entry mentions the attempt made by armed Magyar troops to prevent, or to delay, 
the re-fortification of Hainburg. In 1051, Gebhardt and Bohemian king Bretislav 
invaded Magyar land north of the Danube, while the Emperor entered Hungarian 
territory from Carinthia. In 1053, the Germans concluded peace with Andrew at 
Tribur; in 1060, Andrew, a sick man, sought safety for his family at Melk. Cf. 
MGHSS, V, 127. 
Lamperti Hersfelderisis Opera, ed. O. Holder-Egger, with the Weissenburg 
Annals, SSrG (Hannover, 1894), records the same event under anno 1061, and 
makes mention of William of Thuringia and Bishop Eppo; William was engaged 
to the daughter of Bela, but died, and it was Udalrich of Carinthia who had 
married her. The remark by Cosmas of Prague, "Chronicon Boemorum," that 
Peter Orseolo — some ten years after he had been captured, blinded and was 
buried at the cathedral in Pecs (see "Chronicon pictum," c. 85, SSH I, 342f) had 
married the widow of the Czech Brestislav, cf. MGHSS, IX, 78, rests upon 
shaky ground — cf. J. Loserth, "Kritische Studien zur altere Geschichte Boh-
mens," Mitteilungen des Institutes fur osterreichische Geschichtsforschung, 5 
(1884), 366ff.; or, St. Katona, Historia critica regum Hungariae stirpis Arpadi-
anae, 7 vols. (Pest—Buda, 1779-81), I, 991-92. 
On the diplomacy of Pope Leo IX, cf. Acta Sanctorum Bollandiana, 60 
vols. (Paris-Rome, 1864-76), April, II, 661; or, Wibert's "Vita s. Leonis IX 
papae," in J. P. Migne, ed., Patrologiae cursus completus, series Latina, 221 
vols. (Paris, 1844-55), cited hereafter as MPL, 143, 496bc; also Hildebert, "Vita 
Hugonis," ii: 7, MPL, 159, 864cd; Andrew did not comply with the agreement — 
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The Impact of the 
Ottoman Rule on Hungary 
Geza Palffy 
One of the most crucial events of European significance in Hungarian 
history was the battle at Mohacs on 29th August 1526 when the army of 
Siileyman I (1520-1566) won a decisive victory over Louis Jagello II's 
(1516-1526) troops. The complete defeat and the death of the king who 
ruled Hungary and Bohemia brought about fundamental changes in the 
strategic realities of Central Europe.1 In the 14th and 15th centuries all sig-
nificant dynasties of the region, including the Luxemburgs, Jagellonians, 
Habsburgs and even the Hungarian king Matthias Hunyadi (Corvinus, 
1458-1490), aimed at establishing a salient European power in the Middle 
Danube Basin. After the death of Louis II, Austrian archduke Ferdinand 
was elected king of Bohemia, (Prague, 23 October 1526), Hungary 
(Pozsony, [today's Bratislava, Slovakia], 17 December 1526) and Croatia 
(Cetin, 1 January 1527) and, finally, was crowned emperor of the Holy 
Roman Empire (Frankfurt am Main, 24 March 1558). Thus, during his 
reign, the Habsburgs succeeded in gathering under their hegemony more 
possessions (the Austrian hereditary provinces, as well as the lands of the 
Czechs, the Hungarians and the Croats) in Central Europe than any of 
their predecessors. However, they could still not take possession of the 
entire Carpathian Basin.2 
This study is accompanied by two maps. The first, entitled "Ottoman 
campaigns in Hungary (1526-1683)," is on page 113, and the second, 
"Fortresses in Hungary about 1582," can be found on page 115. 
After 1526, a new participant joined the struggle for European hegemony: 
Sultan Siileyman I who believed that the time had come to accomplish his 
world-conquering ambitions and to crush his main rivals, the Habsburgs. 
From this time on, for more than a century and a half, the presence of the 
Ottomans in Central Europe constituted a major and constant threat to the 
whole of Europe. At the same time, their formidable fleet also menaced 
the provinces of the Spanish Habsburg Crown in the Mediterranean. The 
advance of the Ottomans, economically strong and boasting the only 
regular army in the world, could only be contained by a close political, 
military and financial co-operation among the Habsburg possessions in 
Central Europe, governed from Vienna.3 
The Consequences of the Battle at Mohacs 
The defeat at Mohacs marks the beginning of a new era in the history of 
Hungary. The decisive factor was not the almost complete destruction of 
the royal forces but the change in the country's strategic position. From 
this time on, the fate of Hungary was to be decided almost exclusively in 
the capitals of the two Great Powers: Istanbul and Vienna. Hungary alone 
had no chance of resisting the Ottoman Empire for the latter's economic, 
military and human resources exceeded those of Hungary by far. Under 
these circumstances Hungary's very existence was at stake.4 In 1529 and 
1532, when Siileyman marched against Vienna, he assumed that the 
whole of Hungary would automatically fall under his sway. But after 
having realised that even his unequalled might was insufficient to achieve 
his objectives, the Sultan adopted a new strategy: a gradual, piece-by-
piece incorporation of Hungary in his empire, which in time would open 
the way to the Austrian capital. The first step in the realisation of his new 
conception was the capture in 1541 of Buda, the capital of the medieval 
Hungarian Kingdom.5 
With this event the territory of Hungary was torn into three parts 
for a long time to come. In fact the dismemberment had already started in 
the months following the battle of Mohacs. Contrary to commonly held 
beliefs, Sultan Siileyman did not completely withdraw from Hungary in 
1526 but took the fortresses of the so-called Szeremseg (•Sirmium, the 
eastern territory of the region between the rivers Drava and Sava) into his 
possession. 
Hungary's nobility became divided over the question as to how to cope 
with the crisis. A large group of them elected (on 10 November 1526) 
and then crowned (on 11 November 1526) Janos Szapolyai, one of 
Hungary's most influential landowners, king of the country. A smaller 
group of nobles, who perceived the situation more realistically, elected 
and then crowned Ferdinand Habsburg (on 17 December 1526 and 3 
November 1527 respectively). From the juridical point of view, the 
double election and coronation was not illegal. Nevertheless, it was an 
unfortunate development as it enabled Siileyman to take advantage of the 
division within the Hungarian political elite. While Szapolyai was twice 
defeated by the troops of King Ferdinand (1527-1528) and then became 
isolated diplomatically, the Porte had no difficulties in making him its 
vassal. Thus, against his original plans, Szapolyai became the first repre-
sentative of the Turkish orientation in Hungary and paved the way for 
Ottoman rule in much of the country.6 
The political and territorial division of the Hungarian Kingdom 
constituted one of the most serious and long-lasting effects of the Otto-
man conquest. By 1566, a series of military campaigns (1543-1545, 1551-
1552, 1554-1556 and 1566) had made it possible for the Ottoman leader-
ship to incorporate about 40 percent (that is to say about 120,000 km2) of 
the territory of the medieval Hungarian state. This central region, as well 
as the ones that were conquered later (1596: Eger, 1600: Kanizsa [today's 
Nagykanizsa], 1660: Nagyvarad [Oradea, Rumania], 1663: Ersekujvar 
[Nove Zamky, Slovakia]), remained under Ottoman rule. Contrary to his 
previous plan, Sultan Siileyman did not seize Transylvania and the 
counties bordering on it in the west (this region soon came to be called 
Partium). Having realised that these territories were of no use to him in 
any future campaign against Vienna, and also having recognised the 
advantages that Hungary's division granted him in diverting some of the 
Habsburgs' military power towards Transylvania, in 1556 he decided to 
launch the eastern parts on a separate route of development. Thus the 
Principality of Transylvania came into existence, which remained an 
Ottoman vassal until the end of the 17th century. The Principality was 
obliged to pay an ever-increasing yearly tribute to Istanbul and was 
subordinated to the Sultan in its external affairs. In return, it enjoyed 
almost total autonomy in its internal affairs and was referred to in 
Ottoman sources as "Sultan Siileyman's work (invention)." As regards its 
political, economic and social conditions, Transylvania had always been 
the least developed region of medieval Hungary, therefore its forced 
secession from the other Hungarian territories and the Ottoman rule 
resulted in its further decline.7 
In addition to the Ottoman military leadership, the nobility of the 
considerably diminished Royal Hungary also benefited from the existence 
of the separate Transylvanian state. From the end of the 16th century 
onwards, Royal Hungary's Estates realised that their own privileges could 
be protected from the centralising attempts of Vienna by veiled threats of 
the transfer of their allegiance to the rulers of Transylvania.8 It is worth 
mentioning as an analogy that the Estates of the Holy Roman Empire, in 
their negotiations with the emperors over questions of noble privileges, 
also took advantage of the issue of defence against the Ottomans, which 
from the middle of the 16th century was invariably on the agenda.9 Due to 
their shrewd policy, in the 17th century the Hungarian Estates succeeded 
in preserving their privileges and the relative autonomy of the Hungarian 
Kingdom within the Habsburg Empire. This meant that the country's 
nobility managed to turn Hungary's dismemberment to their advantage. 
This political chess-game had rather grave consequences by the 
beginning of the 18th century. After the Ottomans were driven out of the 
Carpathian Basin, Transylvania was not reannexed to Hungary, but was 
ruled directly from Vienna. Its reunion with Hungary would take place 
only after the Compromise of 1867. In sum, in the long run the establish-
ment of the Principality of Transylvania had done more harm than benefit 
to Hungarian national interests. Furthermore, for a long time the separa-
tion of Transylvania served as a dangerous precedent for Hungary's 
further dismemberment. Indeed, in 1682 a new Ottoman vassal state came 
into being in the northern part of the country, stretching from Gomor 
county to the Transylvanian border. This was the Principality of Upper 
Hungary (in Turkish: Orta Macar) ruled by Imre Thokoly. For a few 
years (1682-1685) then, the country was in fact divided into four parts.10 
Hungary as a Battleground: The Impact of Warfare 
Unlike in numerous regions of the Balkans which had been completely in-
corporated into the Ottoman Empire, the settlement of Turkish-speaking 
populations in Hungary was not very successful;11 nevertheless, Ottoman 
rule in Hungary had long-lasting and very negative consequences. What 
brought about such results was not so much the division of the Hungarian 
Kingdom but the fact that, for much of the century and a half, Hungary 

served as a battleground in the struggle between the forces of the great 
powers. Many of the negative consequences of this struggle would not be 
erased until long after the Ottomans had left Hungary and some were 
never eliminated. 
Although there was hardly a year in sixteenth and seventeenth 
century Europe that elapsed without a war being fought somewhere, 
Hungary stands out in this respect: there the military struggle persisted 
throughout the entire period of the Ottoman rule. From 1521 till the Peace 
of Adrianople (today's Edirne in Turkey) of 1568, the country endured a 
great number of Turkish military campaigns and sieges, just at a time 
when Hungary was on the brink of a civil war due to the ongoing 
struggle between its two kings. Between 1591/1593 and 1606, during the 
so-called Long Turkish War, there were conflicts involving large military 
forces even by European standards. Between 1660 and 1664, as well as 
during Hungary's War of Liberation from the Ottoman occupation (1683-
1699), each of the opposing sides annually fielded armies of almost 
50,000 men.12 
Furthermore, not even the relatively calm periods (1568-1591, 
1606-1660 and 1664-1683) that passed between the open conflicts, can be 
described as completely peaceful. The ongoing wars at the border, as well 
as the daily raids aimed mostly to collect taxes and to plunder, caused 
serious damage by disrupting production and settlement networks, by 
material destruction and by driving away, kidnapping or killing people.13 
In the 17th century similarly significant losses were caused by the 
campaigns waged by Transylvanian princes who, using the Thirty Years' 
War (1618-1648) as an opportunity, tried to strengthen their strategic 
position against the Habsburgs.14 These campaigns also brought about the 
threat of a civil war in Hungary. Although recent research pointed out that 
the population of the country manifested an almost unbelievable ability of 
regeneration for a long while, regions that were victims of all-out military 
operations and incursions, were incapable of complete — or, in some 
cases, even partial — demographic and economic recovery. 
The decay of Hungary's southernmost counties had started long 
before the battle of Mohacs, as the Ottomans had already invaded the 
country's southern parts as early as the late fourteenth century (more 
precisely, between 1390-1400). By this time they had also looted the 
Austrian province, the so-called Carniola (Krain) region.15 Later on, in 
the repeated unsuccessful campaigns to capture Nandorfehervar (Belgrade) 
in 1440 and in 1456, as well as during the local clashes which started in 

1464 and lasted for more than half a century, the Ottomans gradually 
destroyed the region stretching from Temes county up to Valko. The 
settlements there, which somehow had managed to survive the pre-1526 
assaults, were sentenced to annihilation during the Sultan's great cam-
paigns following the battle of Mohacs. According to recent research, in 
the southern part of the country the original population had died out in 
the astonishing extent of 70 to 90 percent by the middle of the 16th 
century. With this rate of extinction — and the resulting change in the 
population — the region's settlement network also suffered immeasurable 
and irreversible losses.16 
Due to the Ottoman expansion, by the 1560s frontier fights 
moved from the earlier borders to the central areas of the country. How-
ever, according to data at our disposal, in the above-mentioned calmer 
periods destruction did not go as far as it previously had in the southern 
parts of the country. This can be explained by the establishment, in the 
regions not yet conquered by the Turks, of a new defence system 
consisting of border fortresses. This came into existence in the 1560s and 
'70s, under the direction of the Aulic War Council (Wiener Hofkriegsrat, 
founded in 1556).17 However, organising this system in the midst of 
intermittent warfare imposed a huge financial burden on the whole 
Central European region. As the income of the ever diminishing Hunga-
rian Kingdom could only cover about a quarter of the pay of the 20,000 
to 22,000 soldiers needed to man approximately 120 border fortresses, the 
rest had to be raised from the Austrian and Czech provinces, as well as 
from the Holy Roman Empire. The support amounted to approximately 
1,000,000 guilders a year, which was about one-and-a-half of all the 
income Royal Hungary had at that time. This implies that for a 150 years 
the country survived only on a huge subsidy from abroad.18 
Despite this help, the gradual decay of much of Hungary could 
not be thwarted. Just to mention some concrete data from a relatively 
peaceful period: west of Lake Balaton, by the Zala river, on the lands of 
the so called border fortress captaincy opposite Kanizsa (organised after 
the fall of Kanizsa in 1600) the Ottomans caused the following damages 
during their 1633-1649 invasions: 
45 villages were attacked 
4,207 persons were killed or taken into captivity 
4,760 cattle were driven off 
66 houses and 2 wine cellars were burnt down and even 
some beehives were taken away, 
while the ferry in Zalahfdveg was destroyed on two occasions, and this is 
only to mention the concrete examples of the devastation that was 
recorded.19 Although the frequent destruction of buildings, the means of 
production, and of other material possessions, caused appalling damage, 
this kind of losses could sometimes still be repaired, especially in the 
neighbourhood of the border fortresses. For, in spite of all the difficulties, 
the inhabitants of the military frontier did not lose heart, but adapted their 
lifestyle to the constant state of war. After the assaults by Ottoman forces, 
they would always return from the places where they had taken refuge 
during the hostilities: castles, woods, or marshlands, in order to re-build 
their houses, cultivate their fields, and to acquire new animals in place of 
those that had been stolen. This exemplary ability to persist in the face of 
adversities, and to regenerate life, greatly contributed to the country's 
surviving the long Ottoman occupation.20 
However, during the time of the frequent great campaigns, the 
resumption of life in the countryside was often simply impossible. Armies 
numbering in the tens of thousands every year caused destruction different 
from that of the usual incursions. The real turning points in the 
development of Hungary were therefore the Long Turkish War (1591-
1606) and the Great War of Liberation (1683-1699).21 For wherever the 
sultan's or the emperor's troops repeatedly crossed for several years 
running, everything was reduced to ruins. At the same time it is important 
to realise that in this respect there was no basic difference between the 
emperor's foreign mercenaries or the Hungarian Haiduks on the one hand, 
and the Tatars of the Crimea or other Turkish light cavalry formations — 
referred to in the contemporary Christian sources as "dreaded devastators" 
— on the other. 
Ottoman studies suggest that the Sultan's troops had a better 
system of supplying themselves with food and basic necessities than did 
the Emperor's.22 This in part explains the fact that the Christian "armies 
of liberation" had to rely heavily on forcible requisitions when campaig-
ning in the Hungarian countryside. In fact, European mercenary forces 
would not have as good a supply system as did the Sultan's, until the 
following century.23 
The periods of massive campaigns had devastating effects for 
many regions of Hungary. The production of food in these war-zones 
soon became paralysed and sooner or later large areas became completely 
exhausted. As a consequence, both the troops involved in the fighting 
and the local population were easily struck by famine. The weakened 
soldiers and civilians were often decimated to an incredible extent by 
diseases such as the plague, dysentery, typhoid fever, malaria and even a 
particular combination of typhoid fever and malaria, the so-called morbus 
Hungaricus,24 
Due to the human and natural calamities, the zones of constant 
warfare became virtually uninhabited and uninhabitable for years, even 
decades. Just to mention a concrete example: between 1593 and 1595 one 
of the most important military routes along the Danube in Western 
Hungary, and the area surrounding this route was totally laid waste and 
depopulated in the wake of the Ottoman and Christian sieges of Gyor and 
Esztergom. This explains why, after recapturing Esztergom from the 
Turks in 1595, Miklos Palffy, the new captain-general of the fortress, had 
to resettle by force of arms Hungarian and Serbian villages from the 
territories formerly occupied by the Ottomans (e.g. from around Buda, 
and even from the remote Tolna and Baranya counties) in order to restore 
— at least in part — the local settlement network, as well as the 
population and the economic life of the affected area.25 
Similar losses were suffered by other regions of the country 
during the Great War of Liberation. Many villages in the neighbourhood 
of the Turkish border fortresses (e.g. Kanizsa, Szekesfehervar, Varad, 
Gyula), had endured the long Ottoman occupation. However, they were 
hardly able to survive the billeting of the imperial troops during the 
winters. Furthermore, the emperor's military leadership on occasion 
insisted on the temporary resettlement of the local population, in order to 
assure the imperial forces' security.26 Interestingly, the regional military 
leaders were not always unsympathetic towards the local population. We 
know of cases when, during these hostilities, Ottoman military officers 
warned the Christian population of the neighbouring villages against 
expected assaults on them by the cavalry of the dreaded Crimean Tatars, 
the allies of the Turks.27 All in all, the Great War of Liberation had an 
impact on Hungary similar to the devastation that had been caused by the 
Thirty Years' War in other parts of Europe. In Hungary, however, the 
great wars were just the continuation of the type of struggle that had 
prevailed in the relatively peaceful periods, one that might be described as 
"static warfare." 
Economic and Other Losses 
As a result, Hungary's settlement network suffered substantial losses in all 
but the country's northern counties. The most fundamental changes 
occurred in the southern and central parts of the country, in particular in 
the areas adjoining rivers and military routes. In these regions up to 70-80 
percent of the original settlements were laid waste — and stayed that way 
for shorter or longer periods of time. It has been estimated that in the 
zones of frequent conflict and along major invasion routes, close to 50 
percent of the settlements became depopulated.28 At the same time, a few 
villages and market towns grew in population as people congregated in 
places that were regarded as relatively safe. By the 18th century this 
restructuring had resulted in a new type of settlement network that is still 
typical of today's Hungarian Plain. 
The age of the Ottoman rule brought about not only changes in 
the population distribution throughout the Kingdom's countryside, but 
also resulted in a dramatic alteration of its urban settlement patterns. Of 
the seven regional centres that had existed before the conquest (Buda and 
its twin-city Pest; Pozsony and its subcentre Sopron; Kormocbanya 
[Kremnica, Slovakia], Kassa [Kosice, Slovakia], Varad, Szeged and Pecs), 
three (Buda, Pecs and Szeged) became Turkish frontier fortresses, whereas 
Varad fell under the jurisdiction of the Transylvanian princes. The 
German and Hungarian town-dwellers — who used to play a major role 
in the country's economic life — left the royal cities in the affected areas 
and sought refuge, in most cases, in Royal Hungary. 
During the long Ottoman occupation, economic activity in 
Hungary shifted from the formerly powerful royal cities to second- and 
third-order centres, in particular to some of the market-towns that came to 
prosper as centres of livestock-trading. At the same time, the size of 
Hungary's bourgeoisie underwent a decline in this period. This trend had 
a negative impact on the evolution of Hungarian handicrafts and cottage 
industries — which had been underdeveloped formerly. Not all the royal 
cities suffered a decline. Pozsony, Kassa and Nagyszombat (today's 
Trnava, Slovakia) — which were geographically peripheral — grew into 
political and financial centres, precisely because they were on the whole 
removed from the zones of frequent conflict. Other places, especially 
some of the market-towns such as Gyor and Debrecen, also in areas that 
were usually spared of fighting, took advantage of their strategic situation, 
made economic progress and accumulated wealth.29 In spite of all these 
changes, in some respects Hungary's economic structure did not change 
greatly during the Ottoman rule. Agriculture, which had played an 
important role in pre-Ottoman Hungary, retained — in fact increased — 
its pre-eminent place in the country's economy. The economic 
development in Europe, with the West becoming more and more a place 
for the processing of resources and the East a provider of foodstuffs and 
raw materials, also increased. This situation had many disadvantages for 
Hungary but it also had some incidental benefits, which will be mentioned 
briefly at the end of this study. 
The fundamental restructuring of Hungary's settlement network 
was accompanied by the decay of the courts of the nobility as well as the 
decline of the centres of religious and cultural life. Similarly to the urban 
population, by the end of the 1560s the nobility — suddenly and virtually 
without exception — had left the territories under Ottoman occupation. 
At the same time the constant warfare doomed the country's monasteries 
— the centres of spiritual and cultural life in medieval times — even if 
they happened to be on the Royal Hungarian side of the military frontier. 
By the 1570s, the approximately 100 medieval monasteries in the diocese 
of Veszprem had all disappeared, while out of the area's 600 parishes 
only a few dozen remained functioning.30 By this time it was only the 
Franciscans (in Jaszbereny, Szeged, Gyongyos and in the Transylvanian 
Csiksomlyo [today's §umu!eu-Ciuc, Romania]), the Paulines (in Slavonia) 
and the nuns taking refuge in Pozsony and Nagyszombat who succeeded 
in maintaining — or resettling — some of their monasteries.31 The Peace 
of Karlowitz (Karloca, today's Srijemski Karlovci, Yugoslavia) in 1699 
— that signified the end of the Ottoman rule in most of the Carpathian 
Basin — came too late to allow a rapid reversal of the substantial losses 
that Turkish rule had brought for the Catholic Church in Hungary. The 
truth of this statement is illustrated by the fact that, while in Austria and 
Italy a rich monastic network is to be found even today, there were only 
traces of it in pre-1945 Hungary — traces that were then nearly wiped out 
by the country's communist rulers. It is worth mentioning in this 
connection that, contrary to common belief, the Ottomans contributed to 
the rapid spread of the Reformation in the 16th century-Hungary by their 
having weakened the position of the Catholic Church rather than by their 
religious tolerance. 
Changes in the Demographic and Ethnic Map 
The wars of the Ottoman period brought about major changes in Hunga-
ry's demographic and ethnic map. While earlier demographic research 
concluded that Hungary's population had significantly decreased due to 
these wars, the latest research shows a much more favourable picture. At 
the end of the Middle Ages the total population of Hungary amounted to 
3.3 millions. This further increased to 3.5 millions by the end of the 16th 
century, and to 4 millions almost a century later.32 This suggests that, in 
spite of the constant warfare, the number of people did not decrease, but 
stagnated and, later on, it even increased. However, when placed in a 
European context and viewed in the light of the large-scale immigration 
Hungary was experiencing at the time, the situation appears no longer that 
favourable. 
In Europe, the end of the 16th century witnessed a major popu-
lation boom followed by a sudden stop and a considerable decline in the 
areas affected by the Thirty Years' War. All in all, in the period between 
1500 and 1700 in the Central European countries comparable with 
Hungary, the increase of population was approximately 120 to 130 
percent.33 Considering this ratio only, the demographic development of 
Hungary seems to be greatly lagging behind. But it is important to note 
that while in neighbouring countries the population increased without any 
replacement, the situation was different in Hungary. Although 
contemporary sources do not allow us to establish the number of South 
Slav (Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian, etc.), Rumanian and Ruthenian 
immigrants to the country, we may be safe in estimating their number as 
at least half a million. We can state that during the 16th and 17th centuries 
the population of Hungary would have not increased without this 
immigration. Thus, the European trend of population growth did not 
reflect itself in Hungary because of the wars that went on for years. 
For Hungary the most tragic consequence of the wars was that 
they affected mainly the Kingdom's Hungarian (i.e. the Magyar) 
population. At the time of their settlement in the Carpathian Basin the 
Hungarians occupied the geographically most favourable river valleys and 
plains. The Ottomans led both their great campaigns and minor 
expeditions precisely in these territories. The ensuing material losses and 
human casualties were suffered predominantly by the Magyars. 
Furthermore, the troops who sustained severe losses in the fortresses of 
the military frontier were also primarily Hungarian. On the other hand, 
the losses suffered by the Kingdom's ethnic minorities — who tended to 
live on Hungary's periphery, often in more sheltered mountainous regions 
— were considerably smaller. While Hungary's Magyar population 
declined during the time of the Turkish wars, some regions inhabited by 
her minorities even managed to enjoy the population boom that was 
common to Central Europe of the times. 
The wave of South Slav immigrants — themselves refugees from 
the Ottoman wars — settled mainly in the depopulated regions of 
southern and central Hungary.34 The first of these immigrants had arrived 
already before 1526. By the time of the collapse of the medieval 
Hungarian state in the second quarter of the 16th century, some 200,000 
Serbians had settled in the southern parts of the country. The Hungarian 
landlords there were actually anxious to receive and settle these Serbs on 
their estates in order to compensate for the loss of their own serfs who 
had fallen victim to the conflicts with the Turks or had been driven away. 
In the second half of the 15th century, for example, the well-known 
captain-general Pal Kinizsi "brought" to his lands thousands of South Slav 
immigrants from among the troops that had served him in his campaigns 
against the Turks in Serbia. 
The tendency to welcome Serb and other Balkan refugees 
increased during Hungary's Ottoman occupation. Owing to this, the 
Temeskoz (Banat), became inhabited almost exclusively by Serbs within 
a few decades after its occupation by the Turks in 1552. This 
development was acknowledged internationally. On the map of Hungary 
that was published in Antwerp in 1577, the Temeskoz appeared under the 
Latin name of Rascia, i.e. the country of the Serbs.35 The devastations 
caused by the Long Turkish War gave a further impetus to South Slav 
immigration. As a result of this, by the middle of the 17th century, large 
populations of Serb Orthodox and Bosnian Catholic refugees had settled 
in central Hungary, between the Danube and the Tisza rivers, while in the 
Transdanubian part of the country — up to Tolna and Fejer counties — 
there came to live the so-called Wallachians, a population of Orthodox 
faith, related to the Serbs. (They are not to be mistaken for Rumanians, 
also referred to as Wallachians [lat. vlachi or olachi] in contemporary 
sources.) The concentration of this population in certain places is 
indicated by the fact that in 1585 in Graboc (close to Szekszard) a Serb 
Orthodox monastery was founded in order to cater for these settlers' 
spiritual needs.36 
The religious and cultural traditions of these South Slav new-
comers were quite different from those of the Hungarians, a circumstance 
which made natural assimilation unlikely. During the Great War of 
Liberation a further wave of South Slav immigrants — about 200,000 
people — arrived in Hungary, reinforcing their settlements there and 
making their assimilation even less likely. As a result, some of the 
affected Hungarian territories lost their Hungarian character completely.37 
Along with the Serbs and Wallachian-Serbs, considerable numbers of 
Croatians, Rumanians and Slovaks also settled in the regions affected by 
the Ottoman conquest. The Croatians came by the tens of thousands to the 
western part of Hungary in the 1530s, '40s, and '50s, and settled from 
Murakoz (the region between the rivers Drava and Mura) in the south to 
Pozsony (Bratislava) county in the north, in a wide zone. As the 
Hungarian landlords in this part of the country (the Batthyanys, the 
Nadasdys, the Erdodys, the Keglevicses, the Zrfnyis, etc.) were inclined to 
settle them on lands uncultivated before, more often than not, new 
villages — or new parts of villages — were established. By the beginning 
of the 17th century the Croatians had also received considerable 
reinforcements, which hindered their assimilation as well. The extent of 
the Croatian immigration to these region is illustrated by the fact that in 
the Burgenland region of Austria — before 1920 a part of the Kingdom 
of Hungary — the proportion of the Croatian population amounts to ten 
percent even today.38 
Hungary's landlords played a major role also in settling Rumani-
ans and Slovaks on lands depopulated during the Long Turkish War (a 
conflict that deeply affected Transylvania as well), Rumanians gradually 
descended from their mountain habitats to territories previously inhabited 
by Magyars. At other times the relative safety and prosperity of 
Transylvania attracted masses of Rumanians from neighbouring Wallachia 
and Moldavia, a movement that constituted a continuous reinforcement 
for Rumanians in this eastern part of the Carpathian Basin. As a result, by 
the end of the 17th century, a relatively unbroken belt inhabited by 
Rumanians had come into existence both in Transylvania and on its 
western borderlands (i.e. in the Partium).39 In the case of the Slovaks, the 
migration to and resettlement in central and southern Hungary took place 
largely after the Great War of Liberation. 
To sum up, during the 150-year Ottoman rule in Hungary, the 
ethnic map of the country underwent fundamental changes. While in the 
Middle Ages Magyars accounted for approximately 75 to 80 percent of 
the Hungarian Kingdom's population, during the 16th and 17th centuries 
they gradually became a minority in their own country. The situation 
deteriorated further in the 18lh century by the resettlements designed to 
revive the country's economy and stimulate its demographic growth. It 
appears that with the exception of minor changes, the ethnic boundaries 
that existed at the beginning of the 20th century — and which played a 
part in the decisions made about Hungary by the victorious Great Powers 
after the World War I — had already taken shape by the end of the 
Ottoman occupation. It has to be emphasised, however, that in the early 
Modern Age the coexistence of different ethnic groups did not cause any 
minority problems in Hungary, as society's demarcation lines at that time 
were not drawn between ethnic groups but primarily between social strata. 
In this period all the subjects of Hungarian Kingdom counted as 
Hungarus, whether they knew Hungarian or not. In this respect it is only 
in the 19lh century that things changed and the earlier transformation of 
Hungary's ethnic map began to threaten with grave consequences. 
Considering the Ottoman conquest's numerous and long-lasting 
negative effects, it is rather hard for the historian to find positive impacts. 
There is no doubt that Hungarians owe the Ottomans several loan-words, 
poems written on Turkish melodies, oriental garments, flowers, and last 
but not least mosques and baths (in Pecs, Siklos, Szigetvar and Budapest) 
that are rightly considered rarities in Central Europe.40 However, the 
significance of these is hard to compare with the negative effects that 
determined the country's fate for many centuries. Given this knowledge, 
we can safely conclude that for Hungary the Ottoman rule had been an 
unmitigated tragedy. 
Hungary and Europe 
Having said all this it may seem strange to state that, in spite of its 
tripartite division, Hungary remained an essential part of Europe both 
during the Ottoman era and thereafter. Although it would certainly require 
another study to give a detailed explanation for this generalization,41 I 
would like to refer briefly to the fact that it was not only Hungary that 
needed a yearly financial subsidy from Central Europe in order to survive. 
The Habsburg Empire also needed the Hungarian Kingdom, first of all as 
a buffer state against potential Ottoman onslaught,42 and secondly as an 
important source of food supplies. The former role secured Hungary's 
place in the Habsburg political-military system. In the latter role Hungary 
served as the major supplier of meat, i.e. cattle, for the increasing 
population of Central Europe's Austrian and German territories. In this 
connection it should be stated that Hungary's partial occupation by the 
Ottomans — as well as her political dismemberment — did not bring 
about a large-scale disintegration of trade patterns in the Carpathian 
Basin, as the Hungarian economy continued to play a major role in the 
commercial affairs of Europe.43 Due to the spread of humanism, and of 
the Reformation, as well as to the growing number of Magyar youths 
attending universities in Central and Western Europe (peregrinatio 
academica), Hungary also retained its place in the cultural and spiritual 
life of Christian Europe. It appears then that Hungary, although it became 
subordinated to the will of the region's two superpowers, survived one of 
the most critical periods of her history in a much more positive manner 
than might have been expected. For the country achieved almost 
everything that was possible under the given circumstances. It was by no 
coincidence that one of Europe's most prominent Aristotle experts, the 
Flemish humanist Nicasius Ellebodius, had settled in 16th century-
Hungary, in Pozsony. His words are a testimony to the contemporary 
Hungarian Kingdom's potential: "Should God grant peace to this country, 
it may become the most suitable place for accomplishing academic plans 
as well."44 
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Habsburg Rule in Hungary in the 
Eighteenth Century 
Janos Barta 
The first century of the Early Modern Period, the sixteenth, brought 
stormy events to Hungary: defeat at Mohacs, the partition of the country 
into three parts, repeated Turkish invasions, frontier warfare, political in-
trigues and assassinations. The following century, the seventeenth, turned 
out to be eventful as well, in which the tripartite division of the country 
continued, as did the Ottoman wars and the frequent pillaging of the 
countryside by the Turks and their Crimean Tatar allies. Added to this 
was the devastation caused by the Hungarian nation's struggles against the 
Habsburgs for constitutional privileges or for independence. 
Compared to the two preceding centuries, most of the eighteenth 
century seems almost eventless, even boring. The Ottomans were finally 
expelled from the Carpathian Basin making the re-unification of Hungary 
possible. The new century witnessed only sporadic attacks by hostile 
forces. Hungary's political life became stabilized to the extent that the 
country's leaders, including its military commanders, died natural deaths. 
Even the principal figures of the 1703-1711 War of Independence, led by 
Ferenc II Rakoczi, were pardoned. After that war, from amongst Rakoczi's 
followers, only the wife of Janos Korponay was executed, but not for any 
of her deeds during the war, but for having conspired to disrupt the Diet 
(the assembly made up of the Hungarian Kingdom's magnates and 
prelates as well as of the elected representatives of the country's nobles 
and burgers) of 1712-1715.' 
Throughout much of the eighteenth century, the situation in 
Hungary was more peaceful than it was in some of the Habsburgs' 
hereditary provinces (for example, Upper Austria, Bohemia), territories 
which were the scenes of military campaigning during both the War of 
Austrian Succession (1740-1748) and the Seven Years' War (1756-1763). 
Furthermore, the elite of Hungary enjoyed the same degree of personal 
security as did the high officials living at the Habsburg Court. True 
enough, these people refrained from leading uprisings against the sover-
eign and did not organize coup-d'etats\ thus they had no reason to incur 
the wrath of the ruler. In fact, being closely associatiated to the ruler 
proved to be more dangerous, on one occasion at least, than being critical 
of him. The case in point is the sad story of Prince Adam Franz Schwar-
zenberg, the Chief Master of the Horse, who died in a hunting-accident in 
1732 when he was mortally wounded by a badly aimed shot of Emperor 
Charles VI (ruled in Hungary as Charles [Karoly] III, 1711-1740).2 In 
reality, the headsman's axe — which was traditionally the tool of execu-
tion 'reserved' for the members of the privileged class — was rarely used 
in the eighteenth-century Habsburg Empire.3 This was the reason why, 
when the leaders of the 1795 Jacobite conspiracy were beheaded on 
Vermezo [Blood-meadow] in Buda, the aged headsman of the city — who 
had long fallen out of practice — managed to sever the head of Count 
Jakab Sigray only on the third try. 
During this period of relative tranquillity, the Habsburg Empire 
(including Hungary) witnessed the rule of a handful of outstanding 
sovereigns. Among them were two or three who took the responsibilities 
of being a ruler seriously; in fact, they wanted to govern their realm per-
sonally. They did not want to spend their energies in military conquests 
but tried to satisfy their longing for prestige and acclaim through being 
good stewards of the state and standing by their political principles. These 
rulers did not isolate themselves within the walls of their palaces but — 
in their own ways — strove to find contacts with their subjects. They 
extended the interest of the state to problems previously untouched by 
government policy — such the issues of serfdom, education and public 
health. Two of these rulers, Maria Theresa (ruled in Austria as Archdu-
chess and in Hungary as Queen, from 1740 to 1780) and Joseph II (ruled, 
1780-1790) brought governmental practices into effect that had never 
before been imagined let alone implemented. Similar prospects were 
promised by the accession of Leopold II (ruled, 1790-1792), but could not 
be attained because of his untimely death. 
In Hungary the eighteenth century could have easily been an 
idyllic era filled with tranquillity, political stability, and energetic rulers 
full with good intentions. Despite the favourable conditions, this era of 
peace and prosperity did not materialize. Strife between the Habsburg 
rulers and Hungary's elite did not diminish, the bitter political debates 
continued in the Hungarian Diet, and peasant uprisings of various inten-
sity kept breaking out. The government reacted by trying to eliminate the 
potential centres of resistance. Empress Maria Theresa went so far as to 
refuse summoning the Hungarian Diet during the last fifteen years of her 
reign. Joseph II went even further and curtailed the autonomy of the 
counties. 
In eighteenth-century Hungary, conflicts have been explained in 
diverse ways. Hungarians at the time were motivated by their grievances 
and accused the Habsburgs of encroaching on their liberties. The scale of 
Hungarian grievances was quite wide and ranged from the realm of 
politics to that of the economy. The policies of the Viennese Court 
elicited protest against the violations of the country's autonomy and 
against the regime of customs regulations that greatly hurt the local 
economy. The most vocal complains, however, came as a result of the 
government's reluctance to protect the privileges of the nobility. The 
willingness or otherwise of a certain sovereign to respect the nobility's 
privileges became the standard by which he or she came to be judged. 
Emperor Charles, who restricted the Protestants' practice of religion in his 
Carolina resolutio but did not touch the nobility's privileges, was critici-
zed less severely than Joseph II who assailed the county system, the 
institution that protected the self-government of the local gentry. (Joseph's 
situation was further complicated by the fact that, simultaneously with the 
assault against the nobility, he had attacked the position of the Catholic 
Church which was also very protective of its privileges.) 
The complaints of the aggrieved contemporaries had greatly 
influenced the judgements about Habsburg policies made by Hungarian 
historians. It is a well-known fact that Hungarian history writing has 
quite often been under the influence of the political atmosphere of the 
times. Accordingly, historiography alternated between ardent criticism of 
the Habsburg rulers and being quite lenient towards them. The nineteenth 
century — with its Revolution (1848), the War of Independence (1848-
49), as well as the subsequent years of the neo-absolutism — was condu-
cive to critical appraisals. The nostalgia between the two World Wars for 
the disintegrated Austro-Hungarian Monarchy prompted the birth of 
several pro-Habsburg works. In the decades following World War II, on 
the other hand, Marxist history-writing for a long time made anti-Habs-
burg attitudes almost compulsory.4 Marxist authors held the economic 
policies of the Vienna government primarily responsible for Hungary's 
backwardness.5 
Conditions in Post-Ottoman Hungary 
In their criticism, however, the Marxists assumed that after the expulsion 
of the Turks, Hungary entered the eighteenth century under the same 
economic conditions as those that existed at the time in the Empire's 
hereditary provinces, i.e. Austria and Bohemia. Of course, this was not 
the case. After the expulsion of the Ottomans, Hungary came under 
Habsburg rule in a sorry state. Large parts of the country were character-
ized by a declining population, a shattered settlement-network and a 
disrupted economy. The true conditions of post-Ottoman Hungary are 
described in contemporary eye-witness accounts. Lady Mary Montagu 
(1689-1762), the wife of Edward Wortley Montagu, the English ambassa-
dor to Constantinople, in 1717 decided to travel to join her husband via 
the overland route instead of the more convenient naval one, found that 
the survivors of Ottoman rule were living in abject poverty in the for-
merly Ottoman-held parts of Hungary: "Their clothing is very primitive, 
made wholly of sheepskin, even the headgear and the boots...." Elsewhere 
in her journal, Lady Montagu described the desolation of the lands only 
recently vacated by the Turks. But it was not only the regions that had 
been formerly parts of Ottoman Hungary that had been devastated. 
Similar had been the fate of the areas that had served as the military 
frontier between the Ottoman and Christian lands, or those through which 
the Turkish armies (and their Crimean Tatar allies) had moved during the 
campaigns of 1657-1664, or those that the Princes of Transylvania used in 
their wars against the Habsburgs, or the counties that witnessed warfare 
either during the War of Liberation against the Turks or the unsuccessful 
Rakoczi War of Liberation against Vienna. 
According to earlier estimates, the population of early eighteenth-
century Hungary (2.5 million) was hardly over half the size of the 
kingdom's population during the age of King Matthias (about 4.5 million). 
Recent researches, however, have indicated that Hungary had at least 4 to 
4.5 million inhabitants after the expulsion of the Turks. At the same time 
new researches have adjusted downward the estimates of Hungary's 
population in the time of Matthias, to between 3 to 3.5 million at the 
most.6 This suggests that the Ottoman occupation did not result in an 
absolute reduction of population as far as the country's entire territory is 
concerned, even though there was a decline in the rate of increase in the 
population — a growth of 1 million inhabitants over 200 years, that is, a 
growth-rate of only 30 to 33 per cent. The damage inflicted by the 
Turkish occupation manifested itself above all in the unbalanced distribu-
tion of the population in post-seventeenth century Hungary. In the years 
1715-20, out of the country's 413,000 taxpaying households, only a little 
more than a fifth (90,000, or 22% of the total), could be found in the 
formerly Ottoman occupied lands — which amounted to over 40 per cent 
of the country's total territory, or approximately 120,000 square kilo-
metres. 
A similar situation is revealed by population density statistics. 
While in Transylvania this density was 18.6 persons per square kilometre, 
and for the territory of the former Royal Hungary this figure was 18.4, in 
the ex-Ottoman territories there were only 8.4 people for every square 
kilometre. An even more extreme picture is revealed by local data. The 
population density of Sopron county, in what used to be westernmost 
Royal Hungary, was 40.6 person per sq. km, while that of Bekes county, 
located in the heart of formerly Ottoman-occupied Hungary, was 3.1 
persons per sq. km.7 
In the sparsely populated areas there was neither the need nor the 
opportunity for more efficient agricultural practices. In the former 
Ottoman-occupied territories farming had been replaced by animal 
husbandry and cultivated fields had been converted to pasture-lands. In 
making these changes, the inhabitants of these regions had been motivated 
by the relative ease of hiding cattle from marauding Ottoman troops by 
driving them to pastures surrounded by marshlands. Ordinarily, in these 
territories cattle were kept in the summer and even in wintertime on the 
puszta, the vast steppes of the Hungarian lowlands. In time, the cattle 
were driven on foot to markets at home or abroad. The cultivation of 
crops remained feasible only in the western counties of the Transdanubian 
region, in the lowlands north of the Danube (present-day southern 
Slovakia), and in the great basins of Transylvania. Because of the poor 
marketing opportunities, even in these regions farming was restricted and 
was not able to advance beyond the traditional system of crop-rotation in 
which leaving fallow the lands was the only way to restore the fertility of 
the soil. In this system plough-lands were used almost exclusively to 
produce grain; plants that needed hoeing or fodder crops never caught 
on.8 
The development of contemporary Hungary's cities and manufac-
turing was also uneven. Although by the end of the seventeenth century 
the number of "free royal cities" (those granted royal liberties) had ap-
proached forty, thirty of these were in the lands of the former Royal 
Hungary. Furthermore, even in the "royal cities" more than half the 
population was involved in agriculture and only 38 per cent worked as 
artisans. For the most part, it was only the mining centres of Upper 
Hungary (in the northern highlands) that could be described as having real 
industrial character. Most of the rest of Hungary's towns, the so-called 
market-towns (oppida), of which there were at least 400, had agriculture 
as their main source of income. Most craftsmen in these centres were 
involved in producing agricultural artifacts.9 
These conditions were far from those enjoyed by the peoples of 
the Habsburg's hereditary provinces. Under the circumstances, Hungary 
could by no means start out in the eighteenth century from the same base 
as did Austria or Bohemia. Furthermore, we might even say that a century 
would hardly be enough to put an end to the backwardness of the for-
merly Ottoman-occupied territories in Hungary. In fact, as far as differen-
ces between the western and eastern parts of the country are concerned, 
the legacies of Ottoman rule can still be observed today in the nature of 
settlement patterns as well as in economic and even cultural development. 
Recovery from Ottoman Rule 
The eighteenth century witnessed several changes that lessened the 
backwardness of the former Ottoman-occupied territories and began to 
moderate the disparities among Hungary's diverse regions. Evidence of 
the change can be detected both in the physical appearance of the coun-
tryside and in its economy and culture. First of all, the formidable chains 
of Habsburg and Ottoman military strongholds on the former frontier bet-
ween the Christian and Islamic realms, began disappearing. Also vanished 
the often 20 to 25 kilometre-wide no-man's-land that used to exist 
between the two chains of fortresses, and which had often been utterly 
devastated by marauding armies. In the towns and castles of the former 
Turkish occupied territories the mosques (bethels), minarets, baths and 
other public buildings were allowed to fall into disrepair or were some-
times deliberately destroyed as evidences of past foreign conquest. In all 
communities large and small, the wounds left by wars and alien occupa-
tion began healing. In the depopulated regions of the Hungarian lowlands 
new villages were being born. On the Habsburg and even the Transylvani-
an side of the former frontier, the ugly, fortified houses of the local 
landowners, those witnesses to the continual warfare of the past, began 
disappearing — they were being replaced by attractive manor-houses built 
in late Baroque style. 
The landscape of the urban settlements also began to change. The 
walls of the cities no longer had to be guarded. Newcomers to these 
places, not finding building lots inside the city walls, could now build 
their — usually larger and more colourful — houses outside of them, 
often in a pre-determined, regulated fashion. The measure of success for 
these growing communities was whether they could develop entire city-
wards full of Baroque buildings, or had satisfy themselves with not much 
more than a new Baroque church and a Baroque city hall. 
The population began growing. Those regions of the liberated 
territories that had good soil were attracting settlers from the overpopu-
lated periphery of the Carpathian Basin as well as from neighbouring 
countries. By the end of the century, Hungary's population had doubled, 
from between 4 and 4.5 million to 9.5 million. The above-described 
imbalance between the population densities of the former Ottoman 
occupied regions and the rest of the country began to disappear. By the 
end of the century, for example, the population density of the formerly 
almost totally depopulated Bekes county had reached a figure of 19 
persons per square kilometre. The most thinly populated counties were 
now found not in the formerly Turkish-held areas but in the mountainous 
frontier regions (the density figure for Maramaros County was 8.7 per-
sons/sq. km; for Udvarhelyszek in Transylvania, it was 11 persons/sq. 
km). At the same time, the country's most densely inhabited areas did 
reach a density figure of over 50 persons per square kms (Pozsony 
County had 53.5; Nyitra, 51.3 persons/sq. km). Ignatius Born, a visitor to 
Hungary, could observe with satisfaction the progress in the re-settlement 
of the Temeskoz region (the Bansag or Banat, today's Banat, — a region 
that at the time was under the direct rule of Vienna). "The villages are 
laid out in a regular fashion... the houses, because of the lack of wood, 
are built of adobe and are roofed with reed. Each settler receives a house, 
farming equipment, a couple of horses and a plot of land..." Many years 
later the novelist Mor Jokai, who found the gifts lavished on German 
immigrants to the region almost extravagant, described this process in his 
A magyar nemzet tortenete [The history of the Hungarian nation] with a 
certain degree of irony: "For the settlers from Germany the lands had 
already been ploughed, the houses had been built [and] fully furnished... 
not even the cat watching for mice was missing from the oven-corner."10 
The economy was also making headway. On the Great Hungarian 
Plain selected areas began to be converted from pastures to plough-fields. 
While the expansion of agriculture and the introduction of more intensive 
methods of animal husbandry were easily visible to contemporary observ-
ers, the upswing in manufacturing activity was not so obvious to visitors 
from Western Europe. Foreign travellers saw only towns that appeared to 
be large villages, full of small workshops operated by members of an 
outdated guild network. Nevertheless, the increasing number of these 
shops spoke of the re-awakened zeal for work and zest for life on the 
part of the craftsmen operating them. Larger manufacturing facilities 
could rarely be established for the lack of a rich bourgeois class and of 
adequate investment capital. The few that were brought about, were 
started by a handful of enterprising aristocrats." 
Some branches of the economy grew faster than others. Mining 
activity increased mainly as a result of state intervention. Commerce also 
expanded by leaps and bounds. At first the value of exported agricultural 
produce far surpassed that of the imported manufactured goods. While 
this situation persisted throughout the century, the imbalance between the 
value of agricultural exports and imported products kept decreasing. In the 
1730s, for example, the value of exports exceeded that of imports by 
between 30 to 35 per cent, while by the 1760s, only by 10 to 15 per cent. 
There are signs also that there was progress in the realm of the 
arts and sciences. Some aspects of culture were slow to develop. When 
compared to other centuries, the eighteenth witnessed only a meagre 
output in poetry and creative writing. Apparently this age did not produce 
enough authors and poets and/or did not give adequate stimulus to them 
to create artistic products worthy of attention. The outstanding literary 
product of the early part of the century was a collection of letters written 
by Kelemen Mikes — which was produced in exile. Hungarian literature 
would only get a real stimulus during the last quarter of the century with 
the spread of the ideas of the Enlightenment. 
The fine arts evolved in a rather uneven manner. The boom in 
church and palace construction offered many opportunities to the painters 
of frescoes. At the same time a fine portrait-painter such as Adam 
Manyoki, lacking enough patrons at home, had to leave the country in 
order to make a decent living. Thus it came to pass that the artist who 
painted the famous portrait of Prince Rakoczi, had to end his career in the 
service of the Elector of Saxony. At the same time a great number of 
foreign masters made a good living in Hungary in planning and decorat-
ing the many new Baroque churches and palaces of the aristocracy that 
increasingly dominated the Hungarian cityscape and the countryside. 
There was progress in education and the sciences also. Schools, 
even though organized on a denominational basis, were providing solid 
education. They supplied the professions in Hungary with well-prepared 
members, and the higher educational institutions of Vienna with highly 
qualified graduate students. The eighteenth century was also the age that 
saw the publication of Matyas Bel's Notitia Hungariae novae historico-
geographica, 1735-1742. This work tried, for the first time, to offer a 
compendium of knowledge about Hungary's history, geography and ethno-
graphy. It was at about this time that popular interest in Hungary's past 
awakened. 1746 witnessed the printing in book form of the medieval 
chronicle of Anonymus, the Gesta Ungarorum, which recounted the 
arrival of the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin. The end of the century 
saw the rise of the idea of kinship between Hungarians and other Finno-
Ugric peoples. 
Hardships of Life in 18th Century Hungary 
In taking stock of Hungary's progress, we have to keep in mind that the 
peoples of re-united Hungary continued to face certain difficulties. The 
new settlers in the formerly depopulated regions were often confronted by 
onerous conditions. In some regions, in flood-plains, moorlands, etc., the 
breaking of virgin sod usually proved a Herculean task. Projects involving 
the regulation of the hydrology of large flood-prone regions were out of 
the question — contemporary technology was inadequate for the task. As 
a result, flooding in many parts of the country remained endemic. The 
city of Szeged in southern Hungary, for example, was the victim of floods 
by the River Tisza almost at regular intervals. Matyas Bel, in the above-
mentioned work, recounts that in 1712 "the city's entire lower town was 
under water..." In the surrounding villages the peasants complained that 
their fields and pastures were flooded and vermin thrived. 
Throughout much of the eighteenth century epidemics were 
frequent in Hungary and spared neither man nor animal. The country's 
population was decimated several times by the bubonic plague. The 
epidemic that started during the Rakoczi War of Independence and lasted 
till 1712 cost 400,000 lives, nearly ten per cent of the country's popula-
tion. Another 300,000 fell victim to the plague of 1738-1741.12 The 
plagues also caused problems by the panic they caused. The Diet of pro-
Habsburg members of the Hungarian nobility that opened in 1708 in 
Pozsony (also known as Pressburg, today's Bratislava in Slovakia) was ad-
journed three times on account of the 1708-1712 epidemic. Smallpox, the 
other scourge of the age, did not come in epidemics but was always 
present and did not spare even the rich and the powerful — it claimed the 
lives of several members of the ruling Habsburg family. The disease left 
its scars even on those who managed to survive it, including Queen Maria 
Theresa herself and several of her children. In the southeast, the inhabit-
ants of the Temeskoz region were tormented by malaria. Many sources 
refer to poor harvests leading to malnutrition and even famines, which in 
turn caused the outbreak of epidemics in some districts. Not surprisingly, 
life expectancy in Hungary remained low. For the early part of the 18th 
century, we only have vague estimates. According to one of these, for 
Somogy county this figure was not more than 22 years.13 By the end of 
the century, however, life expectancy for the whole of Hungary rose to 35 
years. When considering the circumstances of life in the eighteenth 
century, we have no reason to envy the country's inhabitants. 
Habsburg Policies Promoting Progress 
The growth of the population, the progress experienced in the economy 
and in cultural development, did not bring Hungary anywhere close to the 
standards of Europe's more developed nations by the end of the century. 
What was achieved was positive and it disproves the arguments that 
Hungary stagnated throughout this period. Some of the progress was not 
uniformly advantageous and often threatened with possible undesirable 
consequences. The growth in the country's population was attained at the 
expense of increasing the imbalance between Hungary's Magyar and non-
Magyar inhabitants: the influx of foreigners threatened to reduce the 
Hungarian ethnic group to a minority within its own country. In the 
country's growing economy manufacturing had to take second place to 
agriculture. In some forms of art and in architecture, foreign masters 
were dominant. That there was progress overall, however, is indisputable. 
Yet the question remains, whether and to what extent this progress was 
due to governmental intervention? Were there Habsburg policies that 
contributed to Hungary's advancement in the eighteenth century? And, if 
these policies indeed benefitted the country, why was it necessary for 
strife be tween the rulers and the ruled to continue and give rise to 
outright confl ic t? The factors enumerated below can hardly be considered 
complete , nevertheless they provide at least some conditional answers to 
these of t-repeated questions. They do this even if on many occasions we 
have to descr ibe the Habsburg Court's policies as "ambiguous," "contra-
dictory," or "open to interpretation." 
National Defence 
The preservation of peace is an essential precondition to a nation's growth 
and progress. The Habsburg state fought several wars in the eighteenth 
century. The campaigns of the Austrian W a r of Succession and the Seven 
Years ' W a r did not touch Hungarian soil. The Empire's Turkish wars 
were different . The successes of the war of 1716-17 (the l iberation of the 
Temeskoz , the occupation of northern Serbia and northern Bosnia) created 
the false impression that Ottoman power had declined irreversibly and 
that the Turks ' eviction f rom the Balkans was just a question of time. On 
the other hand, the incursion of the Turks' allies, the Crimean Tatars, into 
Transylvania and the trans-Tisza region in 1717 should have driven home 
the lesson in Vienna that against large light cavalry forces the Empire 's 
armies were helpless. Furthermore, the defeat of the Imperial forces in the 
1737-1739 Turkish war (which ended in the loss of Serbian and Bosnian 
territories), restored the pre-1716 balance of power in the Balkans . This 
confl ict proved that the Ot tomans were still a power to contend with in 
Southeastern Europe. Without the Habsburg Empire, Hungary could have 
done little against a great power such as the Ottoman state. The fact that 
between 1717 and the time of the Napoleonic Wars of the early nine-
teenth century no foreign troops penetrated Hungary's borders, was largely 
due to the presence in the country of those not much appreciated Habs-
burg troops. 
Defence against epidemics and the forces of nature 
Natural calamities such as famines, f loods and epidemics that had plagued 
the peoples of 18th century Hungary were familiar to other European 
nations as well. Their prevention was beyond the means of contemporary 
statecraft. To its credit, the Habsburg Court did try to prevent them and 
worked to this effect as hard as any other European state of the times. 
Habsburg policies were least successful in combating the periodic floods 
that afflicted the peoples of Hungary's lowlands. There were plans for 
wide-ranging flood-control projects but their realization was beyond the 
technology of the age. Their realization had to await the nineteenth 
century. The eighteenth century Habsburg state had to be satisfied with 
building and maintaining roads on certain river banks — which often 
served the purpose of towing barges and thereby improving river transpor-
tation. Vienna also brought in regulations for the maintenance of other 
roads, of bridges, and of fording places. It also promoted the extermina-
tion of pests and vermin that plagued crops. 
Viewed from today's perspective, the measures taken by the 
Habsburg state to protect public health do not appear effective. From the 
middle of the century on, there was a commission functioning in Vienna 
that coordinated health policies. Because of the backward state of contem-
porary medical knowledge, little could be done to curb epidemics. The 
struggle against the bubonic plague consisted exclusively of measures to 
slow its spread though the quarantining of the places where it had broken 
out. In time of epidemics, visitors from abroad, or even from other parts 
of the country, were isolated before they would be allowed to move on. 
When in December of 1738 Maria Theresa, her husband Francis of 
Lorraine, and their retinue of scores of servants and footmen, set out for 
Tuscany for Francis to be crowned the ruler of that Grand Duchy, they 
were delayed as they crossed through Verona and were forced to spend 
fourteen days in quarantine. The Empress would forever retain unpleasant 
memories of her stay in a poorly heated and overcrowded country house 
there, but her experience emphasized the need for everyone, even royalty, 
to obey the rules designed to curb epidemics.14 
By the 1760s the great epidemics of the bubonic plague had 
started to disappear from Central and Western Europe, and they also 
began to wane in Hungary. Against smallpox an early type of defence 
was discovered in eighteenth-century England in the form of a primitive 
method of inoculation. Empress Maria Theresa, having lost several 
members of her family to this disease, had all the survivors vaccinated. 
Several aristocratic families followed her example, but the procedure of 
this inoculation was so complicated that it was not possible to apply it on 
a wide scale to protect large populations. Because of this only the top 
layers of society came to enjoy protection from this dreadful disease. 
Nevertheless, there was some progress in public health in the Habsburg 
lands, including Hungary. Evidence of this is the regulation which 
compelled counties and municipalities to hire qualified doctors. Each 
county was also ordered to employ at least one certified midwife. 
Demographic policies 
The growth of Hungary's population was without doubt positively influ-
enced by the Viennese Court's policies. The promotion of population 
growth was a part of the popular wisdom of the age and was advocated 
by such contemporary demographic experts as Johann Gottlob von Justi 
and Joseph von Sonnenfels. To encourage immigrants to the sparsely 
populated Hungarian lowlands, settlers were exempted from taxes and 
labour services for years. An immigration act passed in 1723 exempted 
craftsmen settling in Hungary for ten years, and peasants for six. The law 
also provided for advertizing for immigrants throughout the German 
realm. The Court wanted to attract German settlers of the Catholic faith; 
however, it forbade the people of the hereditary Habsburg provinces from 
moving to Hungary. Most settlers came from the southwestern regions of 
the Holy Roman Empire, often from lands that had been ravaged by the 
wars with Louis XIV of France. 
The re-settlement of people from the periphery of Hungary to the 
central parts, and the immigration of settlers from Hungary's non-German 
neighbours was not actively promoted but was tolerated by the Court. 
True, in 1691 about 25 to 30 thousand Serbs, under the leadership of 
Patriarch Arsenije Crnojevic, received permission to move to Hungary, 
but such mass immigration was not encouraged thereafter. Policies 
regarding the Temesvar region in southernmost Hungary were different. 
In 1718, after the region's recapture from the Turks, Prince Eugene of 
Savoy, the president of the Defence Council in Vienna, ruled that only 
Catholic German settlers would be allowed to move there. Hungarian 
settlers were excluded from the entire Banat area, a regulation that 
remained on the books up to the time of Joseph II. Many Magyar would-
be newcomers were stopped and turned back by local garrison forces as 
they tried to cross the Maros River.15 At the same time, the spontaneous 
migration of Rumanians and Serbs into the region was not interfered with. 
By 1787 the population of this region had reached close to 800,000. 
Though the immigration of Germans had been favoured, they made up 
only eighteen per cent of this, and Rumanians became the dominant 
ethnic group. The Hungarian component of the region's population was 
negligible, a mere 0.6%. Vienna's policies had certainly contributed to the 
growth of Hungary's population, but were also responsible for the alter-
ation of the "ethnic balance" in favour of non-Magyar groups. 
Economic policies 
The impact of Vienna's policies on Hungary's economy is a topic that has 
been the subject of differing interpretations.16 The political wisdom of the 
times favoured state support for economic activities and the government 
of the Empire tended to heed this advice. The most important aid for the 
economy was considered to be protective tariffs. In the Habsburg state 
such tariffs were introduced for the time during the mid-18th century — 
they protected the interests of producers within the Empire. Unfortunately 
for Hungary, this type of state intervention did not always serve the best 
interest of that part of the Habsburg realm. The tariffs established first 
and foremost served the interests of the manufacturers of the Empire's 
hereditary provinces. The countervailing duties that the Empire's neigh-
bours introduced in reaction to these tariffs most often struck at the 
agricultural produce destined for export from Hungary. Historians of 
previous ages complained most bitterly against the customs legislation of 
1754 which made it more difficult for Hungarian produce to enter even 
the hereditary provinces. These regulations had definite political over-
tones. The nobility of the hereditary provinces, unlike the nobility of 
Hungary, paid taxes to the state. By protecting this class from the 
economic competition provided by Hungarian agriculture, the Court 
wanted to compensate its members for paying taxes. The duties imposed 
on Hungarian produce applied even to manufactured products, after all 
most factories in Hungary were owned by members of the Hungarian 
aristocracy. Although these regulations made it more difficult for Hunga-
rians to compete on the Empire's markets and reduced their profits, they 
did not prevent trade — as contemporary trade statistics illustrate. In 
final analysis, the tariff policies of the Empire managed to provide a 
certain measure of protection for the producers of Hungary. The expan-
sion of mining and metallurgy in the country was expressly the result of 
intervention by the Habsburg state.17 
Educational Policies 
The Court took great pains to promote culture, especially educat ion. The 
changes implemented in this respect in Hungary reflected the reforms 
introduced in the hereditary provinces. In 1749 the Medical Facul ty of the 
University of Vienna was expanded. The same year saw the establishment 
of the Theresianum, a school for the training of administrat ive officials. In 
the later part of her reign, Maria Theresa founded a number of new trade 
and technical schools, and expanded others. This process was responsible 
for the t ransformation in 1763 of the mining institute of Se lmecbanya (in 
German, Schemnitz ; Banska Stiavnica, in present-day Slovakia) f rom a 
secondary to a post-secondary educational institution. Starting in the 
1750s, at the University of Nagyszombat (Trnava in present-day Slovakia) 
changes were brought on the pattern of the reforms of the University of 
Vienna. The university which consisted of facult ies of theology, arts as 
well as law, now received a medical school — as well as a "Department 
of Applied Mathemat ics" for the training of engineers. In 1777 Maria 
Theresa transferred the university to Buda, to the Royal Palace there. 
Then in 1784 Emperor Joseph II moved it to Pest. 
The Royal Court divided Hungary into eight educational districts, 
and appointed laymen to head these in all but one instance. Each district 
was obliged to maintain a secondary school (a so-called superior gimnazi-
um) containing all grades. The curriculum was regulated by the Education 
Decree (Ratio Educationis) issued in 1777. This was the first time in 
Hungary's history that the state asserted its prerogative in education, 
determining not only the structure of educational institutions but also the 
requirements of the curriculum. The significance of natural-science-
subjects was stressed, but no less importance was assigned to national 
history, geography etc. Although universal compulsory education was not 
introduced, all communi t ies and estate-owners were encouraged to 
establish schools. Further progressive aspect of the Ratio was that in 
elementary education it prescribed use of the mother- tongue in the schools 
according to the nationality of the students (seven languages were listed 
specifically: Hungarian, German, Slovak, Croatian, Ruthenian, Serbian 
and Rumanian) . In secondary schools, however, the language of instruc-
tion was to be Latin, while the study of the German language was also 
made compulsory.1 8 
Habsburg Policies Causing Conflict 
Hungarian history-writing has traditionally dealt more with those elements 
of Viennese policy that engendered conflict between the Court and the 
Hungarian noble estates than with the measures that fostered progress. 
While the positive type of state intervention could be discussed in a 
comprehensive manner for the whole period under examination, the poli-
cies that prompted conflict need to be discussed in reference to the rule of 
individual sovereigns, sometimes in reference to a particular period of his 
or her reign. This is so because some of the policies of the Viennese 
Court for the governance of the greatly expanded Habsburg realm were 
rather unsteady and underwent numerous changes. 
Habsburg administration of Hungary 
It is common knowledge that the first attempts by the Habsburg Court to 
establish the administration of the Hungary that had been liberated from 
Turkish rule did not promise much that was positive for Hungarians. The 
government of Leopold I (ruled 1657-1705) did not want to see Hungary 
rising to be a powerful component of the Empire. Not surprisingly under 
these circumstances, during the reconstruction of the country after the 
War of Liberation, the Habsburgs displayed no intentions for respecting 
either Hungary's interests or traditions. The last Hungarian Diet that sat 
prior to the expulsion of the Turks in 1687 had already declared the 
perpetual right of the Habsburg dynasty to the throne of the Hungarian 
kingdom (at least on the male line) and through this deed had revoked the 
right of the estates to elect a king. The Diet's decree, moreover, abolished 
the clause of the 1222 Golden Bull that entitled the nobility to refuse to 
obey the king, a clause which was still in force at the time. Not satisfied 
with these concessions on the part of Hungarians, in the first years of 
their rule over "liberated Hungary," Leopold I refused to restore in the re-
conquered territories the pre-Ottoman governmental system. The territories 
in question were pronounced as imperial properties by virtue of the right 
of conquest and were subjected first to military, then to direct royal 
management. The civil administration in these territories was re-estab-
lished (through the reintroduction of the county system) only years later. 
At the same time, the territorial unity of the country was not restored. Not 
only did Transylvania remain as a separately-governed territory, but also 
the detached status of the Military Frontier Zones continued to be en-
forced . Wha t is more , the size of these frontier districts was increased. 
The consequences of these policies are well known: the fo rmer 
owners of estates in the "liberated lands" could reclaim their lands only 
through elaborate documentation of their claims, and through pay ing a 
"military redemption payment" for them equivalent to 10 per cent of the 
value of the lands in question — a sum most landowners were unab le to 
pay. As a result, the bulk of the estates was transferred to new owners : 
the Catholic Church, imperial army generals, and contractors to the 
military.1 9 
It is also a well-known fact that Habsburg governmental sys tem in 
eighteenth-century Hungary was not the one that had been devised in the 
late seventeenth century. After having grown tired of Viennese absolut-
ism, the Hungarian nation revolted against Habsburg rule at the beginning 
of the eighteenth century. The War of Independence (1703-171 1), led by 
Ferenc II Rakoczi , was at long last defeated in the military sense, but in 
the Peace Treaty of Szatmar (30 April 1711), Hungary managed to c o m e 
to a compromise with the Court. The treaty restored the former consti tu-
tion of the country as well as its traditional forms of administration. These 
measures were formally accepted by Emperor Charles VI and by the 
Hungar ian estates during the Diet of 1712-15. 
The sacrifices of the participants of the Rakoczi War of Indepen-
dence and the resulting compromises reached through the Peace of Szat-
mar (today's Sa tu-Mare in Rumania) made a profound impact on the 
history of eighteenth-century Hungary. The compromise of Szatmar could 
not have come about without the expulsion of the Turks. The re-attach-
ment of the fo rmer Ottoman-occupied territories to Hungary enhanced not 
only the country's area but also its political importance within the Habs-
burg realm. Wi th a territory of nearly 300 thousand square ki lometres 
(which grew to 325 thousand square kilometres after the Peace of Passa-
rowitz in 1718) Hungary made up nearly half of the Habsburg lands. A 
country of this size couldn't be relegated to the role of a frontier zone, as 
Royal Hungary had been before the 1680s. In a country divided into three 
parts, Rakoczi ' s War of Independence would have only increased the 
n u m b e r of those uprisings which, leaving the Ot toman part of Hungary 
untouched, would not have achieved any significant results beyond, for 
instance, ensuring the privileges of the estates and the tolerance of the 
Protestant religion. In post-Ottoman Hungary the compromise of Sza tmar 
def ined the basic tone of the entire reign of Charles VI. The fact that by 
the end of his rule conflict between the Court and Hungary's estates had 
re-surfaced, was mainly the result of the fact that the interests of Vienna 
and Hungary's ruling classes continued to diverge. 
A new era was launched in eighteenth-century Hungarian history 
by the political platforms of the two rulers who reigned from the middle 
of the century onwards: Maria Theresa and Joseph II. Mother and son — 
though prompted by opposite motives, but no doubt animated by honest 
intentions and a sense of responsibility — tried hard to remedy what they 
perceived as the shortcomings of their realm's administrative machinery. 
The scope of their reforms extended to almost all spheres of state activity. 
They tried to improve the machinery of government through the establish-
ment of new administrative organs. Maria Theresa set up the Directorium 
in publicis et cameralibus in 1749, and the Council of State (Staatsrat) in 
1760. Through the so-called 'Haugwitz-reform', introduced in the Here-
ditary Provinces in 1749, the nobility was compelled to pay taxes.20 
Theoretically, Hungary was untouched by these reforms since Hungary 
was not under the authority of the Council of State for example. In 
reality, however, since it was not an executive but an advisory organ, the 
Council's members often voiced their opinions on Hungarian matters as 
well. Joseph II, by not summoning the Hungarian Diet during the ten 
years of his reign, paralyzed the work of legislation. Through merging the 
Hungarian and Transylvanian Chanceries as well as the office of the ban 
of Croatia, the Emperor attained a unified, central institution directly 
subordinated to himself. He deprived the Council of Lieutenancy (Consi-
lium Regium Locumtenentiale Hungaricum — a central administrative 
and executive body) of its right to express its opinions and issue orders 
and thereby relegated it to the role of transmitting royal decrees to the 
county authorities. Furthermore, by dividing Hungary into ten admi-
nistrative districts (and Transylvania into three) he emasculated the county 
administrations and deprived them of their traditional judicial and admin-
istrative functions. 
It is widely known that Joseph II, at the end of his reign, was 
obliged to annul almost all his orders relating to Hungary. The discontent 
of the Hungarian estates threatened to bring about the separation of 
Hungary from the Habsburg state. The more immediate danger, however, 
was a sabotage of the state's functioning by the aristocratic heads of the 
country's administrative apparatus. Under such circumstances the Habs-
burg Court was repeatedly forced to accept compromises. Maria Theresa 
was obliged to make concessions at the time of the War of Austrian 
Succession when she had to ask for the support of the Hungarian nobility. 
In return for offering their "lives and blood" for their Queen, Hungary's 
nobles got their sovereign's formal pledge to uphold the laws of the 
kingdom and to respect the privileges of the nobility. She held to her 
solemn oath till her death. It was only through such concessions that the 
continuity of Habsburg administration could be assured in eighteenth-
century Hungary and new anti-Habsburgs uprisings could be averted. 
Had Joseph's policies been continued by his successor, such an uprising 
would have become a real threat. 
Nobiliary Privileges as a Source of Conflict 
The likelihood of conflict between the Court and the eighteenth-century 
Kingdom of Hungary enhanced was by the fact that Habsburg rulers had 
to face a Hungarian society that no sympathy for them and was even 
more determined not to extend the Habsburgs any help. The problem was 
not the hierarchical structure of Hungarian society and the privileges of 
the nobility since societies elsewhere in the Habsburg realm — and in 
much of the rest of Europe — were not greatly different. The problem in 
Hungary stemmed from the particularly high proportion of the nobility in 
society (5 per cent of the population, surpassed in all of Europe only by 
the ratio of Polish nobility) and the adherence of its members — espe-
cially the impoverished elements — to their privileges. The fact is that 
more than half of Hungary's nobility had to work for a living. 42 per 
cent of them owned no estates while a large portion of the rest had some 
land but had no peasants to work it. It was precisely this element of the 
nobility that felt most attached to its privileges — after all these privi-
leges were the only thing that separated these poor noblemen from the 
peasants. The nobleman's "liberties" also accorded to him the illusion of 
participation in the nation's political life, through the county assemblies. 
The members of the nobility instructed the representatives of the counties 
in the Diet and by doing so they were able to prevent the national assem-
bly from implementing change in Hungary's social structure. 
The obstinacy of the lesser nobility and the gentry should not 
have been an excuse for the aristocracy for not discharging their responsi-
bilities. After all it was Hungary's aristocrats who, through their high 
administrative positions, faced the rulers directly, and whose reluctance to 
serve their sovereigns faithfully and effectively led to most of the con-
f l icts . While the members of the lesser nobility protected their imaginary 
roles in society, the aristocrats defended their real political clout. They did 
this with a f i rm belief in their privileged position and rank — as well as 
with a solid convict ion in the justness of their claim to social superiori ty. 
It goes without saying that Ferenc Rakoczi , the leader of the W a r of 
Independence w h o had united almost the whole nation behind himself , 
expected to be treated with the respect due to a prince and found it 
entirely natural to appoint only fellow aristocrats to high posit ions in his 
a rmy and in the governmental institutions he established. In his memoi rs 
he found it important to stress that, at the beginning of the revolution, the 
envoys who were delegated by the rebels of the Upper Tisza region to 
call on him to lead them, had been not peasants but noblemen. H e wrote 
that one of t hem was a "brave, but poor nobleman." When in 1706 the 
issue of imposing taxes on the nobility first came up for discussion in 
Rakoczi ' s camp, the landowner Sandor Karolyi vehemently protested: "the 
clearest explanation of liberty requires that he [the nobleman] be exempt 
f r o m all taxation." The conservative Count Jozsef Teleki, w h o on his 
journey in Wes te rn Europe had visited Voltaire and Rousseau, did not 
change his v iews at all under the influence of his enlightened contacts. 
Dur ing the French Revolution, Teleki would denounce the Jacobins and 
the equality they proclaimed, and voice his satisfaction with the sys tem in 
which "he could flog his peasant but his peasant could not f log him" — 
to use the words of the writer Ferenc Kazinczy. Given such views, it is 
not surprising that Hungary's nobility never showed any wil l ingness to 
renounce its privileges. After the Rakoczi W a r of Independence it did not 
under take armed action against Vienna, but it refused to offer any assis-
tance to the Habsburg rulers in putting reforms into effect — which in 
mos t cases were designed to benefi t Hungary. 
Under these circumstances there could be no smooth cooperat ion 
be tween the Cour t and Hungary 's estates in the administration of the 
country . There was not one Diet in the eighteenth-century history of 
Hunga ry that did not start with a dispute between the ruler and the 
estates. The government was unable to have effective control over the 
Diet 's agenda because most of the assembly's discussions were devoted to 
the nobility's real or alleged grievances. In some cases proposals made by 
the rulers for re forms (such as the taxation of the nobility or the regula-
tion of peasant services during the reign of Mar ia Theresa) were not even 
placed on the agenda. Apart f r o m the very end of the century ( the time of 
the French Revolutionary wars), there was not a single occasion when the 
Diet approved the taxes that had been asked for by the Court. Under the 
circumstances it is not surprising that, in order to reduce conflict, the 
Habsburg government sometimes dispensed with summoning the Diet. In 
vain was it fixed by statute that the Diet was to be summoned in every 
three years, there were four long periods (1729-1741, 1741-1751, 1751-
1764 and 1765-1790) when the Diet did not sit. Furthermore, major high 
offices and ceremonial positions which the Diet filled, for example that of 
the Nador (Palatine, Viceroy) were left vacant for a long time.21 It should 
be added that, in their opposition to the Habsburg regime, Hungary's 
estates received strong support from the officials of the medium-level 
bureaucracy. On the whole it is not unreasonable to conclude that for the 
members of Hungary's gentry serving the interests of their own class took 
priority over the fulfilment of the Viennese Court's expectation that the 
partake in the efficient administration of the country. 
The Problem of Landowner-Peasant Relations as a Source of Friction 
Strife between the Court and Hungary's nobility was exacerbated as a 
result of the interference by Vienna in the relationship between peasants 
and their landlords. At the beginning of the 18th century, the situation was 
favourable to the fonner because of the shortage of labour on Hungary's 
estates. This situation had changed by the middle of the century when the 
estate owners began placing greater and greater burdens on the peasants. 
The latter, beginning with the 1750s, started to turn to the imperial Court 
with their complaints. The Court in turn realised that the prospect of a 
decline in the state taxes collected from the increasingly impoverished 
peasants warranted intervention in this matter. For this reason Maria 
Theresa in 1755 authorized the Council of Lieutenancy Government to 
investigate the peasants' complaints. The monarch, however, did not 
receive any real help in redressing the Hungarian peasantry's complaints 
either from the bureaucracy or from the nobility. During the Diet of 1764-
65 the estates refused to enact a law in the matter of the peasant services. 
The discontented peasants were ready to stage an uprising in the western 
Transdanubian counties from the summer of 1765 on and came to be a 
constant threat to the landowners living in the area. 
The rumours of an impending peasant uprising posed no real 
danger to the imperial government; in fact it gave Vienna an excuse to 
issue a decree regarding peasant-landlord relations. The decree, dated 23 
January 1767, had a dual purpose: first to protect the lands in the hands 
of the peasants (the plot of land held in villeinage under the cultivation of 
the tenant); secondly, to regulate the services levied on the peasant's plot. 
Because of the reluctance of the counties the regulation of villeinage 
services was implemented only in the years between 1770 and 1776.22 In 
Transylvania the Lieutenancy, the so-called Gubernium, managed to 
prevent the implementation of the decree completely. 
Unlike the regulation of villein services, Joseph II's decree for the 
abolition of serfdom did not bring about a fundamental change in Hun-
gary. Its major articles decreed the abolition of 'perpetual' villeinage (the 
situation in which the villein was bound to the land and was deprived of 
the right to move freely), the extension of the right of moving to each 
peasant, and the freedom for them to leam a trade or to attend school. By 
this time, however, the major problem of Hungarian peasant society was 
no longer that they had no right to move but the fact that the villein plots 
were being divided and thus reduced.23 This may be the reason why 
Hungarian nobility were so indifferent about this statute, unlike the others 
promulgated during the reign of Joseph II. 
The Problem of Religious Freedom as a Source of Friction 
The measures of the Court in the realm of religious policies constituted 
another source of conflict, and the most contentious issue was undoub-
tedly discrimination against Protestants, followed by the curtailment of the 
liberties of the Catholic Church under the reign of Joseph II. Added to 
this was the fact that Joseph's policy of religious tolerance, which should 
have appeased Protestants had the opposite effect because it was judged 
as not far-going enough by them. King Charles Ill's dealing with this 
issue was made easier by the fact that the estates themselves were not 
united on these issues. It was the disputes over religious matters during 
the Diet of 1728-29 that enabled the ruler to undertake decisive interven-
tion. The Patent of Religion, the Carolina resolutio, issued on 21 March 
1731, authorized public religious practice for Protestants but only at 
places that had been approved for this purpose in 1681. The decree 
obliged Protestants who were about to take office, including lawyers and 
judges, to take an oath — the text of which included a reference to the 
Virgin Mary and the saints! The forcible conversion of Protestants to 
Catholicism, as well as the expropriation of their church buildings, 
actually continued under the reigns of both Charles III and Maria Theresa. 
At the end of the eighteenth century, almost exactly half of Hungary's 
population, 49 per cent to be precise, was Roman Catholic.24 This was a 
substantial increase since the early 17th century when the proportion of the 
Catholics in the population may have been as low as five or ten percent. 
Catholicism in Hungary had many ties to the state. The commu-
nity of interests between the church and state, however, had its limits. 
Prelates of aristocratic origin and ecclesiastic officials of lesser-noble 
background often took the side of the estates in their disputes with the 
Court. This contributed to the tensions with Vienna since many clergymen 
took part in the work of the Diets (the bishops in the Upper House, the 
abbots and canons in the Lower House), but occasionally also in county 
politics.25 
Relations between church and state deteriorated rapidly during the 
rule of Joseph II. The Emperor's Patent of Tolerance (issued relative to 
Hungary on 25 October 1781) guaranteed absolute civil equality and 
freedom of conscience to Lutherans, Calvinists and members of the Greek 
Orthodox Church.26 Although Protestants had seldom held state offices 
previously, careers in the administration were in fact opened to them by 
the Patent of Tolerance. Another decree (issued on 12 January 1782) 
dissolved those monasteries and nunneries whose monks and nuns did not 
engage in some form of useful activity such as teaching, nursing etc. (In 
Hungary there were 140 monasteries and nunneries dissolved.) 
Joseph's decrees concerning the church provoked fierce resistance 
from the Catholic clergy. Pope Pius VI himself had tried to divert the 
Emperor from his intentions by asking for a personal meeting but he was 
unsuccessful in changing Joseph's mind. In Hungary the episcopacy made 
every effort to prevent the orders from being announced and a number of 
the Free Royal Cities continued to ban Protestants from taking up resi-
dence in them. An interesting aspect of the tolerance policy is the fact 
that whilst Hungary's Protestants received the Patent of Tolerance with a 
tremendous enthusiasm at the time, from the mid-17 80s on they began 
demanding full equality with Catholics in religious practice. 
Habsburg Disrespect for Traditions and Regional Peculiarities as a 
Source of Conflict 
T h e Habsburg rulers usually showed little understanding of the peculiari-
t ies and distinctive character of the territories within their rea lm, or of the 
t radi t ions of their populations. It is perhaps only Maria Theresa who was 
an exception to this generalization. The respect for tradit ions, though, 
neve r kept even her from real izing her ambit ions. If and when she showed 
respec t for regional peculiarities, it was usually for the purpose of increas-
ing her populari ty with the local population. The Queen s t rove to make 
he r adherents indebted to her by way of granting titles and dignities to 
t hem. The major i ty of Hungary 's aristocrats appreciated her effor ts and 
spen t much of the year in Vienna , in the proximity of the Cour t . The sons 
of lesser noble families often served for a long time in the imperial city 
as members of the Hungarian Guards established in 1760. 
Joseph II was not characterized by the diplomatic f inesse his 
mo the r had possessed. Because of the distrust he harboured against the 
Hungar ian estates and as a consequence of the firm belief of his in the 
persuas ive force of the Enlightenment, he wanted to make his subjects see 
reason with the strength of intellect. He had not had himself crowned so 
as not to be restricted by the oath of coronation in carrying out his future 
r e fo rms . He had the Crown of Hungary taken to Vienna, which extra-
ordinary action caused a huge shock all over the country. Contemporary 
memoir -wr i te rs noted that the carriers of the Crown were fo l lowed by an 
horrendous thunder-storm, because of which the residents of the imperial 
city did not wan t to let the C r o w n be carried to the Burg, to the Treasury. 
The introduction of G e r m a n as the off icial language of the Empire 
ins tead of the outdated Latin would have served the needs of a unified 
sys t em of jurisdict ion and administration. To accomplish this purpose the 
language of educat ion would have had to be switched to G e r m a n . What 
Joseph expected was isolated objections f r o m a few judges and teachers. 
Ins tead, it was a lmost the whole of Hungarian society that protested. Mass 
protes t was also triggered by several of his measures of non-polit ical 
na ture . He had forbidden the burial of the dead in wooden co f f ins — he 
prescr ibed sacks instead, into which lime was to be dusted before the 
burial . He fo rbade women to wear fashionable dresses and u s e make-up. 
It is not by chance that even his followers, the Josephinists — who had 
ral l ied under his banner at the outset of his re form program — refused to 
stay with him in the long run. At the end of his reign, Joseph was obliged 
to repeal his decrees, except fo r the Patent of Toleration and the one 
relat ing to the peasantry. 
Hungary's Return to Europe 
In reflecting on the reunification of Hungary in wake of the Turks' 
expulsion, historians might ask why the country did not resume the role 
of power-broker it used to have in Central Europe before the Ottoman 
conquest — some historians might even blame the Habsburgs for this. 
Theoretically, Hungary's reunification could have led to the country resu-
ming its pre-16th century position in Europe, but this was not to be. After 
the Turks' expulsion the country found itself a part, a subordinated part, 
of the Habsburg Empire. Its rulers, despite the repeated demands of the 
Hungarian Diet, did not move to Buda — and did not formulate their 
policies in accordance with the interests of Hungary. They did not 
elevate Hungary to the position of a European great power. They did try 
to avoid conflict with the country's inhabitants and played an important 
role in making 18th century Hungary once again a part of Europe. 
Hungarians have taken their "return" to Europe as a natural 
development, one which included the restoration of European-style soci-
etal and economic institutions and practices. "Returning" to Europe was a 
rare privilege in the 18th century which not many of the nations that had 
come under Ottoman rule could enjoy. In regions of Europe where the 
Ottomans' despotic rule persisted for a long time, the coming of economic 
progress, societal renewal, and the creation of a modern, European-style 
political structure, had to wait for much longer than in Hungary. In the 
Balkans in particular, the beginning of such progress had to wait for 
centuries. For Hungary the danger of remaining a part of such a back-
ward world was finally averted only in the eighteenth century. 
In trying to answer the question why Hungarians were able to 
shed many of the legacies of Ottoman rule it is not enough to argue that 
that rule had been relatively short-lived in Hungary. In answering this 
question it must be admitted that the new owners of the lands re-gained 
from the Turks — the Habsburgs — tried to administer them according to 
European norms rather than in accordance with the un-European practices 
and traditions introduced by the Ottomans. The Habsburgs reversed the 
process we might call the "Ottomanization" of these lands. In doing so 
they prevented the possibility of this process enveloping the whole of 
Hungary. 
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Hungary in World War I: 
The End of Historic Hungary 
Peter Pastor 
Austria-Hungary 's declaration of war on Serbia on July 28, 1914, was 
received with unbounded enthusiasm by street crowds in Budapest. 
During those heady days the people welcoming war on Pest's Oktogon 
Square, or on Buda's St. Gyorgy Square,1 had no idea that instead of the 
expected short and glorious conflict, it would be a war that would last for 
four years and would threaten the very existence of Hungary. Within three 
days the local conflict between neighbours evolved into a world war, a 
development which was received by the crowds with similar enthusiasm 
in all belligerent capitals. 
The pretext for Austria-Hungary's decision to start a war against 
Serbia was the latter's subversive activities culminating in the assassina-
tion of the Habsburg heir, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, and his wife.2 
The archduke was no friend of the Hungarian establishment, as he 
considered the Hungarians as having too much influence within the Empi-
re, and to change the status quo, he wanted to turn the dualistic system 
into a trialistic one by giving the Czechs, Poles, or South Slavs equal 
power to that of the Hungarians and the Austrians.3 The last of these 
choices would have altered not only the Empire, but historic Hungary as 
well. 
The real reason for the war, however, was Austria-Hungary's 
concern with the territorial growth of Serbia, which since 1908 had 
doubled its imperium. The South Slav state, with its irredentist Greater 
Serbian vision, threatened with further expansion, this time at the expense 
of Austria and Hungary. The Austro-Hungarian leaders saw the interna-
tional revulsion to Francis Ferdinand's assassination as the opportune 
moment to start an assumedly quick and victorious war to end the Serbian 
threat by reducing Serbia's territory and making it a puppet state. They 
also assumed that if they missed this opportunity in the summer of 1914, 
in the future the international military constellation would be less advan-
tageous for the Monarchy to fight a war against Serbia as other powers 
were more likely to come to that country's aid.4 
Accordingly, at the meeting of the common Cabinet Council on 
July 7, 1914, in Vienna, the crucial decision for war was agreed upon, 
though the Hungarian Prime Minister, Istvan Tisza, objected. It was not 
that he opposed the elimination of the Serbian threat, since it was he who 
had proposed to the Council the dismemberment of Serbia in the first 
place. He was against the annexation of any Serb territory to the Monar-
chy. He was also concerned that a war against Serbia had not been 
diplomatically prepared and therefore would not attract adequate inter-
national support. He was also worried about Russia, which had acted as 
a protector for Serbia in the past, and Romania, which he saw as a 
potential enemy if the war could not be localized. For these reasons, he 
proposed a harsh diplomatic demarche to Serbia, but the kind it could 
accept. He also believed that since some causus belli could always be 
found, the war should be postponed to a more propitious time, when 
Russia would be preoccupied with Asian expansion. The Cabinet, whose 
bellicose stance was abetted by German Emperor William II, disregarded 
Tisza's admonitions about Russia, and dismissed its possible involvement 
in the war. It was reasoned that in case it did enter, it was to the 
Monarchy's advantage, as Russia was deemed to become a greater threat 
in the future.5 As a compromise, therefore, the Cabinet agreed to the 
sending of the type of demands to Belgrade that the Serb government 
would most likely deem unacceptable, thus justifying the use of force, but 
not angering Russia in the process. Tisza accepted this approach though 
he insisted on approving the ultimatum before it was sent in order to 
ensure that it did not make the goal of its framers too obvious.6 
Tisza's opposition to the use of force changed only on July 10, 
after he received information from Foreign Minister Count Leopold 
Berchtold that William II, who was pressing the Monarchy for a "blitz-
krieg," had made strong representations to King Carol of Romania to stay 
out of the coming conflict. This put Tisza's mind at ease about a possible 
Romanian attack on Transylvania.7 On July 14, when he returned to the 
imperial capital, he went on to support the military solution to the Serbian 
crisis.8 At the Cabinet Council meeting of July 19, 1914, when the 
ultimatum to Serbia was approved, Tisza also suppressed his fears about 
Russia, stating that Russia would possibly stay out of the war if Austria-
Hungary expressed its intention not to annex Serb territory.9 To appease 
Tisza, the Council approved the "no annexation" policy, which also 
intended to allay Tisza's fear of more Slavs being added to the Monarchy, 
thereby shifting the Empire's demographic balance in favour of the Slavs 
at the expense of the Hungarians. 
This concession to Tisza's sensitivities was soon altered. Although 
before the war spread, Count Berchtold had instructed his ambassador to 
St. Petersburg to declare that "so long as the war between Austria-
Hungary and Serbia remains localized, the Monarchy does not aim in any 
way at territorial acquisitions of any sort,"10 after Russia entered the war, 
planners at the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Ministry began to think about 
territorial gains at the expense of Russian Poland. The inclusion of 
additional millions of Slavs in the Empire would have probably led to the 
introduction of some kind of "trialist" solution for the Dual Monarchy 
which would have ended the existing Austrian-Magyar joint hegemony.11 
It is clear, therefore, that in order to solve the "Serb crisis" of the summer 
of 1914 and to maintain Magyar influence in the Empire and supremacy 
in the Kingdom of Hungary, Tisza, instead of calling for the dismem-
berment of Serbia, should have proposed territorial concessions to Serbia. 
In particular, he should have offered to transfer some of the South Slav 
inhabited areas of Hungary to Serb sovereignty. Yet in royal Hungary no 
statesman, politician, or scholar was willing to think of territorial conces-
sions as a way of preserving the Habsburg Monarchy and, in fact, the 
Hungarian Kingdom.12 Instead of making such concessions, war was 
chosen, which led to the Monarchy's destruction and Hungary's dismem-
berment. Rather than offering to transfer land inhabited by Serbs to 
Serbia, by October 1915 the Hungarian government presented its view to 
the common Cabinet Council demanding "parity": If Austria wanted to 
annex parts of Russian Poland, Hungary would demand Bosnia-Herze-
govina and Dalmatia.13 
The Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia was transmitted to 
Belgrade on July 23, 1914, and in spite of the harshness of the ultimatum, 
the Serb reply was conciliatory though evasive.14 It could have served as 
basis for negotiations. The Austro-Hungarian demand for the right of its 
officials to seek out the culprits in Belgrade was rejected on the ground 
that it was a violation of the principle of sovereignty. This rejection 
provided Vienna with the excuse to break diplomatic relations with 
Serbia. Next, mobilization orders followed and war was declared.15 
Miscalculations and Disasters 
For the Monarchy, the war started disastrously. On July 29, the chief of 
the General Staff, Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf, in accordance with his 
country's war plans, ordered the troops to be transported on trains south, 
to the Serbian front, even though it was likely that a major attack would 
come from Russia in the north. On July 31, in response to Russian 
mobilization, Conrad ordered the rerouting of some of those troops to the 
north, in anticipation of a two-front war. He was told by the military's 
railway authorities, however, that the preset time-tables did not permit 
this, and such an action would abort the war plans against Serbia. Thus 
troops destined to be shipped to the Russian front first had to reach their 
debarkation points in the south before they could re-embark to be sent 
back north to Galicia. All in all about 180 trains were unnecessarily sent 
south. The consequence of this blunder was that many of the troops did 
not arrive in time to the Carpathians and Galicia to stem the Russian 
offensive that came at the end of August. Some of the divisions did not 
reach the northern front until January and February 1915.16 
These developments clearly indicated the fallacy of the concept of 
the "short war" which was in part based on the smoothly functioning rail 
transportation of troops to the front to bring about quick and decisive 
victories. Instead of attaining success, the Austro-Hungarian forces had to 
abandon the Bukovinian capital Czernowitz (Chernovtsy) on August 31; 
Lemberg (L'viv), the key city of Galicia, fell on September 3; Przemysl 
came under siege on August 13, and Jaroslav was evacuated on the 21st. 
The retreat was stopped only at the Tarnow-Gorlice line, 230 kilometres 
west of Lemberg, putting eastern and central Galicia under Russian 
occupation. These initial battles of the war proved to be the bloodiest, 
with casualties of 350,000 in the opening phase of the conflict. From 
October to December, an additional 800,000 were wounded, killed, went 
missing, or were captured.17 
The Austro-Hungarian defeat on one front was accompanied by 
the failure of the punitive war against Serbia on the other front. The 
casualty rate in the south approached 300,000.18 The Dual Monarchy was 
never able to recover from this great blood-letting.19 In 1916, the year of 
the famous Russian Brusilov offensive, there was another surge of huge 
losses amounting to 1,061,091 troops.20 During the course of the war the 
Dual Monarchy mobilized 9 million men between the ages of eighteen 
and fifty-three. Of the 9 million, 3.4 million came from Hungary and 
Croatia. Of the men in Austro-Hungarian uniform 1.1 million died, 3.6 
million were wounded, and 2 million became prisoners of war. 530,000 of 
the dead, 1.4 million of the wounded, and 833,000 of the POWs, were 
Hungarian.21 
The Habsburg armed forces, which besides the common Austro-
Hungarian Army included the Austrian Landwehr and the Hungarian 
Honved, were not adequately trained and lacked sufficient firepower. In 
terms of manpower, Austria-Hungary was behind the other great power 
belligerents. Because of the lack of funds, only about thirty percent of its 
manpower pool was drafted, and many recruits were given only two 
months of training.22 The Dual Monarchy had forty-eight infantry divi-
sions, while Russia had ninety-three, France eighty-eight, and little Serbia 
eleven. The Empire's field artillery, in the process of replacement, was 
mostly obsolete. In the Habsburg armies, only forty-two pieces supported 
an infantry battalion as opposed to forty-eight pieces for a Russian 
battalion, and fifty-four for a German one. As a German military special-
ist noted, the Habsburg army was "adequate for a campaign against 
Serbia, but inadequate for a major European war."23 If the Austro-
Hungarian leaders had started the war to prevent their enemies from 
overtaking them as a military power, the war in 1914 indicated that it was 
already too late to use force to reestablish the equilibrium. For Austria-
Hungary the expectation of victory was as much an illusion as was the 
hope of a short war — based as it was on the cult of the offensive, the 
notion which was shared by all belligerents.24 
For Prime Minister Tisza, who mistook the initial enthusiasm of 
his countrymen for the war as a sign of approval of his leadership, there 
existed an additional illusion. He came to believe that the war, when it 
came, could and would lead to national reconciliation and the advent of 
unity among Hungary's nationalities. Yet there was no favourable re-
sponse coming on this matter even from the county and government 
officials,25 much less from the nationalities who saw the war as an 
opportunity to press their demands for additional minority rights. At the 
outbreak of the war, in order to win over the nationalities, Tisza's govern-
ment made a number of concessions. It issued an amnesty to political 
prisoners. It ordered public schools to teach non-Hungarians not only in 
Hungarian but also in their mother tongue. It permitted the displaying of 
national colours along with the Hungarian ones, as long as these were not 
the same as the enemy's. Tisza also offered the leaders of the Romanian 
minority educational reforms, concessions on language use, and the 
formation of electoral districts favouring the Romanian population, but 
these offers were not received as going far enough.26 The ethnic Roma-
nians in Transylvania began to look toward the Romanian kingdom for 
military liberation. The appeasement of Romania and the Romanian 
irredenta in Hungary would have required some territorial concessions, 
but Prime Minister Tisza refused to concede any territory. In 1915, when 
the fence-sitter Italy could have been brought to the Central Powers' side 
with territorial concessions by Austria, Tisza refused to support such a 
deal, fearing that it would lead to demands that Hungary make similar 
concessions to Romania in Transylvania. Even following the entry of Italy 
on the side of the Entente in May 1915, Tisza refused to contemplate 
even some limited territorial concessions to Romania as a price for her 
continued neutrality.27 The territory that could have been sacrificed at the 
time was minuscule in size when compared to the Hungarian lands 
Romania gained by siding with the eventual victors of the war. 
In the second half of 1915, the Romanian ethnic press in Hungary 
(i.e. in Transylvania) became vigorously persecuted.28 In the summer of 
1916, Romania attacked Hungary and briefly invaded Transylvania. The 
sympathetic reception of enemy troops by the indigenous Romanian 
population led to the hardening of Hungarian attitudes. Consequently, 
two to three thousand pro-Regat intellectuals were interned in the western 
Hungarian city of Sopron.29 Soon thereafter eighty thousand Transyl-
vanian Romanians fled their homes — when the Romanian army retreated 
from Transylvania — and sought refuge in the Kingdom of Romania.30 
In 1917, Minister of Education Albert Apponyi had the Romanian teach-
ers' colleges closed, indicating a return to a policy of forced assim-
ilation.31 Other nationalities, the Ukrainians and the Serbs, also suffered 
because of the fighting. Because they lived in the war zone, they were 
often mistreated by the military on the suspicion of being spies for the 
enemy.32 
The Entente Powers' appeal in 1917-1918 to the Dual Monar-
chy's national minorities to undermine the Austro-Hungarian war effort 
also contributed to the Budapest authorities' viewing Hungary's non-
Magyar populations as a potential fifth-column. A government edict 
issued at the end of 1917 reflected this attitude. According to the new 
rule, estates could not be sold (or even leased for more than ten years) 
without government approval. If the government did not approve of the 
buyer, it had the right to select another. Ostensibly, the policy aimed at 
assuring that land could be acquired by war veterans or their widows, but 
in reality it aimed to prevent the acquisition of land by members of 
Hungary's national minorities.33 The government's inability to handle the 
nationalities question under the stress of war acted as a catalyst and 
contributed to the secession of the minorities from Hungary when the 
Dual Monarchy collapsed in October 1918.34 
Another of Tisza's illusions was his belief that the war could 
bring about the enhancement of Hungary's influence within the Monar-
chy, which would lead to full parity with Austria. In fact during the war 
efforts to enhance Hungary's power within the Dual Monarchy led to in-
creasing tensions and a weakening of dualistic cohesion, which before the 
war had served as the best guarantee of the Hungarian state's survival.35 
The War's Impact on Hungary 
The war's outbreak seemed to bring radical changes to Hungarian politics. 
In the long turbulent Hungarian Parliament there were signs of a budding 
truce among the major political parties, particularly between Istvan 
Tisza's governing Party of Work and the opposition Independents. The 
Social Democratic Party, the only mass party in Hungary, and which had 
no parliamentary representation, also supported the war out of patriotic 
duty, just as its sister parties in France and Germany did. Nationalism 
thus carried the day over working-class internationalism. As a result of 
the nationalist war fever in Hungary, for the first time since his coro-
nation in 1867, the Habsburg monarch Francis Joseph came to be recog-
nized as a truly Hungarian king among the Hungarian populace.36 At the 
time of his death in 1916, conservative and liberal writers alike eulogized 
him as such. The liberal writer Hugo Ignotus remarked: "It is no exag-
geration to state that Hungary has not had a national king like Francis 
Joseph since King Matthias."37 
The bubble of the "short war" illusion burst in December 1914, 
the date which, according to the pre-war military planners, was to mark 
the war's end, as it was assumed that the huge national armies of the 
belligerents would run out of logistical supplies. This problem was 
overcome and the war effort continued through the mobilization of the 
civilian population for the production of military supplies. Industrial and 
agricultural production began to be coordinated by the state. This practice 
later became known as total war, though at the time it was called "war 
socialism," as the practice undermined the prevailing economic model of 
laissezfaire capitalism and increasingly resembled the command economy 
model favoured by the socialists.38 
The degree of mobilization and regimentation of the civilian 
population for the war effort was unparalleled in modern times. The 
practice gave birth to the "home front," which not only denoted the 
application of authoritarian measures to civilians, but also connoted the 
need to create the kind of social cohesion that existed among the soldiers 
in the trenches. Governments employed social, political, and economic 
measures and propaganda to that end. In Hungary the establishment of a 
home front brought about radical changes that prepared the ground for the 
political, economic, and social programs that were introduced by the 
revolution that started on October 31, 1918.39 
The increased power of the state in wartime Hungary had its legal 
underpinning in the emergency law, the War Services Act, which had 
been drafted in 1912 during the Balkan crisis. According to this law, in 
the event of war, emergency power was to remain in the hands of the 
civilian government; even military requisitions were to be implemented by 
civilian authorities. The Hungarian home front therefore tended to resem-
ble more that of Great Britain than those prevailing in Germany or 
Austria where the war led to the ascendance of the military over the 
civilian administration.40 
The first major intervention in Hungary's laissez faire economy 
came on August 1, 1914, three days after the declaration of war on 
Serbia. It was a fourteen-day moratorium on loans and debts. It was 
intended to prevent a run on the banks by worried depositors. The life of 
the moratorium was extended in one form or another for a year. Later the 
government, using the War Services Act, placed all defense-related 
industries under military discipline by drafting workers under fifty into 
militia labour battalions, which were then placed in designated factories. 
Other government edicts also drafted some women, and men over fifty, 
but they were not put under martial law.41 The war economy placed more 
and more workers in areas defined as war-related. By October 1, 1915, in 
addition to the mines, rail yards, flour mills, and food processing compa-
nies, 263 firms were put under military justice. A year later their number 
increased to 615, and by the end of the war to 900. It is estimated that 
by war's end between 500,000 and 800,000 thousand workers were 
engaged in war-related production. In addition to these workers, 140,000 
troops were also employed in factories.42 
The flow of production was assured by centralized, government-
controlled monopolies. In mid-1915 the War Produce Corporation was 
set up. Financed by state and bank investments, the firm had a monopoly 
on the acquisition and sale of grain. Other monopolies that were estab-
lished included the so-called centres for metals, textiles, sugar, and others. 
By the end of the war there were 291 such centres. A number of com-
mittees made up of government officials and trade specialists were also 
involved in the coordination of production and distribution.43 The control 
over distribution aimed to fill the needs of the war front first. This meant 
that food items and consumer goods for the home front were restricted 
and price controls were introduced on food stuffs. Food rationing was 
introduced in the spring of 1915 and in January 1916 ration cards made 
their debut. As the war progressed and food shortages increased, the 
authorities reduced the rations.44 
Another consequence of the war on the home front was the 
increase of female and adolescent labour. Women entered the labour 
market not because of the manpower draft, but as a consequence of 
economic necessity caused by the absence of the traditional male wage 
earner. While there are no statistics available for the women employed in 
the consumer-product and service industries, but in the manufacturing 
sector — where women were hired in large numbers during the war — 
statistics are telling enough of the increase. In December 1914, 137,075 
women were employed in this sector; by May 1916, their number had 
reached 209,833.45 Since the wages of female workers were traditionally 
lower, their increased employment led to the decline of wages paid to 
men, though never to the level of women wage earners. In fact during 
the war only teamsters earned less than women.46 
Female labour also increased in agriculture. Agrarian labour laws 
issued at the beginning of the war granted financial support to the sol-
diers' dependents, but not to their able-bodied family members. This law 
forced not only women, but also adolescent children and the elderly to 
perform agricultural labour.47 In spite of this involuntary mobilization of 
villagers, labour shortages persisted. There was an attempt to solve the 
problem by giving leaves at planting and harvest time to peasant soldiers 
who were performing non-frontline duties. Military labour battalions and 
some 300,000 Russian and Serb POWs were also assigned to agricultural 
work.48 
A command economy geared to fighting the war led to serious 
shortages in consumer products. A price freeze failed to slow down the 
inflation caused by the shortages. The slow rise of inflation during the 
first eighteen months of the war gave way to galloping inflation, as there 
was an attempt to finance the war by printing more money. Between 
1914 and 1917 the cost of household goods increased by 268.17 percent 
and that of clothing by 1,230.32 percent. It is estimated that 63-80 
percent of the labourers' wages had to be spent on food, leaving very 
little money for clothing and shelter.49 The consequent decline in the 
standard of living was reflected in a poll taken in Budapest in May 1918. 
This revealed that the 682,548 respondents (out of a population of 
962,435) owned 800,000 pairs of shoes. About 291,000 owned one pair, 
241,000 two pairs, and only 150,000 owned three pairs. Those who 
owned three pairs, however, indicated that their shoes were repaired or 
were beyond repair.50 
Economic hardships led to wildcat strikes by 1916. The govern-
ment responded to the unrest by setting up grievance committees, which 
were to arbitrate between workers and their employers. Most of the 
decisions favoured the workers,51 indicating the seriousness of the plight 
of the workers as well as the government's concern about the decline of 
morale on the home front. Since the workers were represented before the 
grievance committees by the unions, their importance and membership 
also increased. From December 1916 to December 1917 membership in 
unions rose from 55,588 to 212,222.52 
Another circumstance that contributed to low morale on the home 
front was the shortage of coal. Output declined because of the labour 
shortage in the mines and the scarcity of rolling stock. By 1917 this situ-
ation had resulted in industrial slowdowns, and in some factories, in a 
complete halt to production. Responding to the problem, the government 
prohibited the temporary lay-off of workers from these factories and on 
the initiative of the Ministry of National Defense, offered "coal aid" to 
those workers who were idled by the coal shortage. This unemployment 
benefit amounted to seventy-five percent of the worker's wage, half being 
paid by the treasury and half by the employer.53 For the first time in 
Hungarian history, the state rather than private insurance companies paid 
unemployment benefits. The war, therefore, was responsible for the dawn 
of the welfare state in Hungary. The diminution of laissez faire econo-
mics was also demonstrated by the introduction of rent controls, and rent 
moratorium for the dependents of the conscripted soldier.54 
The war also forced the lawmakers and some churchmen to pay 
attention to the plight of the peasants, who constituted 62.22 percent of 
Hungary's population of twenty-one million. In 1916 there were discus-
sions in the country and even in Parliament about land reforms, including 
the distribution of homesteads by the state to soldiers who were small-
holders, sharecroppers, or agricultural labourers in civilian life.55 While 
the war brought about a sixty percent increase in the agricultural labo-
urer's wage, inflation more than wiped out this gain. In 1916 a day 
labourer earned 1,050 kronen for three hundred days' work. In contrast 
to this figure, the annual cost to the treasury of feeding and housing a 
POW was estimated at 1,333.9 kronen.56 
Moderately well-off and well-to-do peasants were also experienc-
ing hardship because of the war, as there were price-ceilings established 
for agrarian products, while much of the industrial goods needed by the 
peasantry were selling at inflated prices. The peasants responded by 
withholding produce and hoarding it for the black market. In some cases 
there was a reduction of output. The government responded with military 
raids of the granaries, which did not bring about a resolution of the 
problem. In spite of the hardship experienced, the peasants, unlike the 
workers, did not respond with strikes. Since agrarian unrest was minimal 
and land reforms were not seen as leading to increased production, the 
government failed to take up the cause of land reform.57 
The difficulties of agriculture were not the consequence of 
patterns of ownership but were due to weather conditions and to the 
impact of the war, which created shortages of draft animals and farm 
machinery. The cutoff of Romanian grain imports in 1916, which had 
supplied 30 percent of the Dual Monarchy's needs, further exacerbated 
the situation.58 By 1918, the wheat harvest had declined by 37 percent, 
rye by 32 percent, barley by 57 percent, potatoes by 40 percent, and sugar 
beets by 54 percent. The shortages contributed to the decline of the 
morale of the home front and hunger riots erupted in 1917 in various 
parts of the country.59 The decline of food production led to a reduction 
of supplies sent to Austria, where the situation was truly critical.60 Con-
sequently, the Austrian newspapers, seeking scapegoats, accused the 
Hungarians of bad faith and setting up a "Hungarian blockade."61 The 
Hungarian press responded in kind, accusing the Austrians of siphoning 
off much needed food provisions, and called on the government not to 
comply with Vienna's requests for produce.62 The quarrels over food 
supplies contributed to the drifting apart of the two halves of the Monar-
chy. 
The government tried to counteract the sagging of national morale 
by reviving discussion on electoral reforms. The re-surfacing of the 
suffrage question, however, only caused the collapse of the parliamentary 
truce. The renewal of acrimony over the issue of suffrage was in part due 
to the fact that in Hungary, alone among the belligerents, a national 
government — a wartime "grand coalition" of all or most parties — never 
materialized.63 On June 21, 1915, the five-year term of Parliament 
expired, but elections were postponed to six months after the signing of a 
peace treaty. At the same time, however, Parliament was not prorogued: 
rather, it was to sit and debate the nation's affairs as usual until the end 
of the war.64 
In the spring of 1915, the opposition parties reopened the debate 
on suffrage on a patriotic note, calling for voting rights for front-line 
soldiers over twenty. Soon after, Count Mihaly Karolyi, a leader of the 
Independents, renewed his call for universal manhood suffrage. Debates 
continued into 1917, when war weariness, shortages, and labour unrest, 
coupled with the news of the Russian Revolution, forced the lawmakers to 
resolve the parliamentary deadlock on the issue. On July 19, 1918, a 
compromise law broadened the right to vote from 7.7 percent of the 
population to 13 percent. The modest reform failed to satisfy either the 
opposition parties in Parliament or the Social Democratic Party outside of 
it,65 but for the first time the government conceded the right to all politi-
cal parties, including the Socialists, to organize without restraints.66 
Parliamentary peace was again broken by Count Mihaly Karolyi 
when on July 17, 1916, he caused the Independence Party to split over 
the question of fighting the war on the side of Germany. A new party 
came into existence, called the Karolyi Independence Party. It demanded 
an independent Hungary linked to Austria only through a personal union, 
a disengagement from the German alliance, and an end to the war with a 
separate peace that did not compromise Hungary's integrity.67 
The Russian revolutions of 1917 not only influenced Hungarian 
parliamentary politics but they also had an important impact on Hungarian 
POWs in Russia. It is estimated that of the 1,600,000 to 2,110,000 troops 
of the Austro-Hungarian army in captivity, 500,000 to 600,000 were 
Hungarians. Of the 300,000 who died in the Russian camps a large 
proportion was also Hungarian. The tsarist Russian government divided 
the captives into camps according to their nationality. Slav, Italian, and 
Romanian POWs were sent to camps in European Russia, while German, 
German-speaking Austrian, and Magyar-speaking Hungarian POWs were 
sent to the more inhospitable areas of the Russian Empire: to the Urals, 
the White Sea area, Siberia, or to Russian Central Asia. Most of the 
300,000 Austro-Hungarian POWs who died in Russian captivity were 
from camps in these regions. Some observers noted that conditions to 
which the Hungarian captives were subjected were among the worst of 
that time. Because of their ill treatment, which continued during the 
administration of the revolutionary Provisional Government of Alexander 
Kerensky, many of the prisoners became attracted to socialist ideas, and 
later fell prey to Bolshevik agitation. This was especially true of those 
who were already acquainted with social democratic ideology before they 
donned the uniform of their country. The Bolsheviks called for the 
humane treatment of the POWs, as their leader, Vladimir Ilich Lenin, 
expected these soldiers to carry the bacilli of Bolshevism back to Eastern 
and Central Europe at war's end.68 
Following the Bolshevik Revolution of November 7, 1917, which 
led to the withdrawal of Russia from the war, Russia's new rulers im-
proved POW camp conditions. About 100,000 Hungarians joined the Red 
Guards — and soon after, the Red Army in the Russian Civil War — in 
order to escape life in the camps and to make their way home. In May 
1918, the Hungarian Red Guards in Cheliabinsk clashed with the en-
trained Czechoslovak Legion troops, erstwhile POWs, who were destined 
to fight for the Entente on the western front and whom the Hungarians 
wanted to disarm. Thus the nationalities conflicts of the Dual Monarchy 
spilled into Siberia. The civil war among the Habsburg nationalities 
helped to touch off the Civil War in Russia.69 Consequently the Czecho-
slovaks remained in Russia and joined the Russian anti-Bolsheviks in a 
vain attempt to set up a government that would bring back the eastern 
front against the Central Powers. Though defeated in Russia, the Czecho-
slovak Legion's activities there contributed in a major way to the En-
tente's decision to support the creation of a Czechoslovak state,70 which 
required the territorial dismantling of both Austria and Hungary. If the 
cause of the war related to the preservation of the integrity of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy, it is significant to note that its own drafted men, 
the Czechs and Slovaks, contributed to its demise. 
The leading Hungarian POW champions of the Bolshevik cause, 
foremost among them Bela Kun, joined the Russian Communist Party and 
on November 4, 1918, a day after the Padua Armistice had been signed, 
they formed the Hungarian Communist Party in Russia.71 These leaders 
were then transported to Hungary in order to foment a communist type 
revolution there. They were able to profit from the chaos that followed 
defeat and managed to come to power for a brief period on March 21, 
1919. Thus the war represented another turning point for Hungary 
through the agency of the former POWs who brought Soviet power to 
East Central Europe. Because the Soviet government of Bela Kun was 
defeated as a result of foreign intervention, the episode also had long 
range impact. The Hungarian communists, who grabbed power again in 
1948 and relinquished it only in 1989, attempted to legitimize their rule 
by harking back to the first Commune. 
Because roughly seventy percent of the Soviet Republic's top 
officials were of Jewish origin, the brief communist interlude provided the 
counter-revolutionaries with a pretext for a vigorous anti-Semitic cam-
paign. This would leave its imprint on the interwar years, even though 
most of Hungary's Jews had not favoured communism either during the 
war or during its aftermath.72 In fact, when the war had broken out in 
1914, Hungary's Jewish population supported the war with enthusiasm, 
seeing in it the coming defeat of the official anti-Semitism of tsarist 
Russia. The Hungarian Jews exemplified the role that Tisza hoped the 
country's nationalities would assume by rallying around the Hungarian 
tricolour. Not surprisingly, the Jewish population in turn expected that the 
war would accelerate their march to complete acceptance.73 The popular 
plays written in response to the war seemed to reflect this perspective. 
Jews, in contrast to their prejudiced portrayals before the war, were 
depicted as being as patriotic as the country's Magyar citizenry. In one 
play a Jewish banker's son joins the hussars and eventually becomes a 
lieutenant. In another, the Jewish grocery-store owner, by volunteering 
for military service, becomes accepted by Gentile gentlemen as their 
equal.74 In real life not only grocers but, as noted by Istvan Deak: 
Jewish writers and journalists did signal service as war 
propagandists, and thousands of Jewish reserve officers 
willingly assumed command of their troops. Never again 
would Jews be allowed to play such a dignified role in 
the history of German-Austrians, Magyars, and Slavs. 
Thereafter their role would be increasingly that of 
victims.75 
This victimization began during the war as the deprivations and hardship 
led to the increase of anti-Semitism proving that for the Jews of Hungary 
the war also brought about an unexpected turning point in their lives. 
A recognition of the problem of victimization was evidenced in 
May 1917, by the radical journal Huszadik Szazad under the editorship of 
the sociologist Oszkar Jaszi. It distributed a questionnaire among sixty 
Jewish and non-Jewish intellectuals who were interested in the "Jewish 
Question." Their reply was published in the same year.76 On August 7, 
1918, in his parliamentary speech, the ex-prime minister Istvan Tisza, 
assailed in the strongest terms the spread of anti-Semitism and the insin-
uation that Jews were war profiteers. Rather, he hailed the bravery of the 
Jewish officers at the front.77 His admonitions, however, were not suffi-
cient to put the Genie back into the bottle. The impending defeat made 
scapegoating a sign of the times. 
Defeat and its Consequences 
On September 29, 1918, an exhausted Germany, Austria-Hungary, and 
Turkey agreed to appeal to Washington to initiate armistice negotiations 
on the basis of President Wilson's Fourteen Points. To save his crum-
bling realm, the Emperor Charles issued a manifesto on October 16, 
proclaiming the federalization of Austria. This declaration was tantamount 
to an admission of defeat. The following day Tisza admitted in Parlia-
ment: "We have lost the war."78 The Italian front, which had been barely 
holding up since the last and unsuccessful Habsburg offensive on the 
Piave in June 1918, cracked in the wake of these admissions. The near 
collapse of authority at the top created a power vacuum that was soon 
filled by forces that only recently favoured change without revolution. 
The rise of a revolutionary government in Hungary on October 31, 1918, 
only three days before the Armistice of Padua, indicated that the military 
representatives on the Italian front signed a cease fire agreement in the 
name of the Dual Monarchy that had already ceased to exist. 
The armistice, de facto if not de jure, brought the war to its end. 
With the Empire falling apart into its national components, there was no 
chance for its return to the battlefield upon being offered unacceptable 
peace terms. The war brought about radical changes that fashioned the 
prewar years into the bygone years that could never be recaptured — "the 
years of peace." The introduction of total war mobilized Hungary's 
civilian population who therefore saw more reason to share a voice in 
national decision-making through the ballot box. It also led to etatistic 
solutions of the economy, undermining the liberal principles of laissez 
faire. With Hungary fighting nation-states, such as the Kingdom of the 
Serbs and Kingdom of the Romanians, the co-nationals of these peoples 
living in the Monarchy came to see themselves as irredenta — the 
unredeemed ones — whose future belonged with the "enemy." The 
dismantling of the Hungarian kingdom therefore became corollary to the 
solution of the nationality problem. 
The privations caused by the war created social conflicts among 
the peasantry and the workers, making them more willing to resort to ille-
gal measures, such as riots and strikes. These actions prepared public 
opinion to accept a revolution that on November 16, 1918, dethroned the 
Habsburgs and promulgated for the first time a republican government in 
Hungary. The stress of war also caused the resurfacing of wide-spread 
anti-Semitism, and the sufferings of Hungarian prisoners of war in Russia 
led to the introduction to the Hungarian experience of the virulent form of 
Marxism: Leninist communism. 
For Hungary the war was supposed to preserve the status quo. 
Instead, it led to a great many hardships during the war and social strife, 
foreign occupation, and civil war after its conclusion. In particular, 
Hungary's defeat led to the harshest of the peace treaties that were signed 
in the environs of Paris, the dictated Peace Treaty of Trianon. From the 
terms and spirit of this treaty, Hungarian society has yet to recover. 
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Progress or National Suicide: 
the Single-Child Family in Hungarian 
Political Thought, 1840-1945 
Bela Bodo 
The carnage of the Great War and the relatively slow population growth 
in its aftermath placed the issue of contraception and family planning in 
the forefront of public discussions in most European states.1 In Hungary, 
the debate focused on the origins and the effects of the egyke on individ-
ual peasant communities, and the nation. Between the wars, the term 
egyke both described a spoiled and overprotected child and denoted a 
form of family planning that allowed the survival of only one offspring. 
Beside these meanings, however, the contemporaries used this phrase as a 
metaphor. For some, the egyke symbolized the survival and continuing 
strength of feudal political and social structures. For others, the egyke 
embodied what they considered the negative features of modern civiliza-
tion such as increasing secularization, women's emancipation and the 
spread of bourgeois values and urban lifestyle. Still others viewed family 
planning through the prism of modern racism: they perceived falling birth 
rates as the sign of the biological exhaustion of the Hungarian nation, the 
end of European supremacy and the decline of the white race. 
How the egyke came to incorporate so many contradictory mes-
sages is the subject of this paper, which has been conceived as a contribu-
tion both to Hungarian demographic and intellectual history. In the first 
part, I outline the historical origins of the egyke debate. In the second 
part, building on the works of Rudolf Andorka, Ildiko Vasary and others, 
I explore the merits and the weaknesses of the egyke as an anthropolo-
gical concept. In the third part, I look at the egyke as a cluster of literary 
techniques employed by a group of talented writers and committed 
humanitarians seeking to convince the wider public about the necessity of 
social and political reforms. Finally, after exploring the literary models 
and philosophical ideas that gave birth to the concept of the single-child 
family, I examine the outcome of the debate. Why did the discourse on 
the single-child family fail to lead to any improvement in the social and 
political status of peasants? What kind of role, if any, did the egyke 
debate play in the polarization of Hungarian intellectual life between the 
wars? 
The Controversy over Contraception before 1914 
The discourse on the spread of contraception among peasants had its roots 
in nineteenth-century Hungarian intellectual history. Already in the 1840s, 
M. Holbling, the Chief Physician of Baranya county in Transdanubia, 
noticed that Hungarian peasant women in the Ormansag, an agrarian 
region situated in the southwestern comer of the country, tended to give 
birth to only one child. Holbling explained this strange custom by the 
vanity of Hungarian women, who allegedly paid more attention to the 
preservation of their youthful figures than they cared about the well-being 
and future of their families. Beside female narcissism, Holbling added, the 
poverty of the rural population and fear of social decline also contributed 
to the spread of the egyke among Hungarian Calvinist peasants. The 
custom produced disastrous results: the egyke led to the complete extinc-
tion of hundreds of Hungarian peasant families in the Ormansag. Their 
lands, Holbling warned his readers, were taken over by German settlers, 
who slowly changed the ethnic makeup of this once purely Hungarian 
region.2 
While the public generally ignored Holbling's writings in the 
mid-nineteenth century, it began to take a greater interest in the spread of 
contraception among peasants from the 1880s on. With growing public 
interest in social questions, the number of publications increased rapidly 
in the decades before the outbreak of the First World War. The most 
important contributor to the debate at the turn of the century was the 
sociologist and social reformer, Dezso Buday, who, for the first time, 
used church records analyzed with the help of modern statistics to 
demonstrate the harmful effects of contraception on the peasant popula-
tion. Buday compared three notoriously egyke regions, such as the 
predominantly Calvinist and Hungarian Ormansag, the mainly Catholic 
and German Mecsekalja, the religiously and ethnically mixed area around 
the town of Mohacs in southern Hungary and proved that the practice of 
family limitation had nothing to do with religion or ethnicity. He reasoned 
that because only France failed to increase her population in the nine-
teenth century as compared to the rest of Europe, French soldiers must 
have introduced the custom of the single-child family in Hungary during 
the Napoleonic wars. However, this alien custom, Buday continued, could 
take root in Hungary because the circumstances favoured it. The lack of 
available land, the practice of partible inheritance, the fear of social 
decline as the result of the fragmentation of peasant farms, the underde-
velopment of the commercial sector, substandard living conditions, the 
low cultural level of the agrarian population and peasants' growing 
appreciation of comfort all contributed, in Buday's opinion, to the devel-
opment of the system of single-child family.3 
Even though Buday's books and articles were well researched and 
passionately argued, they failed to achieve the desired results. Preoccupied 
with constitutional issues, public opinion in Hungary hardly took notice of 
the growing literature on family limitation among peasants. The problem 
of the egyke, even more than the mass emigration of peasants, remained a 
marginal political and intellectual issue in Hungary before 1914. 
The Egyke Debate between the Wars 
All this changed, however, after the First World War. The human and 
material losses of the military conflict, the destruction of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire and the mutilation of the Hungarian nation by the 
Treaty of Trianon in 1920 put the problem of declining birthrates in 
certain parts of the country into a different perspective. According to 
Ildiko Vasary, over 280 books, pamphlets, novels and newspaper articles 
were written on the subject between the wars.4 The composition of the 
participants in the debate also changed. While pastors, doctors and social 
workers had almost completely monopolized the discourse before 1914, 
prominent writers, politicians and social scientists dominated the debate 
on contraception in the interwar period.5 The turning point in this regard 
came with Janos Kodolanyi's memorandum, Lying Kills, which he 
addressed to the Deputy Prime Minister, Karoly Huszar, in 1927.6 At the 
prompting of his friend, Protestant pastor and art historian Lajos Fiilep, 
another important writer, Gyula Illyes also visited the Ormansag and 
wrote a passionate article on the phenomenon of the single-child family in 
the celebrated journal, Nyugat (the West) in 1933.7 Other famous writers, 
such as the nationally known poet and translator of European classics 
Mihaly Babits, soon followed suit.8 In 1935, a group of students and 
young scholars from the disciplines of demography, history, ethnography 
and music spent a few weeks in the village of Kemse in Baranya County. 
They described their experience in a short but highly influential book.9 
Finally, in 1941, a doctor and amateur sociologist, Janos Hfdvegi, wrote 
the first truly comprehensive work on the custom of the single-child 
family. In his book, he summarized previous research and examined the 
phenomenon from the perspective of modern social hygiene.10 
Even though no commentator blamed the spread of contraception 
among peasants on a single factor, writers did not ascribe the same 
importance to each cause. While Conservatives emphasized moral decline 
among peasants as the root cause of the egyke system, people on both 
ends of the political spectrum held material and structural causes respon-
sible for the declining birthrates. Besides condemning modernity, which 
allegedly fostered the desire among peasants for a more comfortable life, 
some Catholic intellectuals used the issue to discredit Protestantism. Antal 
Pezenhoffer, for example, argued that Protestantism, by undermining true 
religious and patriotic sentiments among peasants and by reinforcing 
capitalist greed, was indirectly responsible for the introduction of the 
egyke in the Hungarian countryside. Drawing the obvious conclusion from 
his diagnosis, Pezenhoffer concluded that Protestants should take advan-
tage of the Pope's generosity and apply for membership in the Catholic 
Church in order to prevent greater catastrophes.11 
Kuno Klebelsberg, the Minister of Education in the late 1920s and 
1930s, also ascribed some responsibility for the spread of the custom of 
single-child family both to Protestantism and to the underdevelopment of 
infrastructure in rural communities. However, his main targets were 
women, who, Klebelsberg believed, played a vanguard role in spreading 
urban values and degenerate lifestyles in the countryside. Klebelsberg 
divided women into two groups. Mothers who have given birth to at least 
three children, he contended, deserve our greatest respect. However, 
women who do not take motherhood seriously represent a danger to 
society, he continued, and therefore they should be treated as enemies. 
Women have to take motherhood more seriously, otherwise, Klebelsberg 
warned his readers, the Hungarian race will soon disappear from the 
Carpathian basin.12 
Protestant intellectuals rejected the charge that their faith had 
anything to do with the spread of custom of the single-child family. If the 
egyke has its roots in declining morality, Lajos Simon argued, then the 
greedy and narrow-minded elite are fully responsible. By preserving the 
latifundia (thus depriving peasants of the land they needed to succeed in 
the new capitalist economy), the Hungarian elite short-changed the ex-
serfs in 1848; the same group of people have kept the rural communities 
in the state of medieval backwardness ever since. Simon accepted the oft-
repeated argument that the custom of the single-child family distorted 
peasants' morality. However, Simon, unlike his Conservative counterparts, 
perceived peasants' selfishness as a product rather than the cause of the 
egyke. Peasants were only victims and the elite alone should take full 
responsibility for the falling fertility rates in Hungarian villages.13 
While most writers condemned selfishness as either the major or 
a minor cause of the egyke, at least one author viewed egotism in a more 
favourable light. Elemer Simontsits, an amateur sociologist, argued that 
the laws of the jungle had historically determined family planning*. In 
earlier periods, the size and structure of the average family, like the 
human population at large, reflected the expansion and contraction of 
natural resources. Parents who did not possess enough resources did not 
hesitate to kill their infants, especially in the times of crisis. Nature, 
especially human nature was cruel, Simontsits argued, but cruelty was not 
without a function: it ensured the survival of the human race. Egotism 
came to defy the laws of nature only in the modern age. Modern man no 
longer uses contraception and infanticide because he cannot feed his 
family but only because he wants more comfort. Simontsits also had a 
pessimistic outlook on the future. Since they reflect both man's eternal 
nature and his more recent obsession with comfort, he argued, falling 
birthrates cannot be reversed. Although some states may attempt to 
change the course of history, their efforts will inevitably fail because laws 
and regulations cannot change the nature of modern man.14 
The doctor Janos Hfdvegi, who had worked for years in the 
Ormansag, was the first scientist who examined the spread of contra-
ception among peasants in both national and international contexts. While 
most writers limited their attention to peasants, Hfdvegi examined both the 
rural and urban manifestation of the same custom. He listed a number of 
factors such as the human and material losses of the Great War, the end 
of overseas migration, the rise of the national liberation movement in the 
Third World, urbanization, the success of feminism and widespread 
unemployment that, in his opinion, led to a decline in fertility rates in 
most European states after 1918. Important as these factors were, he 
argued, they do not explain the widespread use of contraception in 
modern society. The egyke was the product of liberalism and predatory 
capitalism, both of which originated in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries. It was a manifestation of neo-Malthusianism, that is "the philo-
sophy of easy life," which has created an "unheroic" type of individual 
both incapable and unwilling to accept the responsibilities of raising large 
families. 
Recognizing that birthrates had actually increased in most places 
since the advent of capitalism, Hfdvegi had a hard time explaining why 
this extreme form of family limitation was practised only in a few regions 
in Hungary. In an attempt to square the circle, he combined economic 
arguments with notions borrowed from the fields of eugenics and social 
hygiene. Showing susceptibility to racist theories, he argued that the 
Hungarian nation was composed of the Turanian and Eastern Baltic races. 
The Turanian race, Hidvegi contended, was susceptible to certain ill-
nesses such as goiter. The isolation of the Turanian race in certain regions 
such as the Ormansag exacerbated exiting health problems, by preventing 
it from intermarrying with other groups. Living amidst rivers and swa-
mps, the Turanian race in the Ormansag also developed immunity against 
malaria by constantly exhibiting its symptoms, such as lethargy and a lack 
of sexual appetite. Thus inherited and acquired characteristics, combined 
with inadequate diet, especially the lack of vitamins, disturbed the normal 
functioning of sexual hormones and lowered birthrates among peasants in 
the region.15 
Hidvegi's work enjoyed great popularity among the Populists, 
who played an important role in the cultural and political life of interwar 
Hungary. The Populists were social scientists, writers and artists who 
drew their inspiration from folk culture and, at the same time, sought to 
improve the social and political status of peasants. Politically, Hungarian 
populism was a complex phenomenon: even though most Populists saw 
themselves as members of the political Left, they also borrowed many 
ideas from the Conservatives and the extreme Right. With a few notable 
exceptions, the Populists rejected the ideological rigidity and totalitarian 
political practices of the Soviet and Hungarian communist parties. They 
wanted to create a state that, in contrast to the 'dictatorship of the prole-
tariat,' would ensure social justice without, however, destroying parli-
amentary democracy and abrogating civil rights. Unlike the Communists 
and Social Democrats, the Populists saw themselves as nationalists who 
considered the support of Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring states 
as one of their priorities. Like most Hungarians in the interwar period, the 
Populists advocated the revision of Hungary's borders. Unlike the extreme 
nationalists both inside and outside of the government, however, the 
Populists wanted peaceful revision and only to the extent that the new 
frontiers would more closely correspond to the existing ethnic lines. 
Some, especially in the face of the Nazi threat in the 1930s, supported 
close cooperation between, and even the federation of, the small states of 
East-Central and South-Eastern Europe. While many Populists harboured 
prejudices against ethnic and religious minorities, especially the Jews, they 
sought to assimilate rather than exclude them. Significantly, the Populists, 
with a few notable exceptions, fought against racial discrimination in the 
late 1930s and early 1940s.16 
In regards to the origins of the custom of the single-child family, 
the Populists, like most Conservatives, blamed the egyke on the 18^8 
Revolution. Unlike the Conservatives, however, the Populists did not 
regret the passing of feudalism. The egyke spread, they argued, not 
because peasants were liberated but because liberation was not accompa-
nied by a more equitable distribution of the land. The remnants of the 
feudal past survived in the form of the large estates, which prevented the 
expansion of small family farms. Since Hungarian customs demanded the 
equal division of the land among children, peasants in many places began 
limiting the size of their family in order to avert the fragmentation of their 
land. Already a serious issue before 1914, the egyke became a pressing 
concern after the Great War. The lost war, the end of migration to North 
America and the slow recovery of industrial production at home exacer-
bated existing tensions in the countryside. High tensions, Populist writers 
continued, should have normally produced a major political upheaval, a 
kind of peasant war not seen since the Dozsa uprising in the early six-
teenth century. Modern Hungarian peasants, however, were no longer in 
the position to openly challenge the power of the elite. The new capitalist 
economy, combined with the excessive power of the modern state, as 
demonstrated by the defeat of the revolution in 1918, had broken the back 
of the Hungarian peasantry. Exhausted by centuries of struggle and 
controlled and manipulated by the modem state, the only rebellion that 
peasants were still capable of waging was a "silent revolution." According 
to the Populist writer Imre Kovacs, "the silent revolution" of peasants in 
the interwar period took four forms: some continued to head for the 
Americas; others found consolation and peace among the members of 
revivalist religious sects; still others escaped into right-wing political 
fanaticism. Finally, some peasants chose to limit the size of their families 
drastically not only to preserve the integrity of their farms but also to 
hasten the destruction of the peasant way of life by eliminating its human 
carriers.17 
The spread of the custom of the single-child family was particu-
larly dangerous, the Populists continued, because it produced cultural 
changes that, within a few generations, brought entire communities to the 
verge of destruction. The introduction of the egyke increased the power of 
women, especially that of the mothers-in-law (sziilek), who replaced 
patriarchy with a matriarchal system in their villages. The Populists 
writers portrayed the sziilek as heartless and quarrelsome old women, who 
tortured young wives both to avenge their past suffering at the hands of 
their own mothers-in-law and to put the daughters-in-law in their place. 
The sziilek owed their power, at least in part, to tradition. In Hungarian 
peasant households, Populists writers argued, the power of the sziilek 
almost equalled that of their husbands. While the young wives worked in 
the fields, their mothers-in-law remained at home to cook and to look 
after farm animals and small children. If the daughters-in-law became 
pregnant, it was the mothers-in-law who customarily decided the fate of 
the fetus. Aging and overburdened by work, the sziilek were naturally 
opposed to large families, especially when a second or third child threat-
ened the integrity of the family farm. Supported by other elderly women, 
who made public opinion in the villages, the mothers-in-law could easily 
force the new wives to undergo abortion. The husbands usually took the 
side of their mothers; they abused and frequently expelled their wives if 
they dared to oppose the sziilek's decision.18 
The custom of the single-child family not only preserved the 
power of the sziilek but it also benefited younger women at the expense of 
their husbands. Since property in Hungarian villages was distributed 
equally among children irrespective of their gender and age, Populist 
writers argued, single girls were groomed from an early age to become 
the future managers of their households. Spoiled as children by their 
parents, girls grew into willful and promiscuous young adults. Since there 
were not enough available unmarried men in the egyke communities, 
young women were often forced to import their husbands from the 
neighbouring villages. However, these outsiders could never become the 
masters of their households. Their native wives not only made all the 
important decisions, but, as a sign of their excessive power, often cheated 
on and physically abused their husbands. As if the low status of important 
men was not a big enough scandal, the custom of the single-child family 
also reduced the status of men bom in the egyke villages. Dominated by 
their mothers and sisters as children, boys in the egyke communities failed 
to develop a strong interest in the opposite sex. Many of them became 
homosexuals or had no sexual desire of any kind. These "perverts"and 
"weaklings" created a culture far inferior to the male culture of healthy 
peasant communities. Instead of cultivating their land, men in the egyke 
villages switched to less masculine occupations, such as petty trade, which 
required less stamina, dedication and physical strength but promised 
quicker returns. Laziness went hand-in-hand with greed and cowardice: 
bachelors and adult men in the egyke villages would never engage in 
brawls or draw out their knives to defend their honour. In short, men in 
these communities were a pitiable lot, a shame to their gender and social 
group. 
Child-rearing practices in the egyke villages further contributed to 
gender inequality and the distortion of peasant culture. In a frequently 
cited example, a boy's parents would not let him play with his friends lest 
he ruins his expensive clothing or they would beat him up. Overprotection 
prevented the peasant boy from committing the mischiefs necessary to test 
the boundaries of the adult world and his own evolving character. Be-
cause, as a child, he spent too much time with his parents and grandpar-
ents, the egyke never learned the virtues of sharing, renunciation and the 
love of struggle. Thus the overprotected and precocious egyke grew into a 
cynical and selfish young adult. Not equipped to compete successfully 
with healthier men, he soon lost his property and found himself on the 
margin of society. Thus, the introduction of the custom of the single-child 
family ultimately proved self-defeating; it could not prevent, but rather 
hastened the destruction of peasant farms.19 
The process of "degeneration," Populist writers continued, mani-
fested itself in every aspect of village life. The once hard-working and 
frugal peasants gave themselves over to ostentation and excessive con-
sumption. While men spent their days in the tavern, women gorged 
themselves on cakes and sweets at the local cafes. Farmers, whose parents 
and grandparents had lived in small but tasteful huts constructed in 
traditional style, now built huge gaudy mansions in order to impress their 
neighbours and fellow villagers. Peasants in the egyke villages abandoned 
traditional culture; in a very short time, they lost their traditional dances, 
songs, proverbs, fairy tales and ballads. The citizens of egyke communities 
neglected their civic responsibilities: the used every trick in the book to 
avoid paying local taxes necessary for the smooth operation of the local 
administration and the maintenance of roads and public buildings. To 
avoid paying Church taxes, many people left the established churches to 
become Unitarian or Baptist or they abandoned the Christian faith alto-
gether. People in these communities had no respect for priests, teachers 
and any other authority figures. In such communities, class arrogance was 
particularly acute; it manifested itself even in the Reformed Church, where 
pews were assigned to families on the basis of their property. Social 
prejudices went hand-in-hand with a lack of respect for the elderly. Old 
people in such communities could not enter the sanctuary to attend church 
services, but were forced to sit outside the church on a bench placed at 
main entrance. They were extremely shy and felt a constant need to 
apologize for being alive.20 
By the mid-1930s, at least among people who cared about the fate 
of the peasantry, the Populists' image of the egyke village became 
generally accepted. Contemporaries continued to disagree, however, not 
only on the causes of the egyke, but also on the solution to what they per-
ceived as a very serious social problem. With a few notable exceptions, 
Conservatives meticulously avoided the question of land reform: instead 
of a more equitable division of agricultural land, they advocated increased 
bureaucratic control of the rural population. They believed that improved 
midwife training and the employment of better doctors, more dedicated 
priests, pastors and teachers, combined with enhanced discipline in 
schools and the removal of spinsters and bachelors from teaching posi-
tions, would suffice to reverse the demographic decline. The Populists 
generally accepted the Conservatives recommendations but wanted more 
comprehensive reforms. Some supported the introduction of primogeniture 
to prevent the further division of family farms. Others wanted to set the 
normal family size at four children per couple; each child would inherit 
one fourth; if there were only one or two heirs, the rest of the land would 
revert to the state. All sought some form of land reform that would give 
the peasant more land and remove the iron ring of latifundia around 
peasant farms. The Populists also advocated the creation of cooperatives 
both to produce and sell agricultural products and to build small but 
comfortable houses for young peasant families. They wanted cheap long-
term loans for farmers, especially those with large families, better trained 
and dedicated doctors and nurses, well-equipped regional hospitals, health 
insurance for peasants and agricultural labourers and the creation of a tax 
system favourable to large families. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, 
some Populists came to accept racist ideas, such as the redistribution of 
the latifundia on the basis of racial purity and family size. They hoped 
that these measures would stop the influx of peasants into the cities and 
eradicate the custom of the single-child family with all its negative effects 
from Hungarian soil.21 
The Egyke in Modern Scientific Discourse 
The Russian occupation of Hungary at the end of the Second World War 
put the issue of contraception among peasant in a very different 
perspective. After the Communist takeover of power in 1947, the Populist 
writers were either silenced or expelled from the country or gave up their 
views in exchange for political power in the new Communist state. The 
destruction of the large estates in the second half of the 1940s and then 
collectivization and increasing mechanization of Hungarian agriculture in 
the 1950s and 1960s pushed the issue of the single-child family into the 
background. Only in the early 1970s did demographers like Rudolf 
Andorka begin to raise anew the question of family limitation among 
peasants. Using family reconstruction methods and household structural 
analysis, as developed by English and French social scientists, Andorka 
examined demographic changes in two villages in the Ormansag and one 
in the nearby region of Sarkoz.22 While Andorka paid his respect to the 
Populist writers, he also challenged their conclusions on two important 
points. Since peasants had started using contraception as early as the late 
eighteenth or early nineteenth centuries, Andorka argued, the roots of the 
single-child family should not be sought in the omissions of the 1848 
revolution. Second, the extreme form of family planning could be called a 
"system" only with reservation. While fertility rates in the egyke villages 
were certainly lower than in most parts of the country, Andorka 
contended, most women continued to give birth to two or more children. 
While in most families only one or two children reached maturity, one 
could still find large households with as many as six or eight children 
even in these communities.23 
Building in part on Andorka's works, in the late 1980s Ildiko 
Vasary took an even closer look at the concept of the single-child family. 
In a well researched and argued article, she challenged the Populists' 
contention that the absence of primogeniture played a major role in the 
fragmentation of peasant farms and the origins of the custom of the 
single-child family. She argued that, in the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, the equal division of land among peasant children did not 
necessarily retard population growth. On the contrary, by expanding 
marriage opportunities, partible inheritance fuelled the demographic 
revolution in Eastern Europe. In any case, Vasary continued, inheritance 
systems should be seen as "limits and opportunities rather than determi-
nants for strategies and goals." Even though Vasary accepted the Popu-
lists' thesis on the impact of the survival of large estates on peasant farms, 
she also argued that the continuing existence of the latifundia was only 
one of the many factors that pushed peasants to limit the size of their 
families. Besides the survival of large estates, Vasary argued, the peas-
ants' attitudes to modernization, the villages' proximity to the closest city, 
the state of local infrastructure, changing agricultural techniques and the 
presence or absence of employment opportunities in the industrial and 
commercial sectors influenced demographic patterns.24 
Andorka and Vasary raised important questions about the useful-
ness of the concept of the egyke in modern demographic research. How-
ever, their critique failed to expose other contradictions in the Populists' 
argument and explain these contradictions in the context of Hungarian 
cultural and political history. The first contradiction concerns the Popu-
lists' view of modernization in general and the spread of individualism 
among peasants in egyke communities in particular. The Populists noted, 
and decried, the growth of individualism in Hungarian villages. At the 
same time, they argued that public opinion was stronger in the egyke 
villages than elsewhere. Similarly, contemporaries drew attention to the 
declining power, and increasing neglect, of the elderly in these commun-
ities. However, this argument collided with their earlier statements about 
assertive mothers-in-law and the power of elderly women in setting 
community standards and dominating public opinion. Moreover, Populist 
and fascists writers who accepted anthropological theories failed to 
explain why environmental and racial factors worked differently on men 
and women: why the custom of the single-child family increased promis-
cuity among women but lowered sexual appetite among men. Although 
many noticed that sexual license was a general feature of their age, they 
still liked to overemphasize the role that the custom of the single-child 
family had allegedly played in the destruction of women's morality.25 In 
the same vein, contemporaries attributed the increased power of women to 
the excessive use of contraception rather than to more general trends such 
as the impact of the Great War on peasant families and communities. 
My own research into the social history of Nagyrev, a hamlet in 
the region of Tiszazug, which became infamous after the discovery of a 
murder epidemic in 1929, suggests that the model of the egyke commun-
ity, as established by contemporary intellectuals, did not necessarily 
correspond to local circumstances. For example, here was no matriarchy 
in Nagyrev.26 Men, especially older men, continued to make the most 
important decisions both in their families and in their community. Inheri-
tance in the village was passed down in the male line, even though equal 
division of land among all children (including girls) became increasingly 
common in the interwar period. Patrilocality remained the rule, despite the 
relatively high number of imported husbands. Church records clearly 
demonstrate that local parents continued to neglect their children. Mortal-
ity rates both among infants and older children remained high: frequent 
accidents such as drowning prove that parents were far from overprotec-
tive. Local people told me that strict discipline reinforced by physical 
punishments for the slightest mistakes continued to characterize child-
raising practices of peasant families irrespective of their size. Therefore, 
we should not confuse the single child with the "spoiled brat" whom we 
encounter in the works of the Populist writers. In short, the village must 
have looked very different from the image that contemporaries had of the 
egyke communities between the wars.27 
The Sources of the Egyke as a Cultural Concept 
The image of the egyke community has to do, first and foremost, with the 
professional and political agendas of their proponents and with contempo-
rary ideas about changing gender and social relations and only secondarily 
with actual circumstances. The weaknesses of the egyke as an anthropo-
logical/sociological concept speak volumes about the Populists' lack of 
training in these disciplines. The historian Gyula Borbandi has noted that 
the Populist writers, with the possible exception of the sociologist Ferenc 
Erdei and the agrarian expert Matyas Matolcsy, knew very little about 
contemporary sociology. Perhaps the majority never read the pioneering 
works of Emile Durkheim.28 What they did read, like the works of the 
founder of family sociology in France in the nineteenth century, Frederic 
Le Play, was considered as a passe by most Western sociologists by the 
1920s. Ironically, Le Play was first introduced to the Hungarian readers 
by neo-conservative agrarians, who wanted to preserve rather than destroy 
the latifundia. The authoritarian and anti-egalitarian messages implicit in 
Le Play's idealization of the pre-industrial stem family (famille souche)29 
appealed to the Hungarian neo-conservatives, who disliked both internati-
onal capitalism and parliamentary democracy. The first monographs on 
rural life appeared in the conservative Magyar Gazdak Szemleje (Hungar-
ian Farmers' Review) and Erdelyi Gazda (Transylvanian Farmer) at the 
turn of the century.30 The Populists adapted not only the neo-conserva-
tives' methods but also retained many of Le Play's ideas. Like Le Play, 
they continued to valorize patriarchy until its image lost any connection to 
its historical manifestations but still provided an important vantage point 
from which the weaknesses of the capitalist economic and social order 
could be observed and criticized. 
While Le Play continued to assert a strong influence on both the 
Conservatives and the Populists, the key elements in the image of the 
single-child family, like degeneration and matriarchy, did not come soci-
ology. Novelists like Janos Kodolanyi borrowed them from contemporary 
philosophy and literature. The notion of degeneration was most likely a 
German import. George Mosse tells us that it was originally a medical 
term: physicians used it to describe patients who departed from the so-
called normal human type. They diagnosed the causes of degeneration in 
shattered nerves, inheritable diseases and lewd lifestyle and sexual 
excesses. Ironically, it was a Liberal physician, Max Nordau, who first 
applied this medical term to social and cultural phenomena. In his famous 
book Degeneration (1892), Nordau condemned both the social and the 
artistic manifestations of decadence because they violated the principles of 
bourgeois culture: harmony, respectability, self-discipline and natural laws. 
Nordau's book must have touched a nerve in German society, because, by 
the outbreak of the First World War, all major political parties incorpo-
rated the fight against decadence in their program.31 
By the early twentieth century, many intellectuals, especially those 
who sympathized with the political Right, came to see liberated women as 
both the manifestations and symbols of decadence. In Vienna, the young 
Jewish philosopher, Otto Weininger, went a step further: he infused anti-
women sentiments with racism. Working under the influence of Freud, 
Weininger acknowledged that female and male did not exist in pure forms 
and that everyone possessed both male and female qualities. Unlike Freud, 
however, Weininger sharply distinguished between the male and female 
characteristics, assigning positive qualities only to men. People, like the 
Jews, in whom the female elements dominate, Weininger argued, always 
remain children; both are, by nature, irrational, potentially anti-social and 
prisoners of their own sexuality. The more male characteristics dominate, 
Weininger continued, the less the person cares about sex. True men are 
rational and care little about sex because they are preoccupied with the 
higher aspects of life such as politics, science, commerce and religion. 
Men alone possess a highly developed moral sense, while women and 
Jews have only sexual passion. While the Romantics at least acknow-
ledged that women also had positive qualities such as charm, sensitivity 
and motherly love, Weininger perceived only negative traits. Women, he 
believed, were irrational, capricious and hysterical; like Jews, they could 
never progress beyond their present state.32 
By the 1920s, the notion of degeneration, tied to the presumably 
unchangeable character of women and the negative effects of matriarchy, 
came to permeate public debates on human progress. In Germany, the 
rejection of matriarchy formed the basis of Gerhart Hauptmann's widely 
acclaimed novel, the Island of the Great Mothers. In this novel, first 
published in 1925, the great German naturalist writer tells the story of a 
group of female travellers stranded on a tropical island. Left to their own 
devices, the mainly upper-class European women were not only able to 
survive but they also created a harmonious society free of the exploita-
tions and injustices of the old patriarchal order. Convinced that men posed 
a mortal threat to this perfect world, the leaders made gender segregation 
the most important law on the island. In order to avoid future complica-
tions, they sent all school-aged male children to a remote part of the 
island. There, under the supervision of their father, the only surviving 
male from the shipwreck, the boys grew into skilful artisans and fearless 
warriors. They also established a society that was the exact opposite of the 
female Utopia: reason rather than faith, competition rather than compas-
sion and dynamism rather than stagnation formed its main features. 
Incensed by the women's desire to use them as sex-slaves, men finally 
revolted against their mothers and destroyed matriarchy on the island.33 
While many of the keys elements of the image of the egyke 
community are originally of foreign origin, it was nowhere so fully 
developed as in Hungary. Moreover, at least some of the imported 
concepts, such as the notion of decadence, had taken deep roots in 
Hungary long before the spread of contraception in the countryside 
became a national issue. At the turn of the century, Hungarian intellectu-
als, like Endre Ady and Gyula Krudy exulted decadent lifestyle as part of 
both their protest against bourgeois hypocrisy and their discovery of the 
libido. It is true, however, that, even before 1914, the majority of Hungar-
ian intellectuals tended to interpret the same notion very differently: they 
denounced decadence as both unhealthy and unpatriotic.34 By the early 
1920s, this negative interpretation of decadence had clearly won the day. 
After the war, a national consensus emerged on the nature of decadence 
(it became seen as a serious social illness and a barrier to national revival) 
and on the need to combat every form of degeneration. However, dis-
agreements soon emerged on the issues of how the revival of the nation 
and the regaining of country's historical borders should be accomplished 
and what forms a national revival and the fight against decadence should 
take. The proto-fascist elements, mainly young officers who had partici-
pated in the White Terror, wanted to rebuild Hungary on the basis of war-
time experience. They saw themselves as a new elite: they believed that 
the war had cleansed them of everything bourgeois, sentimental and 
feminine and that the new society should be based on wartime values such 
as merit, character, virility and courage rather than inherited wealth, 
empty titles, egotism and sexual perversion. The Populists shared the 
proto-fascists' dislike of the bourgeoisie and its decadence culture. 
However, they were also keenly aware of the negative aspects and 
ultimate futility of war. Like the proto-fascists, the Populists also wanted 
to rebuild the country but not on the basis of lessons learned during the 
Great War but on the basis of traditional peasant values. It was in this 
context of national emergency that the image of the egyke community 
emerged and came to dominate public discourse. The Populists and many 
Conservatives believed that much more than the fate of individuals and 
their villages was at stake: the spread of contraception in the countryside 
posed a mortal threat to the survival of the nation. 
The paranoia about racial suicide explain in part the gap between 
the Populists image of egyke villages and real circumstances. The key 
elements of this image were borrowed from sociology, contemporary 
literature and philosophy. At the same time, the speed with which the new 
concept became generally accepted speak volumes both about the Populist 
writers' talent and their view on modern science and politics. Denes 
Nemedi argues that the Populists adopted "sociography" as their favourite 
genre because they disliked positivist science, characterized by overspe-
cialization and the use of scientific jargons.35 The Populists' shift from 
sociology to sociography and to naturalist novels disclosed their desire to 
re-politicize intellectual life. The Populists wanted to reconnect culture 
with politics; they wanted to use art and science to solve the nation's 
most pressing social and political problems. The Populists also denied that 
art and science were transnational enterprises. Nations not individuals 
create culture, they argued. National cultures express the aspirations, 
embody the talent and vitality and serve the interests of an ethnic group. 
Some, like the writer Laszlo Nemeth, went so far as to advocate the 
creation of a new branch of science, which would combine the various 
branches of knowledge into an organic whole. He called this new science 
hungaroldgia or the "science of Hungarianess." The goal of hungaroldgia, 
Nemeth argued, was to discover, spread, preserve and strengthen true 
Hungarian values. Hungaroldgia would make Hungarians conscious of 
their national character; it would help them preserve their unique culture 
in the rapidly changing modern world.36 While many Populists doubted 
the viability of hungaroldgia, with very few exceptions, they all believed 
that certain branches of social science, art and literatures, such as sono-
graphy, ethnography, folk music and naturalist novels, played a greater 
role in the preservation of the nation than the ideologically less loaded 
natural sciences. These genres were very important, the Populist argued, 
because they linked urban intellectuals to the repository of all national 
values, the peasants. Writing about peasants and their social problems was 
a political deed of the highest order, they believed, since the future of the 
nation depended on the welfare of this social group. Researching the lives 
of, and writing about, peasants would lead to the creation a new elite, 
knowledgeable, deeply rooted in the Hungarian soil and fully committed 
to the program of national rejuvenation.37 
Besides the Populists' view on the relationship between culture 
and politics, the position of intellectuals in Hungarian society also influ-
enced the great outpour of sociographies in the interwar period. The 
conservative and liberal sections of the Hungarian elite and middle class 
were never able to overcome the memories of the democratic and 
communist revolutions. Always quick to equate reform with revolution, 
the Horthy regime, from its establishment in 1921 until the end of the 
Second World War, deliberately followed an authoritarian path. Since it 
relied mainly on the bureaucracy, the clergy and the army for political 
support, the Horthy regime paid little attention to the traditionally anti-
government Hungarian intelligentsia. Constantly frustrated by the govern-
ment's disregard for their political advice, reform-minded intellectuals 
turned to journalism, easily assessable types of literature and popular 
social science both to vent their frustration against the regime and to 
create a political forum for themselves. Thus sociography and realist 
novels came to function as a substitute for party politics for the progres-
sive intelligentsia in Hungary between the wars. 
The image of the egyke became generally accepted because the 
Populists were talented writers and dedicated social reformers. They were 
the masters of what Thomas W. Laqueur described as "the humanitarian 
narrative." According to Laqueur, humanitarian narrative, as a product of 
the empiricist revolution of the eighteenth century, relied on detail as a 
sign of truth. By describing in great detail the suffering of others, it 
sought to create a "reality effect," which in turn called forth "sympathetic 
passions" in the readers. Humanitarian narrative, Laqueur argues, exposed 
the cause of the specific wrong and recommended specific action as both 
possible and morally imperative. In this updated version of ancient trag-
edy, the readers were invited not only to feel for the suffering of the 
protagonists but also to take part in their liberation. Thus, unlike the 
ancient tragedy, the humanitarian narrative was able to "bridge the gulf 
between facts, compassion and action" by compelling the readers to push 
for specific social reforms.18 
Laqueur described the realist novel, autopsy, clinical report and 
parliamentary inquiry as belonging into the genre of the humanitarian 
narrative. It is my contention here that the Populist discourse on the 
single-child family contains all the basic elements of the humanitarian 
narrative. For example, the graphic details of degeneration served to shake 
comfortable readers out of their complacency. The authors' outrage was to 
engender compassion for subjects of so much mistreatment and to turn 
passive readers into active participants in social reforms. The discourse 
exposed the alleged cause of social disease (the survival of the large 
estates) and offered concrete remedies in the forms of land reforms and 
improvements in infrastructure. 
The Debate's Outcome 
The conscious use of literary strategies and the almost complete mono-
polization of humanitarian narrative turned the Populist writers into the 
most potent force in Hungarian literature in the late 1930s and early 
1940s. However, their success came with a price. Whereas the humani-
tarian narrative attracted impressionable high school and university 
students, it created discomfort among other sections of the educated 
middle classes and the elite. The liberal and socialist sections of the 
urban, and predominantly Jewish, intelligentsia came to resent and increa-
singly felt threatened by the Populists' appeal to instinct and nationalist 
sentiments. It comes as no surprise that these 'urbanites' rather than 
Conservatives were the first to notice the logical inconsistencies in the 
Populists' analysis of the single-child family. They dismissed the Popu-
lists' works as unscientific and the whole discourse on declining birthrate 
as a product of post-war nationalist paranoia.39 Thus the debate on the 
single-child family contributed to the increasing polarization of the 
regime's opposition into 'urbanist' and 'Populist' factions. Mutual suspi-
cions fed by derogative remarks, personal animosities and the tendency of 
intellectuals to exaggerate real differences in opinion and style made 
cooperation between the two groups on social and political issues 
difficult.40 
The Populists' appeal to compassion was best suited to gain 
followers among the half-converted and among people who had no direct 
interests in the maintenance of the large estates and the political status 
quo. However, the humanitarian narrative was unlikely to find recruits 
among the more conservative sections of the middle class and the elite. 
Instead of gaining more converts, the moralizing tone and quasi-revolu-
tionary rhetoric of many Populist writers tended to alienate the more 
influential sections of the middle classes and the elite. Ironically, however, 
the Populists writers needed both the middle class and the elite to realize 
their plans. Lacking strong political support among peasants, in the 1930s 
the Populists tried to convince the government about the necessity of land 
reform. The founding of the National Peasant Party (Nemzeti Parasztpart) 
in 1939 signalled a change in strategy: it showed that the Populists 
realized that reform from above, or at least in the form they had envi-
sioned it, was an illusion. It also showed that at least some Populists 
recognized that they had to organize themselves politically if they had 
wanted to achieve more than literary success. However, the old problems 
remained: the majority of the Populist writers could not make up their 
mind whether they were politicians or writers and whether they should 
establish a political party or remain members of a loosely organized 
movement. Many continued to ignore the call of party politics altogether 
and showed only a perennial interest in political affairs. Thus it comes as 
no surprise that the National Peasant Party remained an insignificant 
political force during the Second World War. The failure of the party to 
b e c o m e popular among peasants and to introduce re fo rm on their behalf 
cont ras ted sharply with the continuing high esteem that Populist writers 
e n j o y e d among the members of the educated middle class. Ironically, their 
success as writers presupposed the failure, or at least came at the expense , 
of agrar ian reforms. Thus the fai lure of land re fo rm before 1945 should 
not be exclusively attributed to the strength of conservative fo r ce s in 
Hunga ry : it was also the results of the misplaced efforts and political 
inexper ience of their Populist opponents . 
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Hungarian Survival — in Hungary 
and Beyond the Borders: a Postscript 
N. F. Dreisziger 
... every nation will survive while it has some 
message to communicate to the rest of hu-
manity. Hungary has yet to tell her message... 
Zoltan Kodaly (1882-1967) 
Closely related to the problem of the survival of the Magyar nation is the 
question of the continued existence of Hungarian communities beyond the 
borders of the Hungarian state. This subject is composed of two parts. 
The first and the more important one is the issue of the persistence of 
Hungarian minorities in the states bordering on Hungary. The other is the 
question of the survival of the Hungarian diaspora, the scattered Magyar 
communities that had come about during the past century-and-a-half as a 
result of emigration, whether voluntary or forced, of Hungarians from 
their homelands in East Central Europe. 
The question of the survival of Hungarian culture outside of the 
state of present-day Hungary is a relatively recent one. Its origin can be 
found in the First World War and the post-war peace settlement, which 
truncated the historic Kingdom of Hungary. The origin of the Hungarian 
diaspora scattered throughout parts of the Old World and the New, is also 
fairly recent, dating from the last decades of the 19th century. Of course, 
there had been emigrations from Hungary before, but nothing on the scale 
and with the permanence of those that resulted in the rise of the present 
Magyar diaspora. After every war of liberation against the Habsburgs, a 
new emigration resulted, but in terms of numbers and long-term viability, 
they were on the whole insignificant. In regards to mere numbers, this 
generalization does not hold true as far as the emigres of the War of 
Independence of 1848-49 are concerned, but it does regarding perma-
nence. In the wake of the Austro-Hungarian compromise of 1867 a great 
many of the "forty-niners" returned to Hungary. Because most of the 
others were also in position to return, their activities as political emigres 
lost a great deal of their legitimacy. For these reasons the beginnings of 
the Hungarian diaspora in North America can best be dated from the 
coming of the masses of Magyar economic migrants during the last 
decades of the 19th century. 
The post-World War I territorial settlement, proclaimed by the 
Treaty of Trianon, had much more drastic consequences. Not only did it 
result, in time and rather indirectly, in the emigration of tens of thousands 
of additional Hungarians from the Carpathian Basin, it also brought about 
the birth of very large Hungarian minorities in Romania, Czechoslovakia 
and Yugoslavia. The history of these ethnic communities constitutes a 
large subject that defies adequate summation in an overview such as this 
one. Accordingly, a few comments will have to suffice along with brief 
references to general trends and future prospects. 
Survival in the Neighbouring States 
The Treaty of Trianon sanctioned the transfer of territories with 1.6 
million Hungarians to the greatly enlarged post-World War I Romania, 1 
million to the newly-created state of Czechoslovakia, and half-a-million to 
the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Solvenes, the future Yugoslavia.1 
For these Hungarian communities the following eight decades would be 
characterized by minority status in highly nationalistic societies whose 
leaders and even members usually considered them their traditional 
opponents and probable future adversaries. The eight decades following 
the Treaty of Trianon also brought the erosion of the Hungarian presence 
in these countries, along with the diminution — or, at least, the relative 
diminution — of the size of the Hungarian minorities. Though greatly 
diminished in relative demographic terms, the Hungarian communities of 
Hungary's erstwhile neighbours — Czechoslovakia (today's Slovakia and 
the Subcarpathian region of Ukraine), Yugoslavia (today's Serbia, Croatia 
and Slovenia) and of course Romania — constitute collectively present-
day Europe's largest ethnic minority.2 
Comprehensive treatments of the evolution of these minority 
Hungarian communities in the Carpathian Basin are rare,3 especially in 
Hungarian, as the topic was virtually taboo during the communist era in 
Hungary. The situation changed with the passing of that age in 1989. Not 
surprisingly, the early nineties witnessed the publication of works on this 
subject, the most prominent of which was a book designed for secondary 
and post-secondary students, Magyarok a hatdrokon tul [Hungarians 
beyond the borders].4 Though the basic purpose of this survey's authors, 
Karoly Kocsis and Eszter Hodosi Kocsis, was to acquaint Hungary's youth 
with the Hungarian-inhabited lands in the vicinity of Hungary (the book 
doubles as a tourist guide), it also offers an overview of the demographic 
evolution of the Hungarian minority communities of the Carpathian Basin. 
According to the book's authors, there were both general causes of 
the demographic erosion of the Hungarian communities of the neighbour-
ing states, the so-called Successor States, and causes that were specific 
only to some — and, in some cases, to one — of these countries. Life in 
a culturally and politically alien environment, where official discrimina-
tion was often accompanied by hostility on the part of the local "state-
forming" population, was not conducive to the maintenance of a Hungar-
ian identity. To avoid harassment and maltreatment (which was espe-
cially blatant sometimes in the armed forces of these states), many 
Hungarians, especially members of the younger generations, simply 
assumed the identity of the majority: spoke their language (especially in 
public), attended their schools, frequented their cultural institutions, and in 
some cases even changed their names. Even manifestations of good 
relations between minority Hungarians and members of the majority 
community could speed the diminution of Magyar culture: inter-ethnic 
marriages also contributed to the process of assimilation, as the children 
of such marriages were more likely to acquire the majority culture — and 
majority ethnic identity — than the offspring of Hungarian parents. 
Especially rapid was the de-Magyarization of formerly Hungarian-
speaking non-Hungarian minorities. Magyar-speaking members of certain 
ethnic or religious communities, such as Jews, Germans and Gypsies, 
often abandoned the Magyar language quite rapidly and assumed trap-
pings of the majority culture with less reluctance than did Hungarians. 
When it came to a declaration of their ethnic identity, they were more 
likely than Magyars to identify themselves as members of the national 
majority. A further decline in the number of Hungarians in the official 
censuses conducted in these countries was caused by the fact that 
members of these minorities, even those who spoke Hungarian at home, 
were usually listed as members of the majority nationality.5 
Specific causes of the decline in the size of these Hungarian 
communities were many and diverse. They were often the byproduct of 
wars or domestic political strife. The Second World War had taken an 
enormous toll on the Magyar-speaking Jewish community of most of the 
Carpathian Basin. In the Hungarian controlled parts of the region, the 
most damage occurred during the late spring and early summer of 1944, 
after the Nazi occupation of Hungary. Elsewhere, in pro-Axis Romania, 
Slovakia and Croatia, the Holocaust of the Magyar-speaking Jews had 
started earlier, but claimed fewer victims, mainly because by 1940 most 
Hungarian Jews were in Hungarian-controlled territory. Despite this and 
somewhat ironically, it was the Jewish population of truncated, "Trianon" 
Hungary, that survived the Holocaust in greater numbers and larger 
proportion than the Magyar-speaking Jewish population of the neighbour-
ing states. The explanation, of course, lies mainly in the fact that in July 
of 1944 the planned deportation of the Jews of Budapest was blocked by 
Admiral Miklos Horthy, the Regent of Hungary.6 
Other examples of war-related diminution of the number of 
Magyar or Magyar-speaking peoples in the neighbouring states of 
Hungary have to do with events that befell ethnic Hungarians rather than 
peoples of multiple ethnic identity. Most such examples have to do with 
the expelling or deportation of Magyars from their ancestral communities 
that took place during the Second World War and its aftermath, but a few 
happened before then or after, such as the expelling of tens of thousands 
of Hungarians from Yugoslavia in the wake of the crisis that followed the 
assassination of that country's king in Marseille, in 1934.7 Such deporta-
tions took place perhaps on the largest scale after World War II in 
Czechoslovakia, where an even larger number of Magyars were forced 
from their towns and villages. Some were transferred to the territory 
vacated after the German population of the Sudetenland was expelled, 
while others were sent to Hungary after a "voluntary" exchange of 
populations. Those who wished to avoid being relocated, could do so if 
they renounced their Hungarian identity.8 Though probably affecting 
proportionately fewer people but claiming thousands of lives, the post-war 
treatment of the members of the Magyar minorities in Romania and 
Yugoslavia contributed to the sudden demographic diminution of their 
particular communities. 
The demographic statistics available to the authors of the textbook 
in question, covering the whole six decades after Trianon, speak volumes 
about the decline or stagnation of the Hungarian population in the neigh-
bouring states of the Carpathian Basin. In the region that was transferred 
to Romania in 1920, about 1,658,000 Hungarians had lived at the time of 
the last (pre-war) Hungarian census. For 1980, the corresponding figure 
is 1,651,307. For the territory of present-day Slovakia, these two figures 
are 881,326 and 559,801 respectively. For the South Slav states (Serbia, 
Croatia and Slovenia combined) there is also a decrease, from 658,247 to 
419,412.9 The full implication of these decreases becomes evident only 
when we look at the population growth statistics of these countries 
themselves. For example, in the same period (from the early 1920s to the 
early to mid-1980s), the number of Slovaks in what is now the Slovak 
Republic had increased from about 1,688,000 to 4,393,000; and that of 
the Rumanian population of Transylvania, from 2,930,813 to an estimated 
5,500,000.'° 
The decline of the Hungarian presence in the neighbouring states 
has been documented not only by Hungarian textbooks published in the 
immediate post-communist era when Magyar nationalism had undergone 
a certain degree of reawakening. It has been remarked earlier that during 
the communist era the subject of the fate of Hungarian minorities in the 
neighbouring socialist states had been taboo, especially for authors writing 
for popular audiences in Hungary. The country's leaders, however, had 
an interest in the subject. In fact, on one occasion at least, they commis-
sioned a major study of an important aspect of this subject, the fate of the 
Hungarian minority ethnic press in these countries. The study was to be 
circulated among the communist faithful, and was produced by one of the 
period's most prominent historians, academician Magda Adam.11 
Adam was not reluctant to stress the important role that the 
media, especially the printed media i.e. the ethnic or minority press, 
played in the lives of the Hungarian communities of Romania, Czecho-
slovakia and Yugoslavia. She was also not reluctant to point out the 
difficult conditions under which the Hungarian "ethnic press" tried to 
exist in these countries. Its problems were numerous. One of the most 
persistent ones was the isolation of Hungarian journalists and writers from 
other journalists and writers, whether citizens of Hungary or residents of 
the other neighbouring states. This isolation was deliberately fostered by 
the authorities of the countries concerned. Another problem, especially in 
Romania and Czechoslovakia, was the lack of state support for Hungarian 
cultural activities, including the press. The excuse for this was the claim 
that the Hungarian government promoted Hungarian culture throughout 
the region, and that Hungarians everywhere in the Carpathian Basin were 
"reading" press products published in Hungary, and were viewing 
Hungarian television broadcasts. The problem with this claim, according 
to Adam, was the fact that the entry of Hungarian publications into, for 
example Romania and even Czechoslovakia, and their distribution there, 
was impeded by the national and local authorities. With their press not 
receiving state support (and without state support in socialist countries, 
the operations of the press were well-nigh impossible), and Hungarian 
press products not being accessible, minority Hungarians had to rely on 
the non-Hungarian media for information and entertainment.12 
The situation was somewhat better in Yugoslavia, Adam admitted. 
There the principle of socialist "self-management" occasionally provided 
opportunity "for the establishment of a network of institutions which 
rendered minority rights (also theoretically existent in Czechoslovakia) 
attainable in practice." "In contrast," Adam explained that in Romania no 
such situation existed and every effort was made by the country's autho-
rities "to impede or make impossible contact with Hungary" contact that 
was vital to the Hungarians of Transylvania. "The aim [of this policy]" 
according to Adam, was "clearly to speed up" the assimilation of Hungar-
ians in Romania.13 With regard to Czechoslovakia, Adam had similar 
conclusions: 
[The minorities policy] in Czechoslovakia already boasts signif-
icant results: the weakening of ethnic consciousness amongst 
the ranks of the Hungarians living in Slovakia has reached a 
stage when, even in the short run, it may corroborate the 
Slovak and Czech claims that the nationality question no longer 
exists in Czechoslovakia....14 
No specific mention has been made so far of the Hungarian 
minority of Subcarpathia, or Transcarpathia as the region is also known, a 
piece of territory that before 1920 belonged to Hungary, in the interwar 
years to Czechoslovakia, in the Cold War era to the U.S.S.R, and which 
presently is a part of the independent republic of Ukraine. Yet, such 
mention is in order as this region, in particular that portion of it that is a 
part of the lowland known as the Hungarian Plain, is the home of a 
Hungarian population numbering close to 200,000.15 
Though there has not been an absolute decline in Subcarpathia's 
Hungarian population since the World War I period, there has been a 
rather steep relative decline: from constituting about 30 percent of the 
region's inhabitants in 1910, the Hungarian community had declined to 
about 15 percent by the end of the 1970s.16 The story of this demographic 
diminution has been told in our journal by Professor S. B. Vardy in 
1989,17 and is not at all untypical of the fate of Hungarian minorities in 
the territories detached from Hungary by the Treaty of Trianon. 
It all started by the land reforms that Czech administrations 
imposed on the region following the formation of Czechoslovakia. These 
reforms came at the expense of Hungarian landowners in the region, but 
benefitted predominantly the local non-Magyar population. At the same 
time, educational and other reforms also favoured the Slavic groups as 
funds were made available to them for building schools, while the large 
Magyar ethnic group in the region was served by a single secondary 
school throughout the 1930s. Throughout this time, Vardy remarks, 
"Hungarians... had to suffer mistreatment at the hands of the increasingly 
intolerant... Slovak and Ukrainian nationalists."18 
The Soviet takeover of the region was motivated by strategic 
considerations. The possession of Subcarpathia gave the U.S.S.R. a 
military staging-area within the Carpathian Basin, a convenient entry point 
to Central Europe. Not surprisingly, the aim of early Soviet ethnic policy 
in the region was to reduce the size and influence of "unreliable" minori-
ties, especially the Hungarian one. Thousands of Magyar men (and even 
women) were deported to other parts of the U.S.S.R. and all Hungarian 
schools were closed. Years later, some deportees were allowed to return 
and during the mid-1950s the schools were gradually reopened. The 
region's Ukrainian nationalists as well as the Russians who had been "im-
ported" into the region by the Soviet authorities, tended to make life 
miserable for the local Magyar population. Not so the Rusyns, who de-
tested both the Ukrainian chauvinists and the Russian "carpetbaggers" and 
viewed Hungarians a fellow victims of Soviet rule.19 
The last three decades of Soviet rule in Subcarpathia did not bring 
dramatic events to impact negatively on the Hungarian minority there; 
nevertheless, they still witnessed the erosion of Hungarian culture. 
Children who had attended local Magyar schools were disadvantaged in 
their search for employment, which fact contributed to the decline of 
enrolment in these schools. State support for Hungarian cultural institu-
tions, including the schools with declining enrolment, dwindled; fewer 
and fewer priests could be found to administer to the community's reli-
gious needs, and in general, the size of the Hungarian community's 
intelligentsia declined. Though the late 1980s brought some improve-
ments, especially in the increased contacts Hungarians were allowed with 
their co-nationals in Hungary, the prospects for long-term cultural survival 
did not improve substantially. A number of factors, according to Vardy, 
had saved the Hungarian community of Subcarpathia from total assimila-
tion: "self-isolation, rural existence, lack of geographical mobility, and 
resistance to intermarriage...."20 Although these factors have no doubt 
continued to work after the fall of the U.S.S.R., there can be little doubt 
that the erosion of Hungarian culture has continued since the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and will continue in the foreseeable future. 
The situation of the Hungarian communities of the northern 
Balkans (of Yugoslavia and its successor states), is not substantially 
different. The fate of these Magyar ethnic islands in the lands of the 
South Slavs has been outlined in a number of articles written by Professor 
Andrew Ludanyi, one of which had appeared in our journal.21 Only the 
briefest summary of this study can be given here, but even that will give 
a taste of the difficult lives that Hungarians had lived at times in the 
country that was originally called the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes and later became known as Yugoslavia. 
Although interwar Yugoslavia was perhaps Europe's most multi-
ethnic state, toleration of minorities was rarely practiced there. Instead of 
fostering ethnic equality, what characterized Yugoslavia was the existence 
of a hierarchy of nationalities. The dominant group was the Serbian one. 
Croats and Slovenes constituted citizens of secondary rank, while Hungar-
ians were somewhere near the bottom of the "ethnic ladder" — partly 
because of the fear many South Slavs had of potential Hungarian designs 
for the dismantling of the post-World War I territorial settlement. For 
this reason, according to Ludanyi, the Belgrade authorities adopted a two-
pronged policy to weaken the Magyar minority politically. One prong of 
these policies was outright repression, the other was the more "sophisti-
cated" policy of playing off other minorities against the Hungarians. 
Manifestations of the policy of repression were the exclusion of Hungari-
ans from the country's civil service, the insistence that they use Serbo-
Croatian in their dealings with the authorities, and the banning of contacts 
— even purely cultural contacts — between the Magyars of Yugoslavia 
and citizens of Hungary. There was also economic discrimination against 
them. As had been the case in all the other detached territories, the Serb 
authorities embarked on "land reforms" which in most cases meant the 
distribution of the land of Hungarian landlords among the South Slav 
peasants of the area in question.22 
The situation of the Hungarian minority of Yugoslavia dramati-
cally deteriorated in the wake of the Second World War. Hungary's 
involvement in that struggle on the side of Nazi Germany designated the 
Magyars of Yugoslavia as "collaborators" and set them up, along with the 
so-called Danube Germans, for a vicious campaign of retaliation at the 
end of the war. The number of Hungarian victims has been estimated to 
have been in the tens of thousands (German victims exceeded 100,000). 
Unfortunately for Hungarians, within half-a-decade after the war's conclu-
sion, they once again became regarded as a potentially dangerous political 
minority. What happened was that, as a result of the break between 
Soviet leader Joseph Stalin and Yugoslav leader Josip Broz Tito, relations 
between Yugoslavia and Hungary (a loyal Soviet satellite at the time) 
greatly deteriorated with unpleasant consequences for the former country's 
Hungarian residents. In between these "times of troubles," and after an 
improvement of relations between the Soviet and Yugoslav leaderships, 
the Hungarians of the South Slav state managed to enjoy modest respites 
from persecution as Tito's communist dictatorship, whenever not moti-
vated by the spirit of revenge or the fear of foreign invasion, tried to 
transcend the inter-ethnic strife. Not surprisingly, throughout most of the 
1960s, 1970s and into the 1980s, in certain respects the situation of the 
Hungarian minority in Yugoslavia was better than that either in Czecho-
slovakia or in Romania. The immigration of South Slav (mainly Serb) 
settlers into areas of Hungarian settlement, however, continued at greater 
or slower pace throughout these decades. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia in the early 1990s marked the 
return of "times of troubles" for the Hungarians of the South Slav lands. 
As Professor Ludanyi pointed out in a paper published in 2001, this fact 
was largely lost on the world's media, which focused on the main contes-
tants in the civil strife: the Serbs, Croats, Bosnians and, by the end of the 
decade, the Albanians of Kosovo.24 This latest assault on Yugoslavia's 
Hungarian communities started with the disintegration during the late 
1980s of the "old" communist order and the resurgence of Serbian 
nationalism under the administration of Slobodan Milosevic. One of its 
important events was the cancellation of the autonomy of Vojvodina, 
which was accompanied by the installation of many Serbian nationalists 
(Milosevic supporters) into positions of influence in the region. When the 
war of words among Yugoslavia's major ethnic groups turned into a civil 
war, the gradual ethnic cleansing of Hungarian towns and villages started. 
The process had a lot to do with the military draft. Magyar men of 
military age, both conscripts and reservists, were more reluctant than ever 
to fight for the Serbian cause in Yugoslavia's military. Thousands — 
according to some reports, tens of thousands — of them fled the country, 
most of them to Hungary. Their families became victims of retaliation, 
ranging from threats, beatings and evictions. The homes of evicted 
Hungarians or those abandoned by them were offered to Serbian refugees 
of Yugoslavia's civil wars. In some regions, according to Ludanyi, Serb 
nationalists resorted to even more blatant methods to make sure that 
Hungarians fled their homes so an ample supply of accommodation was 
provided for Serbs expelled or forced to flee from other parts of the 
disintegrating Yugoslav state. As a cumulative impact of this process of 
Hungarian exodus and Serbian influx, the proportion of the Hungarian 
population of Vojvodina decreased during the 1990s from 17 percent to 
just 13 percent of the region's total.25 
The exodus further weakened the Hungarian community both 
demographically and politically. It also had cultural implications. With 
decreased numbers, their quest for the maintenance of Magyar ethnic 
schools was threatened, as diminished numbers gave ample justification 
for the closing of such schools. Ludanyi does not see an end to the 
process of gradual ethnic cleansing, though he suggests that with peace in 
the region it might continue in a "more subdued fashion." "Grim" is the 
word he uses for the future prospects of Vojvodina's Magyar minority.26 
The region where the prospects of the Hungarian minority's cultu-
ral survival should be the best is in Romania, in Transylvania. Here they 
live in large numbers (nearly two million, according to some estimates) 
and often in fairly compact communities. The fate of Hungarians in 
Transylvania was the focus of one of the papers given at the year 2000 
University of Toronto conference. Its author, Dr. Laszlo Dioszegi of 
Hungary's Teleki Laszlo Institute, traced the gradual decline of this 
minority from 1920 to the 1990s and pointed out why, despite the above-
mentioned positive demographic and geographic factors, the prospects for 
the survival of Transylvania's Hungarian communities are not better, or 
not much better, than of those in the other states of central Eastern 
Europe.27 
According to Dr. Dioszegi, what characterizes above all the eighty 
years of history of Romania's Hungarian minority is the absence of 
minority rights, a seemingly hopeless ethnic strife and, at times, even 
atrocities committed against the members of this community. Although 
the size of the minority did not decrease in absolute numbers, its propor-
tion in Romania's general population did. Nevertheless, because a large 
portion of Hungarians live in compact settlements, they still manage to 
achieve solid representation in the Parliament of contemporary Romania. 
In a democratic Romania of the future, the country's Hungarians might 
wield some influence, a fact that distinguishes them from the Hungarians 
of the other states of the region. 
The wielding of some political, economic, and cultural influence 
has always been problematic for Romania's Magyar minority, especially in 
times of authoritarian, or even totalitarian, rule in that country — that is 
to say, throughout much of the eighty years since Trianon. The Hungari-
ans' grievances were numerous from the very beginning: some of them 
had difficulties in obtaining Romanian citizenship; all of them were 
forced to use Romanian in dealing with the country's authorities, in the 
courts, and even in commercial transactions; Hungarian landlords, includ-
ing the denominational churches, lost their lands in a "land reform" that 
rarely benefitted any Hungarian peasants. With the Hungarian denomina-
tional churches having lost much of their income, they could no longer 
fund the schools they used to support. At the same time, the Hungarian 
public schools received less and less funding from the Romanian state — 
a process which, according to Dr. Dioszegi, resulted in the "systematic 
Romanization" of Transylvania's educational system.28 
The Second World War brought much grief to Transylvania's 
residents of all nationalities. The re-attachment of Northern Transylvania 
to Hungary through the so-called Second Vienna Award in August of 
1940 brought hope to a great many Hungarians — and disappointment to 
the about million Rumanians who suddenly found themselves once again 
residents of Hungary. It also brought disappointment to the tens of 
thousands of Magyars who were left in Romanian lands. Nationalistic 
emotions rose as did ethnic hatreds. Before the war was over, the sub-
stantial Jewish community of the re-attached lands became victim of 
Hitler's "final solution," with the authorities of Nazi-occupied Hungary at 
best turning a blind eye, and at worst, cooperating in the enterprise. With 
the end of the war approaching, the wrath of Romanian chauvinists was 
visited upon Transylvania's Hungarians who were denounced as "Nazi 
collaborators," ignoring the fact that until its defection from the Axis 
camp in August of 1944, Romania — or at least, its government under 
Marshall Antonescu — was one of Hitler's staunchest allies. 
The war's end brought the imposition of communist rule in 
Romania. From then on, Hungarians there were under the double yoke of 
communist and Romanian rule. Communist rule was not an unqualified 
curse. As in the case of Tito's Yugoslavia, communist nationality policies 
were moderated by the idea of the brotherhood of socialist peoples. In 
Romania such moderating influences did not last long, not much beyond 
the first half decade of communist rule.29 Despite the communists' lip-
service to socialist internationalism, the imposition of their rule had a 
predominantly negative impact on the status of minorities in Romania. 
Some of the most damaging ones were the nationalization (i.e. expropria-
tion) of the properties of the denominational churches, and the strengthen-
ing of the state's monopoly over education. Both of these trends benefit-
ted the interests of the country's majority (mainly Orthodox) Romanian 
population. The communist era also witnessed the increased mobility of 
labour in Romania. Many Hungarian towns and cities lost their "Magyar 
character" with the mass influx of Romanian workers. Later, the exodus 
of Germans from the Saxon towns of southern Transylvania (predomi-
nantly to West Germany) also helped to tip the demographic balance there 
further in the favour of Romanians, as homes abandoned by these emi-
grants became occupied by Romanian newcomers to the region. 
The situation of the Hungarian minority began deteriorating in the 
1950s. The Revolution in Hungary in 1956 gave a big push to this trend, 
as the Bucharest regime looked upon this event with fear and horror and 
used it as an excuse to abolish many of the collective rights the Hungari-
ans in Transylvania still enjoyed. Those who thought that the situation 
couldn't get much worse were taught a lesson during the regime of 
Nicolae Ceau§escu — especially in the 1980s, during the hight of this 
leader's totalitarian dictatorship. 
The ultimate aim of the Ceau§escu regime was to create an 
ethnically uniform, "Romanian" Romania. To achieve this aim a system-
atic assault was conducted against Transylvania's Hungarian minority. 
Schools where the language of education was exclusively Hungarian, in 
predominantly Magyar districts, were closed. Elsewhere, Hungarian 
teachers were let go from bilingual (Magyar-Romanian) schools and were 
replaced by Romanians. Outstanding Hungarian intellectuals were encour-
aged to emigrate to Hungary, and a few did, to avoid harassment and to 
escape the great poverty that characterized Ceau§escu's Romania. Cultural 
contacts with Hungary were impeded, and the importation of magazines 
and books — foremost of all, children's books — from Hungary was 
banned. Young Hungarian university graduates, especially teachers, were 
given employment only in Romanian-populated communities, while young 
Romanian intellectuals were encouraged to settle in Hungarian towns and 
villages. All this was topped by the policy of eradicating the memory of 
things Hungarian through the physical destruction of many Hungarian 
historic sites. The process was to culminate in the wholesale demolition 
of entire Hungarian villages and their replacement with communities 
featuring "modern" apartment houses and industrial buildings.30 
The most damaging of this totalitarian regime's policies, however, 
was the deliberate scapegoating and demonizing of the Hungarian minori-
ty,31 done in no small measure with the aim of deflecting general dissatis-
faction in Romania with the steep decline in living standards in the 1970s 
and 1980s. The after-effects of this campaign of vilification were defi-
nitely felt in the years after the demise of Ceau§escu's regime, when 
Hungarians were often attacked and beaten by Romanian crowds imbued 
with anti-Magyar hatred. Such feelings often re-surface even today espe-
cially when Hungarians ask for greater cultural rights for their communi-
ties. 
Despite all this, the post-communist era has brought new hopes 
for the Hungarians of Transylvania. The gradual restoration of a pluralis-
tic society, private property, a greater freedom of travel and the resump-
tion of contacts with the cultural institutions and the people of Hungary, 
have brought much relief to the Magyars of Romania. An increasing 
number Romania's leaders realize that their country's chances of establish-
ing closer economic and political links with the rest of Europe — and, 
especially, with the European Union — will depend to no small extent, on 
Romania's adoption of European standards and values in the matter of the 
treatment of minorities. Nevertheless, it is not likely that all the problems 
of the Hungarian minority in the country will be solved any time soon. 
As Dr. Dioszegi feels compelled to point out, the disappearance of xeno-
phobic sentiments in Romania, and a French-German type of national 
reconciliation between Hungary and Romania, are not in the cards.32 
Unfortunately for the Hungarian minorities of such neighbouring states as 
Slovakia and Serbia, the same is undoubtedly true. The long-term 
survival of these ethnic communities is still in the balance. 
In connection with the treatment of Hungarian minorities in the 
Successor States one might ask the question: What would have been the 
situation if circumstances had been different and it had been Hungary that 
possessed large Slav and Romanian minorities throughout the past eight 
decades. The answer is suggested by the treatment of these minorities in 
pre-1918 Hungary and again, to a lesser extent, during 1940-1944. The 
Hungarian record in this respect is certainly not unblemished, though it 
never reached or even approximated the depths that the handling of 
unprotected and disfavoured ethnic groups attained during the Balkan 
wars of the 1990s.33 It has also been pointed out in favour of Hungary 
that that country's regimes, though not necessarily all members of the 
general public, dealt with the members of their Slav and Romanian 
minorities much more generously ever since the end of World War II than 
the regimes, and often the state-forming populations, of the Successor 
States did with their Magyar residents.34 Hungary's Slav and Romanian 
minorities, however, were small in number and did not constitute, and 
could hardly have been accused (by demagogues anxious for the support 
of the chauvinistic masses) of constituting, a threat to the Magyar nation. 
What would have happened if the Hungary of the 1990s had a region, an 
"ancient Magyar land," populated predominantly by Romanians or 
Serbians who mounted a campaign of terror against the local Hungarian 
authorities and the few Hungarian local residents? In other words, could 
"a Kosovo" have happened in such a Hungarian state? We think not and, 
fortunately, we need not speculate about the answer to this "might have 
been" of history: Trianon has "saved" Hungary from such fate. For this 
turn of events, however, Hungarians, and especially Hungarians in the 
Successor States, paid — and continue to pay — a very high price. 
Survival in the Diaspora 
In any discussion of "Hungarian survival" a few words should be said 
about the persistence of Hungarian communities beyond the original 
homeland of the Magyars in the Carpathian Basin. The matter of the 
survival of the ethnic islands of Hungarians in the countries they had 
migrated to in the past dozen decades is rarely an issue of great concern 
to Hungarians in Hungary, but it is one in the Magyar diaspora itself. 
Some members of these isolated Magyar communities feel confident 
about the future — after all, in some parts of the world Hungarian culture 
has been present more-or-less continuously ever since the last decades of 
the nineteenth century. Unfortunately for Hungarians everywhere, this 
attitude reflects a great deal of misplaced confidence. The reality is that, 
although Hungarian culture in the diaspora is not facing the type of 
persecution that it faced in the states bordering on Hungary, the islands of 
Magyar culture are confronting a future which is even more uncertain 
than that of the Hungarian minorities "beyond the borders" of Hungary in 
the Carpathian Basin. 
The surveying of the state of Hungarian diaspora is a onerous task 
which is made even more difficult by the lack of accessible literature on 
the subject.35 For scholars working in North America the "terra incog-
nita" of this field are the Hungarian communities of Australia and Latin 
America. Fortunately, there is some literature that is readily available and 
offers some glimpses of the situation. One of these, a fine monograph by 
historian Egon F. Kunz, reports on the fate and prospects of the Hungar-
ian communities of Australia as they existed in the early 1980s.36 
While Kunz paints a picture that proclaims the vitality of the 
community activities and lives of Hungarian immigrants to Australia in 
the decades after the Second World War, he is quite pessimistic about 
their prospects as an identifiable, organized ethnic group. The pre-World 
War II and immediate post-war arrivals, according to Kunz, "who have 
contributed much to Australian intellectual and artistic life,... [are] 
gradually disappearing from the scene." The later newcomers, the Dis-
placed Persons and the Fifty-sixers, "are still around," but Kunz predicts 
that without the arrival of a new wave of Magyar immigrants, "the 
continuation of organized ethnic life on its present scale cannot... survive, 
much after 1990...;" only "a loose network based on shared values,... and 
a sense of belonging will prevail."37 
The Hungarian immigrant experience has had a similarly vibrant 
past in that other great overseas country, Brazil. There, Hungarian eco-
nomic migrants of the early decades of the 20th century established 
colonies in such places as Matto Grosso, Arpadfalva, Londrina, Jacutinga, 
Ceboleiro, Arapongas, Rolandia, Apucarana, Marialva and Maringa. Later 
newcomers settled in the cities, in Rio de Janeiro and especially in Sao 
Paulo. In these metropolitan centres, but mainly in the latter, a dynamic 
Hungarian ethnic life existed in the 1950s, 1960s, 1970s, and even the 
early 1980s. What happened thereafter we have to gather from fragmen-
tary evidence. From a study published in 1990 we learn that, for example, 
Sao Paulo's Hungarian "Free University" was still functioning, mainly as 
a forum for guest-lectures, but only barely.38 Other sources suggest that a 
similar fate awaits most of Brazil's other Hungarian institutions. In fact, 
a keen observer of Brazilian-Hungarian life has summed up the current 
situation in this way: "...the colony's social and cultural activities... have 
declined greatly in recent years. This is the result of the ever dwindling 
numbers of the immigrant generation — due to out-migration, ageing and 
death — and the ever increasing assimilation of the members of the 
subsequent generations."39 
The largest and most important Hungarian community overseas is 
undoubtedly that of the United States of America. The history of this 
ethnic group is better known and better documented than any of the 
Hungarian expatriate immigrant communities discussed above. Last year 
alone, two massive monographs appeared on the subject. One of them 
was Jul ianna Puskas's Ties that Bind, Ties that Divide: One Hundred 
Years of Hungarian Experience in the United States,40 and the other Bela 
Vardy 's Magyarok az Ujvilagban: Az eszak-amerikai magyar sag rend-
hagyd tortenete [Hungarians in the New World: the irregular history of 
the Hungarians of North America].41 
Both of these books are massive and extensively documented 
surveys of the history of the Hungarian community of the United States 
— the title of Vardy's book notwithstanding. Yet they are quite different 
works. Puskas, the Hungarian scholar, published a book in English, 
intended mainly for North American scholarly audiences; while Vardy, 
the Hungarian-American scholar, wrote a book in Hungarian, mainly for 
the general reading public of Hungary.42 
Neither of these monographs delves deep into the subject of the 
prospects of the Hungarian ethnic group in the USA. Puskas emphasizes 
instead the great changes that America's Hungarian communities had 
undergone in the past and are undergoing even in our days. She points 
out that we can hardly talk of an ethnic identity among the Hungarian 
immigrants to the USA before World War I. Because the "emigration" of 
these people was a "temporary emergency solution to a problem at home," 
they did not think of themselves as members of an American ethnic 
community — more likely, they considered themselves sojourners. Only 
the post-war period saw the transformation of America's transient Hungar-
ian communities into ethnic ones. At first, this Hungarian-American 
immigrant culture flourished, but then came times of accelerated assimila-
tion and inter-generational conflicts, all against the backdrop of the Great 
Depression and World War II. The coming of new waves of Hungarian 
immigrants (with very different social and ideological backgrounds) after 
the war, according to Puskas, did little to retard the start of the "vanishing 
of the Hungarian identity in the United States."43 
It is not only "Hungarian identity" that has been vanishing in the 
USA. Hungarians, in particular first generation immigrant Hungarians, 
are also disappearing from the statistics. The American census has the 
tradition of listing the 20 most substantial ethnic groups for each of the 
country's states. While in the 1970 and 1980 censuses Hungarians occu-
pied respectable places in many of these lists, by the time of the 1990 
census, in most of them they had moved closer to the bottom, or had 
disappeared altogether. Only in Florida did they hold their place, suggest-
ing that for a lot of Magyar-American retirees that state is the favourite 
choice of residence. This disappearance from the census data, of course, 
is caused not only by the decreasing size of the Hungarian-American 
community, but by the growth of other American ethnic groups. Never-
theless, it is clear that in the 21st century, Hungarians will probably 
constitute a small, almost inconsequential ethnic group within that great 
melting pot that is the United States.44 
The situation is not much different in Canada; however, in that 
country the "vanishing of the Hungarian identity" (to use the words of 
Julianna Puskas), did not start during the Great Depression or the Second 
World War. More precisely, the decline in community activity and 
solidarity that became evident then, was more than compensated for by 
the resurgence in the group's vitality after the war. The explanation for 
this difference in the evolution of the Magyar communities of the US and 
Canada lies in the different histories of the two groups. The demographic 
foundations of the former had been laid before the First World War with 
the arrival of hundreds of thousands of Magyar newcomers. In Canada 
the demographic base of that country's Magyar ethnic group was only 
started before 1914, and was completed only in the interwar and post-
World War II periods. While the "golden age" of the Hungarian-American 
community was the 1920s,45 that of the Hungarian-Canadian ethnic group 
it was the decades following the arrival of the Displaced Persons and of 
the Fifty-sixers, i.e. the 1960s, the '70s and the '80s.46 
By the 1980s, however, the signs of the "vanishing Hungarian 
identity" were evident in Canada too, especially in those parts of the 
country where the post-war newcomers did not replenish the Hungarian 
colonies that had been established during the first decades of the 20lh 
century. In Saskatchewan, which only a century ago was known by many 
Magyars and Canada's "Little Hungary" and where even during the 
interwar years many Hungarian farming colonies thrived, only faint 
echoes of Magyar community life remain: a few abandoned churches and 
a few of the early colonists' children still speaking Magyar — in local 
nursing homes. Census statistics confirm this situation. Although record-
ing a large number of people (ca. 15,000) with multiple ancestry that 
includes Hungarian, the 1991 census revealed that those with "Hungarian 
only" origin numbered only 7,920 in the province. The same census also 
disclosed that fewer than 350 people in the province used Hungarian as 
the "only" language in the home. Evidently, by 1991 Saskatchewan's 
Hungarian community had been made up predominantly of third or fourth 
generation Hungarian-Canadians. Despite the valiant efforts their first and 
second-generation predecessors had expended in the cause of culture 
maintenance, the community's cultural identity had eroded.47 
Elsewhere in Canada, the 1991 census painted a picture that 
ranges between that which characterized the still fairly unassimilated 
Hungarian community of Ontario and the largely assimilated one of 
Saskatchewan. But decline in the size of the first-generation Hungarian 
population, and especially in the numbers of those who use Hungarian as 
the only language of the home, is significant. All this is not surprising, 
since the last time Hungarians entered Canada in large numbers had been 
almost half a century ago. The Hungarian-Canadian group as an immi-
grant community, with its attachment to most facets of the ancestral 
culture, is in decline in many areas of Canada. Two of its greatest 
achievements had been the establishment in the late 1970s of the Chair of 
Hungarian Studies at the University of Toronto and the creation of the 
Toronto Hungarian Cultural Center — a massive building with a large 
auditorium, as well as a dining hall, classrooms, exercise rooms, etc. It 
speaks volumes that, at the time of the writing of these lines, the future of 
both of these institutions is in grave doubt. 
The likely future of Canada's Hungarian community has been 
summed up in the following paragraph: 
For more than a century now, the members of various waves of 
Hungarian newcomers have been establishing in Canada their... 
clubs, churches, press organs, and other community institu-
tions.... Time and again, new waves of immigrants took over 
the maintenance of these, or established new ones. As a result, 
Hungarian-Canadian culture and community life flourished or, 
at least, survived. For four decades now, no new wave of 
Magyars has come to Canada. The implications of this circum-
stance are clear. Unless another one will arrive within the 
foreseeable future, the prospects for the Hungarian-Canadian 
community's continued existence — with its distinct cultural 
characteristics and institutions — will be bleak.48 
No one desires the coming of still more trauma to East Central 
Europe that would drive thousands of Hungarians from their ancestral 
communities in the Carpathian Basin. Without the coming of a new wave 
of Magyar immigrants, however, the Hungarian identity in Canada will 
continue to whither away, just as it had started to do so in the United 
States soon after the mass immigration of Magyars to that country was 
terminated by the so-called Quota Laws of the 1920s. The process of 
complete identity loss may take a long time, and may never reach its 
ultimate conclusion.49 But the dynamic community life that characterized 
some centres of Canada from time to time in the 20lh century, will no 
doubt vanish, as it has vanished in most great cities (and smaller settle-
ments) of the United States, Brazil, Australia and elsewhere. 
Survival in Hungary: Conclusions 
In most discussions of the survival of the Hungarian nation prominent 
place is given to the conquests and foreign occupations Hungary endured 
throughout the centuries. Indeed, such events have often had disastrous 
consequences for the country and its inhabitants. It should not be forgot-
ten, however, that calamities of similar magnitude had been inflicted on 
the Magyar nation by Hungarians themselves — in internecine struggles, 
civil wars and through their tradition of becoming politically divided 
when facing external danger. The introduction to this volume — and, 
especially, several of the papers printed therein — cited many examples 
of Hungarians fighting Hungarians, or elements of the Magyar nation 
siding with one of Hungary's assailants in order to fight their countrymen 
who had decided to support another. No doubt, volumes could be written 
about internal strifes and civil wars in Hungary, which resulted in loss of 
life, material destruction, and, ultimately, in the weakening of the Magyar 
nation. 
Discord and internal conflict were not the only self-destructive 
behaviours that at times characterized Hungarians throughout the centu-
ries. Less perceivable but also damaging in the long run have been their 
attempts at the limiting of natural population growth. In times of great 
economic hardship, recurrent warfare, or oppressive foreign rule, such 
practices might seem justifiable to today's observers. Unfortunately, the 
limiting of the size of families was sometimes practiced — and is still 
sanctioned by some even today — in times of relative peace and prosper-
ity. Indeed, slow demographic growth constitutes one of the greatest 
threats to the long-term survival of the Magyar nation.50 
As has been suggested in this volume's introduction, Hungary 
should be able to counteract this threat to its existence through judicious 
immigration policies, just as the loss of lives as a result of wars, epidem-
ics and natural disasters was often compensated for in the past by the 
influx of newcomers into the country. Hungary could even encourage, 
even more than it had done in recent years, the immigration of Hungari-
ans from those regions of neighbouring states where the prospects of the 
long-term survival of Hungarian culture have become next to non-exis-
tent. True, such immigration policies might do damage to these countries, 
as they might reduce their chances of remaining multi-ethnic nations and 
becoming the kind of members of the international community in which 
diversity is tolerated and the contributions of all ethnic groups are valued. 
However, since the prospects of most of Hungary's neighbours becoming 
such progressive nations within the foreseeable future are — unfortunately 
— slim, Hungary's lawmakers might well put aside any reservations about 
the negative implications of their immigration policies for these countries. 
Although demographic stagnation can be counteracted to some 
extent by judicious immigration policies, it may be more difficult to ward 
off the long-term threat of the ultimate assimilation of Hungarians in a 
prosperous European Union.51 Staying outside the EU seems hardly an 
option, as it would deprive Hungary's citizens of the prospects of a better 
life. Nevertheless, in such a union there will be labour and other mobility 
resulting in the mixing of populations on an unprecedented scale, and 
there will be increased pressure on the country's young to master one or 
more of Europe's major languages. When everyone who wants to have 
ready access to Europe's knowledge-based labour market will learn 
English and German, what will be the incentive to mastering Magyar? 
There can be little doubt that in Hungary's villages Hungarian will be 
spoken at the end of the 21st century, but will the country's large urban 
centres be able to resist the pressures of economic and cultural interna-
tionalization? 
To put the conundrum in a different way: Hungary can enter the 
circle of advanced, progressive nations only if her youth acquire knowl-
edge of the Europe's leading languages. However, if everyone who aspires 
to be economically and socially mobile will know English for example, 
the need to learn more than rudimentary Hungarian will disappear. We 
need not be overly pessimistic however. A small segment of Hungary's 
population had faced this challenge (i.e. the need to learn German, 
French, etc.) in the past, The Hungarian aristocracy of the 18th and 19th 
centuries was confronted by such pressures. Most of its members re-
sponded to it by becoming multi-lingual, by mastering two, three or even 
more of Europe's leading languages, without necessarily abandoning 
Magyar. We would like to believe that this is the future that awaits 
Hungary's economic and cultural elite and not the loss of the ancestral 
tongue and cultural assimilation in an all-European culture. 
In contemplating the future, Hungarians must remember the 
resilience that their culture has demonstrated in the past. Time and again, 
the nation suffered great losses, yet the Magyar identity survived. Indeed, 
there is evidence to suggest that the "Magyar bloodline" did not persist 
through the ages. There may be few if any direct descendants of Arpad's 
people living in Hungary today. The population of the seven Hungarian 
tribes that entered the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century 
(already multi-ethnic in composition) has been decimated by the invasions 
and other calamities of the past eleven centuries. Their "blood" has 
intermixed time and again with that of non-Magyar newcomers to 
Hungary. Recent examinations of the genetic characteristics of Hungary's 
population attest to this. The results of scientific tests show that Hungari-
ans, as far as their genetic makeup is concerned, are indistinguishable 
from their neighbours.52 Accordingly, if "Magyar blood" is a prerequisite 
for belonging to the Magyar nation, it can only be putative blood that 
fulfils this requirement. Pure "Magyar blood" or pure "Magyar ancestry" 
for the most part exists only in the imagination of romantic nationalists — 
and in families from whose family trees non-Hungarians had been ex-
punged by the over-zealous nationalists of later generations. Fortunately, 
most Hungarians — and, especially, most of Hungary's leading intellectu-
als — subscribe to "civic" rather than "ethnic" nationalism." For them, 
belonging to the Hungarian nation is not a function of lineage but a 
manifestation of more or less successful efforts at the acquisition of a 
particular culture. To paraphrase that great Hungarian, Zoltan Kodaly, the 
Hungarian culture is not a birthright for Hungarians, but the result of 
strenuous efforts at culture acquisition.54 
Although the blood-line of Arpad's Magyars has disappeared — 
or, more precisely, has become submerged through centuries of demo-
graphic intermingling — Hungarian culture has persisted. It persisted 
precisely because of the conscious or unconscious efforts of millions of 
people throughout the centuries to acquire the Magyar tongue and 
Hungarian customs and traditions. Unquestionably, Hungarian speech and 
culture have changed in the process, but not enough to erode their 
uniqueness. How this culture — and the people who possessed it, as well 
as the state they had established — fared and survived during the past 
thousand years, was the main theme of the studies in this volume. What 
the prospects for the survival of the Hungarian culture and identity are — 
in Hungary, in the Hungarian homelands that had been detached from 
Hungary, and in the countries where Hungarians had settled in large 
numbers over the past dozen-or-so decades — was discussed in this 
volume's introduction and postscript. 
The historiographical debate on the subject of Hungarian survival 
will no doubt continue in the decades to come, as will the discussion of 
the future prospects of Hungarian culture and identity. Opinions will no 
doubt vary and they will be expressed predominantly by the people most 
concerned, the Hungarians. The author of these lines hopes that this 
discussion will persist for a long time not only in Hungary but wherever 
Hungarians live in large numbers today, for the continuation of the debate 
will be the best indication of the survival of Hungarian culture and 
identity in these places. 
NOTES 
The quotation from Zoltan Kodaly at the beginning of this essay continues thus: 
"[Hungary] has not communicated [its message] especially in the realm of cul-
ture: [it could not do so] because throughout the centuries [it] was forced to keep 
arming in defence of its mere existence. And as we know, the mission of peoples 
can gain lasting expression only through the works of peace." Cited in Laszlo 
Eosze, Kodaly Zoltan elete es munkassaga [Zoltan Kodaly's life and work] 
(Budapest: Zenemukiado, 1956), p. 153. My translation. Because Kodaly's proze 
almost defies accurate translation, I cite the whole statement in the original 
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